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PREFACE 
In February 1995 the European Parliament Secretariat set up a working party to 
monitor all the preparatory stages of the Intergovernmental Conference ( 1996 IGC 
Task Force) . 
The Task Force reports directly to the Secretary-General and, ultimately, to the 
President of Parliament, Mr Klaus Hansch; it is administrative in nature and its 
role is basically to coordinate the work of the various departments within 
Parliament most directly concerned with the Intergovernmental Conference; its 
other tasks are to locate, gather, analyse and summarize all IGC-related 
proposals and studies, not just from the various Community institutions and the 
official bodies of the Member States but also, and most importantly; from civil 
society. 
So far the Task Force has concentrated its efforts on drawing up a whole series 
of documents on the Intergovernmental Conference. These include a comprehensive 
memo on the positions of the various Member States and another on the state of 
considerations in the national parliaments; the production of over 30 briefing 
papers on the major topics to be dealt with at the Conference; the drawing up 
of an IGC-related bibliography by source and by topic; the preparation of a 
selection of bibliographical references to periodicals and a compilation of 
summaries on the same topic, and the coordination of a single periodical 
containing press reports relating to the IGC (Info CIG/96). All these documents 
are regularly updated, and the Task Force has also commissioned and supervised 
a series of studies produced outside Parliament (simplification of the Treaties, 
European citizenship, position of the national political parties, division of 
powers and responsibilities between the Union and the Member States, etc). It 
has ensured that this constant flow of valuable information is widely 
distributed, both within the Union institutions and within the Member States and 
public organizations and associations. In particular a constant supply of 
information on computer has been provided since mid-1995 by means of the OVIDE 
system and will soon be available on the Internet. 
To provide more systematic information on the IGC, the Task Force has decided 
to compile a White Paper on the Intergovernmental Conference in three volumes. 
The first volume contains the most important official positions so far adopted 
by the institutions and bodies of the European Union; the second volume brings 
together and summarizes the Member States' positions and viewpo1nts; and the 
third volume is a collection of the briefings prepared by the Secretariat's Task 
Force on the main topics that will be on the agenda for the Intergovernmental 
Conference. 
There is no doubt that the 1996 IGC will be a defining moment for the future of 
European integration. This review cannot and must not take place without the 
active involvement of European citizens, who will be the main players in shaping 
the destiny of the Community. 
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The European Parliament is fully aware of this, and its position as the directly 
elected representative of the people of Europe gives it the confidence to assume 
a central role in encouraging ever wider participation and greater understanding 
of the negotiating process and of the very real challenges facing the 
Intergovernmental Conference. 
In Parliament's opinion, the Community must emerge from the review of the Treaty 
as a more democratic, fairer, more interdependent, more prosperous and more 
equal Europe. If the White Paper helps to bring about a better understanding of 
the Community, and even contributes only minimally to the achievement of these 
objectives, the work which has gone into preparing it will not have been in 
vain. 
Enrico VINCI 
The Secretary-General 
Luxembourg, January 1996 
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I. INTRODUCTION1 
The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) which is to be convened in 1996 pursuant 
to the Treaty on European Union (Article N(2)) will have as its raison d'etre 
the first revision of that Treaty, and will, to that end, examine those of its 
prov1s1ons for which revision is provided for. Such revision must not, however, 
entail any questioning of the existing acguis communautaire (Article M). 
Conference agenda 
The agenda for this conference, whose purpose is to revise the Treaty of 
Maastricht, has, in general terms, already been set in a number of documents and 
other sources of varying legal and political nature; there is, of course, still 
room for including further aspects should all the Member States so agree. 
1. The Treaty on European Union 
* Articles A and B - general principles for rev1s1on (especially the final 
paragraph of Article B), including the 'pillar'-based structure of the Union; 
* Article N(2), which covers a wide range of subjects; 
* Article 189b(8) (revision of the codecision procedure concerning Parliament 
and the Council); 
* Articles J. 4 and J. 10 (revision of the provisions governing the common 
foreign and security policy (CFSP)); 
* Declaration 1 (on civil protection, energy and tour1sm); 
* Declaration 16 (on the hierarchy of Community acts). 
2. Institutional consequences of the fourth enlargement 
2. 1 . The Brussels European Council of 1 0 and 11 December 1993 
The conclusions of the Belgian Council presidency state that the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference will, apart from examining the legislative role of 
Parliament and the other matters provided for in the Treaty on European Union, 
review the size of the Commission and the weighting of the Member States' votes 
in Council. The conference will also consider what measures may be required to 
facilitate the work of the institutions and ensure their smooth running. 
2. 2. The European Council of 29 March 1994 and the Ioannina Compromise 
With the accession of Austria and Sweden (with four votes each in Council) and 
Finland (with three), the total number of votes in Council is now 87, and the 
number of votes required for a qualified majority is 62 (there is a further 
requirement that at least 10 Member States should have voted in favour where the 
This note is an updated version of the notes of 20 December 1994 (cf. 
IV/WIP/11/006), 12 April 1995 (cf. JF/bo/55/95), 31 July 1995 (cf. 
JF/bo/152/95) and 8 December 1995 (cf. JF/bo/178/95). This note will 
also be updated regularly. 
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Council is not in agreement with the Commission proposal). The Ioannina 
Compromise, in its present form following the fourth enlargement, lays down that 
where members of the Council who together represent 23 to 25 votes state their 
intention of opposing adoption of a Council decision by a qualified majority, 
the Council will do all in its power to obtain a satisfactory solution; this is 
to be adopted with at least 65 votes in favour, within a reasonable period of 
time and without prejudice to the mandatory time limits specified by the 
Treaties and derived law. It should be added, however, as a point of interest 
in the present context, that the Ioannina Compromise also entails an agreement 
by the Member States that the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference will consider 
the reform of the institutions and re-examine the minimum number of votes 
required for a qualified majority. 
2.3. The Corfu European Council of 24 and 25 June 1994 
The European Council confirmed the Ioannina Compromise and agreed to the setting 
up of a 'reflection group' to prepare the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, to 
consist of representatives of the foreign ministers of the Member St.ates and the 
President of the Commission. It will be chaired by the representative of the 
Spanish Government, and will begin work in June 1995. Two t-iembers of the 
European Parliament will take part in its activities. ThE~ grot:p will also 
exchange views with the other institutions and bodies of the Union. It will have 
th~ tasks of: examining the provisions of the Treaty on Europea0 Union which 
needed to be revised and proposing possible changes; and prepari.'19 options on 
the institutional questions referred to in the conclllsir"ls 'Jt '.he Brussels 
European Council and the Ioannina Compromise (number of vob>s, qualified 
majority ceiling, size of the Commission, and other measures to ensure the 
smooth running of the institutions in the context of enlarg~ment). 
2. 4. The Cannes European Council of 26 and 27 June 1995 
As part of preparations for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, the Council 
has issued even more detailed instructions on the work of the Reflection Group. 
After confirming the conclusions reached in Corfu and the need for the 
Reflection Group to elaborate options on the institutional questlons set out in 
the Brussels conclusions and the Ioannina agreement, the European Council, in 
view of the lessons which may be learnt more than a year and a half after the 
entry into force of the Treaty on European Union and of the challenges and risks 
linked in particular to the prospect of a further enlargement, considers that 
thoughts should now focus on a number of priorities to enable the Union to 
respond to its citizens' expectations. These priorities are: to analyse the 
principles, objectives and instruments of the Union, with the new challenges 
facing Europe; to strengthen the common foreign and security policy so that it 
can cope with new international challenges; to provide a better response to 
modern demands as regards internal security, and the fields of justice and home 
affairs more generally; to make the institutions more efficient, democratic and 
open so that they are able to adjust to the demands of an enlarged Union; to 
strengthen public support for the process of European integration by meeting the 
need for a form of democracy which is closer to the citizens of Europe, who are 
concerned at employment and environmental questions; and to put the principle 
of subsidiarity into practice more effectively. 
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Finally, the Group should bear in mind the advantages of seeking 'improvements' 
in the working of the institutions that do not require any amendment to the 
Treaties and can thus enter into force without delay'. 
2. 5. The Madrid European Council ( 15 and 16 December 1995) 
The Madrid European Council of 15 and 16 December 1995 adopted the decision to 
begin the IGC on 29 March 1996, with the aim of creating the necessary political 
and institutional conditions for adapting the Union to present and future needs, 
especially with a view to the forthcoming enlargement. 
After welcoming, with great interest, the report of the Reflection Group chaired 
by Mr Westendorp, the European Council decided that the IGC should examine those 
provisions of the TEU whose revision is explicitly provided for by the treaty 
text itself, together with the subjects which it was agreed should be dealt with 
at the IGC in the conclusions of the Brussels and Corfu European Councils and 
in the declarations adopted in the context of interinstitutional agreements. The 
European Council also reaffirmed the guidelines decided on at the Cannes summit. 
In general terms, the role of the IGC should be to examine means of improving 
the Treaties so as to adapt the Union to present realities and future 
requirements, bearing in mind the outcome of the work of the Reflection Group. 
The European Council also agreed that the formal revision procedure referred to 
in Article N of the TEU should be carried out as rapidly as possible, to enable 
the IGC to be formally opened on 29 March 1996 in Turin. 
The European Council decided that the IGC would take the form of regular 
meetings of the foreign ministers, in principle once a month; the foreign 
ministers would be responsible for the work prepared by a group consisting of 
representatives of the foreign ministers (one per Member State) and the 
President of the Commission. The secretarial side of the conference would be the 
responsibility of the Council Secretariat. The Council also decided that the 
European Parliament will be closely associated with the work of the conference, 
in such a way that it can both be informed regularly and in detail of the 
development of the discussions and express its viewpoint, where it considers it 
useful, on all the subjects discussed. The Foreign Hinisters will decide the 
exact way in which Parliament is to be associated, on the basis of respect for 
the provisions concerning the revision of the Treaties. 
Finally, the Madrid European Council decided that the representatives of the 
countries of eastern and central Europe with which 'Europe agreements' have been 
signed, as well as those of Malta and Cyprus, will be informed regularly of the 
development of the discussions and will be able to express their views at their 
meetings (generally every two months) with the Union Presidency. The EEA 
countries and Switzerland will also be kept informed. 
2.6. The Turin European Council (29 March 1996) 
The Turin European Council of 29 March 1996 established the mandate for the IGC 
and laid down its programme. 
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In their final conclusions, the Heads of State and Government considered that 
the Conference should, in the light of the Reflection Group's report and without 
prejudice to any other matters which might be raised at it, concentrate 
primarily on the subjects which are outlined below. 
1. A Union closer to the citizens 
The European Council calls on the IGC to base its work on the fact that the 
citizens are at the core of the construction of Europe: the Union has an 
absolute duty to provide concrete responses to their needs and concerns. Since 
the Member States have undertaken to respect human rights, democratic values, 
equality and non-discrimination, and as the Union is a community based on shared 
values, the IGC must study whether and to what extent it is possible to 
strengthen those fundamental rights and improve their protection. 
The citizens of Europe are increasingly concerned with the sphere of justice and 
home affairs. In an area like the EU with free movement of persons, goods, 
capital and services, the exercise of those rights in accordance with the Treaty 
must go hand in hand with suitable protection. To this end, the Union's external 
frontiers must be strengthened. In this connection, the Conference is asked to 
propose suitable measures on, in particular, the above aspects: 
improved methods and instruments in the context of clearly-defined 
objectives; 
improved protection for the Union's citizens, especially with respect to 
international crime, terrorism and drug trafficking; 
development of coherent and effective policies on asylum, immigration and 
visas; 
resolution of the divergences concerning judicial and parliamentary control 
of EU decisions in the field of justice and home affairs. 
For the Union and its Member States, the fight against unemployment must be the 
priority task. The need to create employment means hat national economic and 
structural policies are a matter of common concern. If there are to be better 
job opportunities there must be an economic policy oriented towards stability, 
improved competitiveness and steady growth, above all via the completion of the 
single market and the application of the EMU convergence criteria. However, 
extra coordinated action is also required. 
Accordingly, with a view to attaining the objective of high employment while 
guaranteeing social protection, the IGC must examine how the Union could provide 
the bases for improved cooperation and coordination aimed at reinforcing 
national policies. It must also study the possibility and means of enhancing, 
by means of the Treaty, the effectiveness and coordination of the efforts of 
both governments and the social partners. 
The IGC could also examine the question of the compatibility of competition with 
the principles of universal access to essential services in the public interest. 
The IGC should also consider the status of the most remote regions, the overseas 
territories and the island regions of the Union. A major public concern is that 
the environment must be preserved in an acceptable state. The improvement of 
environmental standards is a major challenge for the Union. The IGC will have 
to examine means of increasing the effectiveness and coherence of environmental 
protection at Union level from the viewpoint of sustainable development. It must 
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also ensure the most suitable application and realization of the principle of 
subsidiarity, introduce greater transparency and openness into the work of the 
Union and consider the possibility of simplifying and consolidating the 
Treaties. 
2. The Institutions in a more democratic and effective Union 
With a view to improving the EU institutions and preparing for the forthcoming 
enlargement, the heads of state and government stress the need to seek the most 
suitable means of ensuring that those institutions operate on the basis of 
greater effectiveness, coherence and legitimacy. The Conference will have to 
study: 
the most effective means of simplifying the legislative procedures and making 
them clearer and more transparent; 
the possibility of extending the scope of codecision on genuinely legislative 
matters; 
the role of Parliament, together with its legislative powers and membership 
and the question of the uniform electoral procedure. 
The IGC must also examine how and to what extent the national parliaments could 
contribute, collectively or otherwise, to the work of the Union. The workings 
of the Council should be improved, and the IGC should consider the scope of 
majority voting, the weighting arrangements and the thresholds for decisions by 
qualified majority voting. The Conference will also have to study means of 
enabling the Commission to carry out its work more effectively, examining its 
membership and representativeness. It must also consider whether, and in what 
way, it is desirable to enhance the role and functioning of the Court of Justice 
and the Court of Auditors. It should also look at means of improving the clarity 
and quality of legislation and of stepping up the campaign against fraud. The 
heads of state and government call on the Conference to study the possibility 
and means of introducing rules, either general or concerning specific areas, 
which would enable a number of Member States to develop closer forms of 
cooperation, open to all and compatible with the Union's objectives, while at 
the same time preserving the acguis communautaire, avoiding discrimination and 
distortions of competit1on and respecting the single institutional framework. 
3. Reinforcement of the Union's capacity for external action 
The international situation is increasing the Union's responsibilities and the 
need to strengthen its identity on the world stage with a view to working for 
peace and stability. The Union's political weight should be commensurate with 
its economic power. The coherence and unity of all aspects of its external 
action must be developed, on the basis of full respect for the role of the 
Commission. The EU has set itself the objective of creating a common foreign and 
security policy, possibly including a framework for the common defence policy 
which could, when the time is right, result in a common defence. 
To achieve this objective, greater capacities will be required for: 
determining the principles and the scope of the common external policy; 
defining the actions required to pursue the Union's interests in those fields 
and in accordance with those principles; 
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creating procedures and structures contributing to more effective and timely 
decision-making in a spirit of mutual loyalty and solidarity; 
agreeing on appropriate budget arrangements. 
In the light of these objectives, the Commission should also consider whether 
and how the creation of a new specific function could enable the Union to 
express itself in a more visible and coherent fashion and with a more palpable 
face and voice. The IGC will, ln addition, have to examine how to strengthen the 
affirmation of a European security and defence identity. To this end, it should 
undertake a clear redefinition of the relationship with the WEU, as an integral 
element in the development of the EU, especially in view of the 1998 deadline 
set by the Treaty of 2russels. This objective should also include the boosting 
of the Union's available operational capacity, with special reference to the 
areas covered by the WEU's 'Petersberg missions' and in accordance with the UN 
Charter. The Conference could also consider whether and to what extent the 
Treaty should encourage closer cooperation on weapons. 
Finally, the European Council calls on the Conference, whose work it hopes will 
be concluded within approximately one year, to adopt a coherent global vision 
throughout: its goal is to satisfy the needs and expectations of the citizens 
of Europe, while at the same time advancing with the construction of Europe and 
preparing the Union for enlargement. 
* * * 
The heads of state and government also confirmed the agreement reached on 26 
March 1996 by the Foreign Ministers concerning the association of the European 
Parliament with the work of the IGC. 
Association of the European Parliament with the work of the Intergovernmental 
Conference 
In view of the experience of the Reflection Group and in line with the 
conclusions of the Madrid European Council ( 15 and 16 December 1995), the 
European Parliament will be closely associated with the work of the Conference, 
in such a way as to enable it to be informed in a regular and detailed fashion 
with regard to the state of the debates and to defend its viewpoint on all the 
subjects debated whenever it considers it desirable. 
To ensure that this association operates in the context of respect for the 
provisions governing the revision of the Treaties, the Foreign Ministers have 
agreed on the following arrangements: 
1. The meetings of the European Council at which the IGC is discussed will 
begin, as is customary, with an exchange of views with the President of the 
European Parliament on the subjects on the agenda. 
2. At the beginning of the ministerial sessions for the IGC there will also be 
an exchange of views with the President of the European Parliament on the 
subjects on the agenda, in the presence of representatives of Parliament. 
3. Once a month and where the representatives of the Ministers consider it 
desirable by joint agreement, the Presidency will hold a working meeting on 
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the occasion of the meetings of the representatives of the Ministries, with 
a view to encouraging a detailed exchange of views with the representatives 
of Parliament. 
4. The Presidency will inform Parliament regularly, orally or in writing. He 
will also, as agreed, inform the national parliaments through the Conference 
of European Community Affairs Committees (COSAC). 
5. The association of the European Parliament will commence with the invitation 
of its President and two representatives to the opening of the IGC in Turin 
on 29 March 1996. 
6. The Presidency will ensure the smooth functioning of the IGC and Parliament's 
association with it, respecting the intergovernmental character of the 
Conference, the respective competences of the parties and the need for close 
cooperation based on mutual trust between the institutions. 
3. Interinstitutional agreements 
3.1. The interinstitutional declaration on democracy, transparency and 
subsidiarity of 25 October 1993 
The agreements on these subjects reached at the interinstitutional conference 
held in Luxembourg on 25 October 1993 are aimed at giving concrete expression 
to the Treaty on European Union and reinforcing the Union's democratic and 
transparent character. The declaration states that these agreements may be 
extended or adapted by joint agreement on the initiative of any one of the three 
institutions; this confers a specific dynam~c on it in the context of the IGC 
and the revision of the Union Treaty. 
3. 2. The interinstitutional agreement of 29 October 1993 on budgetary 
discipline and reform of the budget procedure 
The object of this agreement is to implement budgetary discipline and introduce 
improvements to the annual budget procedure ann to interinstitutional 
cooperation in the area of the budget. It sets out the framework for the 
financial perspectives for 1993-1999; in addition, Article 24 of the agreement 
states that the Union institutions are to confirm or modify its proposals at the 
Intergovernmental Conference. Parliament obviously favours the upward revision 
of the perspectives, and also wishes to reopen the debate on the legal basis and 
the maximum amounts. 
3. 3. The 'modus vi vendi ' concerning commi to logy reached by the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 20 December 1994 
The third section of this agreement contains a statement by the three 
institutions to the effect that the review of the Treaties scheduled for 1996 
should include, on the request of Parliament, the Commission and several Member 
States, consideration of the implementing measures concerning acts adopted under 
the procedure described in Article 189b of the EC Treaty where such measures are 
the responsibility of the Commission. It is also agreed that the 'Reflect~on 
Group' will be invited to consider this problem, which has obvious institutional 
implications. 
- 16 - PE 165.963 
Wh1te Paper on the 1996 IGC (Volume II) 
In this legal and political context, the great debate and the anticipatory 
explorations of the Member States in the run-up to the 1996 IGC began more than 
one year ago. Each Member State began, more or less explicitly, to define its 
positions, although, as was to be expected, their official positions were first 
presented only at the start of the conference. At all events, one may already 
deduce, from the statements and opinions supplied by some of their highest 
authorities and from the first documents produced, the initial elements of the 
strategy which the Member States are likely to maintain over the IGC. The 
present report will now set out, in an exhaustive and detailed fashion, the 
initial approach of each of the Member States. 
II. POSITIONS OF THE VARIOUS MEMBER STATES 
Government policy paper addressed to the Belgian Parliament on the 1996 IGC 
On 28 July 1995 the Belgian Government adopted a note on its policy for the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference as a subject for consultation with the Belgian 
Communities and Regions at the Interministerial Conference on Foreign Policy in 
September. The note was finally approved by the Council of Ministers on 
13 October 1995 and submitted for discussion to the Belgian Chamber and Senate, 
with a view to enabling the government to decide on the position it would adopt 
at the Intergovernmental Conference. The points of view expressed in the note 
are only an initial expression of the Belgian view for the whole IGC, which will 
be adjusted and corrected piece by piece as negotiations progress, in close 
contact with the Belgian Parliament, Communities and Regions. 
As a fundamental asoect of Belgium's European policy the Belgian Government 
thinks it should be a priority of foreign policy to seek to develop the European 
Union on a federal basis, as part of a socio-economic model in which economic 
growth goes hand in hand with social progress. Specifically, the Belgian 
Government believes that Economic and Monetary Union should be backed up by 
stronger social protection, laws to safeguard a high degree of environmental 
protection and practical harmonization on taxes. The Belgian Government also 
favours maintaining European integration on a Community, not intergovernmental, 
basis, arguing that the Community method is a better way of reconciling 
efficiency through majority decision-making with effective protection against 
the abuse of power. The government thinks that European integration is a way 
of enabling all the Member States to exert a real influence in a world in which 
globalization continues apace. The government has announced that during the IGC 
it will be guided primarily by its wish to consolidate the Union. To this end 
it has announced the following guidelines: 
to stimulate a strengthening of the institutions, Belgium favours confirming 
the central role of the Commission, bolstering the Council's decision-making 
capacity by making majority decisions the norm, and promoting democratic 
control by Parliament; 
- 17 - PE 165.963 
White Paper on the 1996 IGC (Volume II) 
the Belgian Government thinks that the internal market should be extended and 
expanded by introducing a common minimum standard in the social, fiscal and 
environmental fields, areas in which harmonization should be secured by a 
qualified majority; 
the government is in favour of applying the Community method as far as 
possible to the field of cooperation on justice and home affairs; 
as regards the common foreign and security policy ( CFSP) the government 
supports strengthening the Commission's role as initiator and executive, 
making majority decisions the norm and using Community financial mechanisms. 
In particular it thinks that the Western European Union should be brought 
into line with the European Union as far as possible. 
The Belgian Government thinks consolidation should enable the European Union to 
continue to expand without risking dissolution or compromising European and 
Monetary Union. With this in mind, and with regard to the institutional 
adjustments required for expansion, Belgium assumes that each country will have 
to be able to identify itself in the decision-making process which will thus 
need to improve its efficiency. The new Member States will have to accept the 
Community patrimony in its entirety and share all of the Un1on's objectives, 1f 
necessary by setting up a multi-speed arrangement managed by the Commission. 
A challenging issue for the IGC will, in the Belgian Government's view, be the 
need to consolidate the European Union before expanding it. It takes the view 
that political union, the political structure essential for Economic and 
Monetary Union, remains incomplete in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty and 
its development needs to be encouraged by the IGC to ensure that the completion 
of Economic and Monetary Union proceeds in parallel with the search for ways to 
develop political union and social Europe. The development of the European Union 
should therefore be based on the Community's existing achievements and on the 
Union Treaty, whose imperfections must be put right. The aim must be to 
safeguard the prosperity and welfare of European citizens, promote internal 
security within the European Union and strengthen the Union's position towards 
the outside world. 
On further enlargement the Belgian Government thinks that the Union should first 
adapt its working methods and that the Union's policies cannot be extrapolated 
unconditionally as regards their substance. Belgium thinks that the Community 
patrimony, structural policies and the CAP are the result of an essential 
solidarity and fundamental equilibria within the European Union, and that the 
new Member States will have to adapt to this patrimony. Belgium also thinks that 
the IGC is not the forum for discussing renegotiation of the Union's system of 
finance and that enlargement must be incorporated not by dismantling any 
existing policies but by introducing special transitional measures in the final 
accession Treaties. 
On future challenges facing the Union, the Belgian Government supports a 
separate approach to each issue as the best way of ensuring success. It mentions 
the following: transition to the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union; 
review of the Structural Funds; the CAP; the system of financing; the accession 
of new Member States; development cooperation policy and Mediterranean policy. 
The Belgian Government's policy paper also addresses the issue of ratifying the 
results of the IGC. It believes it would be unacceptable for one or more Member 
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States to be allowed to hold up progress on European integration towards an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe, for which it believes thought must be 
given to the political and inst1tutional choices that are bound to arise if the 
results of the IGC negotiations are not unanimously endorsed. It also thinks 
that the 1996 IGC should culminate in a readable Treaty, and as its contribution 
to the transparency of European integration, without wishing to affect the 
Community patrimony, it puts forward the idea of recasting the present Treaties 
in a single text. 
The policy paper also devotes a chapter to the issue of adequate decision-making 
at the appropriate level. On subsidiarity, the Belgian Government thinks the 
principle should ne·ver result in the systematic ossification or erosion of 
Community law. In its view the present subsidiarity mechanisms are working 
properly. It regards subsidiarity as essentially a principle of good 
administration and thinks a more positive wording of the present definition 
would be desirable, based on the criteria of need, efficiency and proximity. It 
also states its conviction that, on the basis of the constitutional provisions 
of the various Member States, the same principle applies within their own 
internal legal systems, and announces that at the IGC it will endeavour to 
convince the other participants of this view. Any renegotiation of the 
subsidiarity definition will only be possible if it does not affect the 
operation and further development of European integration and if the 
distribution of the Member States' internal powers is not subjected to control 
by the Court of Justice. 
On relations between the European Union, Belgium as a federal Member State and 
the Belgian Communities and Regions, the Belgian Government cons1ders 
subsidiarity to be an essential principle for such relations, which takes 
physical form in the Committee of the Regions of the Union, enabling the 
Communities and Regions to speak directly on certain issues relating to the 
European Union. The government also points out that Belgium was the first Member 
State to make practical use of the opportunity under Article 146 of the 
Maastricht Treaty to be represented on the Council by ministers who were not 
members of the national government, and that this has taken practical shape in 
Belgium in a cooperation agreement on representation within the European Union, 
concluded between the Federal State and the Communities and Regions. On matters 
in which the Communit1es and Regions have exclusive responsibility under the 
Belgian Constitution, their governments will be participating, under the 
coordination of the Belgian Foreign Ministry, in the negotiations at the IGC, 
and all the parliaments in Belgium will be involved on an equal basis in the 
progress of the negotiations. 
On the division of powers, the Belgian Government considers that such powers 
should be delimited to make the Union more efficient, transparent and 
democratic, but that to draw up a fixed and rigid 'catalogue of powers' would 
be hard to reconcile with the dynamic and evolving nature of European 
integration. It also thinks that a 'specific list of powers' would not add 
anything substantially new to the Union's aims and responsibilities as they 
emerge from the Treaty and the case law of the Court of Justice. It will try to 
ensure that the Union does not exceed the aims and powers allocated to it by 
subsequent recourse to the Court. The Belgian Government also thinks that 
Article 235 of the Treaty should be maintained to safeguard the dynamic and 
evolving nature of European integration. It is in favour of moderate use of the 
article and of involving Parliament in its application. It opposes any tendency 
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to misuse Article 235 as a way of taking decisions by a unanimous vote on 
subjects for which the Treaty specifies a qualified majority. It thinks that 
revision of the Treaty should not involve the abolition of any field of activity 
of the Union or of specific sectors like civil defence, energy and tourism. At 
the request of the Belgian Communities and Regions, it will in due course be 
putting to the IGC specific proposals to amend the Treaty articles on education, 
professional training, young people, culture and the media, public health, 
environmental policy, transport policy and, possibly tourism and sport. 
To secure a sustainable level of prosperity in Europe, the government wants a 
common minimum threshold for social security, taxation and the environment, for 
the social protocol to be incorporated in the Union Treaty, institutional 
confirmation of the results of the social dialogue, upward harmonization of 
social security provisions, the insertion of social convergence criteria, the 
insertion of social and environmental clauses in the common commercial policy, 
the definition and specification of the universal service, the fight against 
poverty and social exclusion. Belgium also considers that the Union's decision-
making capacity should be boosted so as to contribute more efficiently to 
economic revival, greater competitiveness and the promotion of employment. So 
it proposes adopting measures to develop the trans-European transport, energy 
and telecommunications networks, encourage the distribution of work and underpin 
social policy. It also wants special attention to be given to small businesses 
and for the European Union to recognize in the Treaty itself the concept of, and 
opportunities for action provided by, public service. On Economic and Monetary 
Union, Belgium considers that the agreements should be fully implemented in a 
process that would make European integration irreversible. Once the final phase 
of Economic and Monetary Union takes effect, it says, there will also be a need 
to maintain macroeconomic convergence between the Members of the Economic and 
Monetary Union. Finally, it believes that the 'temporary monetary cohabitation' 
of the single currency with the other national currencies must not damage the 
single market and that action must always be taken to ensure that all the Member 
States of the European Union eventually fulfil the conditions for accession to 
Economic and Monetary Union. On other policies, the paper highlights two 
institutional consequences of establishing a common minimum threshold in the 
social, environmental and fiscal field. On the first, the Belgian Government 
comes out in favour of extending qualified majority voting in the Counc1l to 
social, ecological and fiscal matters. On the second, on the structure of the 
Union, it thinks that the balance between the rights and duties of the Member 
States should be maintained and that all the Member States which benefit from 
the advantages of the single market should accordingly also apply the European 
social, ecological and fiscal rules in full, in order to avoid the risk of 
downward competition in the social, ecological and fiscal area, which would 
threaten the single market itself. For these reasons the Belgian Government 
rejects the idea of 'Europe a la carte'. 
The Belgian paper also refers to questions of the third pillar, the 'Union of 
Law and Security'. In this respect it thinks that the intergovernmental method 
has shown its limits and that every avenue must be explored for applying the 
Community method in the third pillar. Specifically, it favours transferring to 
the first or Community pillar those matters linked with Community powers, such 
as the asylum and visa policy, which is connected with the free movement of 
persons; and customs cooperation on the fight against drugs, which is linked 
with the free movement of goods. It proposes that the other subjects should 
continue to come under the third pillar and that intergovernmental cooperation 
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on justice and home affairs should apply more efficient methods, based as far 
as possible on the Community methods of the first pillar. In the Belgian view, 
this would mean extending the Commission's right of initiative on judicial 
cooperation to the civil sphere, customs cooperation and police cooperation; 
extending majority voting; stepping up the European Parliament's role wherever 
the Council adopts decisions of a legislative nature and/or takes decisions by 
a majority vote; and the obligatory powers of the Court of Justice. Here the 
Belgian Government is prepared to accept transitional periods and to distinguish 
between the legislative and operational spheres; it favours transfrontier access 
to justice for the European citizen and integration of the Schengen Agreement 
into the European Union. 
The Belgian Government paper deals with the European Union's foreign policy in 
a chapter entitled 'A Union with a decisive voice and impact in the world at 
large'. As regards the Community's external economic policy, it welcomes the 
results obtained by using the Community method and is in favour of the Union's 
external economic policy continuing in the same Community tradition as at 
present while also setting an example for other fields of foreign policy. It 
would like to strengthen and extend the Commission's foreign policy powers to 
the service industries and will oppose any attempt to disrupt the unity of the 
Union's foreign representation as provided at present by the Commission. As 
regards cohesion between the pillars of the Union, from the point of view of the 
cohesion of the Union's foreign representation the Belgian Government says one 
of its aims will be to bring the pillars closer together and eventually to merge 
them. 
As regards the common foreign and security policy, the Belgian paper deals 
mainly with the way policy is prepared and promoted. It expresses the hope that 
the Commission will continue to make full use of its right of initiative, which 
should be cultivated into a full-scale agency for progress. To this end the 
Commission should not just use its own resources and powers but should also draw 
upon the cooperation and assistance of the Member States. In particular, the 
Belgian Government will endeavour at the IGC to strengthen the Commission's 
right of initiative by adding a Treaty provision under which Commission foreign 
policy proposals must be adopted by a qualified majority in the Council. On the 
process of adopting decisions the Belgian Government supports the view that CFSP 
decisions should be adopted by a qualified maJority vote. It points out that the 
introduction of the majority system for decision-making does not mean that a 
Member State will be compelled against its will to take active part in any 
action that would involve the use of military resources. It starts from the 
principle that all the Member States are politically and financially involved 
in a common decision. As regards putting the CFSP into practice the Belgian 
Government thinks that the IGC should endeavour to strengthen the CFSP 
instruments, especially the joint action instrument introduced by the Maastricht 
Treaty. It regards the Commission as the Union agency par excellence capable of 
providing for joint application of resources in a joint action framework. Only 
the Commission is capable of providing the essential continuity of action and 
coordination with other Union activities in the Community sphere. However, it 
does not give the Commission exclusive implementing powers for the CFSP or 
propose setting up a large-scale administrative apparatus, but points out that 
the diplomatic network, experience, personnel and resources available in each 
of the Member States should be fully utilized in a joint approach, with the 
Commission acting as a catalyst and coordinator. The Belgian Government also 
favours wider application of Community funding of the CFSP. On the issue of the 
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legal oersonali ty of the Union, Belgium thinks that such personality is 
essential to carry out any joint activity with efficiency. In place of separate 
responsibility between the European Community and the European Union, the 
Belgian Government proposes a formula giving the Union specific powers to 
conclude Treaties, for instance by means of a Treaty provision empowering the 
European Union to conclude agreements with third parties within the context of 
joint actions. 
On the common European defence policy the Belgian Government favours bringing 
the WEU as far as possible into line with the Union, with a view to eventual 
integration. Indeed, phased integration is regarded as the best opinion, carried 
out in a series of stages starting with the operational and institutional role 
of the WEU (developing its operational capacities; administrative rapprochement 
between the WEU and the European Union; rapprochement between Member States and 
the WEU observer countries; coordination of WEU action under the CFSP, 
particularly with regard to the provisions on joint action and Community 
financing). In addition, following enlargement the Belgian Government refers to 
the option to introduce a principle of explicit solidarity in a new Union 
Treaty, though without giving automatic security safeguards, a requirement to 
consult in the event of threat and arbitration in the event of a conflict 
between Member States. 
The paper examines the institutional questions when discussing the Union's 
transparency and efficiency. Broadly speaking, the Belgian Government thinks it 
essential to strengthen and expand the Union's role and powers throughout the 
scope of application of the Union Treaty, not only with regard to the roles of 
the Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice but also in calling for the 
Council to take its decisions by a qualified majority as a general rule. The 
Belgian Government believes the decision-making process itself should be more 
efficient, transparent and democratic and proposes, as major improvements, 
extending majority voting to policies relating to the single market (social 
policy, the environment and taxation), extending Parliament's right of 
codecision and simplifying a number of existing procedures. 
As regards Parliament itself, the Belgian Government thinks that the call for 
greater democratic legitimacy will mean giving the European Parliament a bigger 
role. It does not share the view that legitimacy resides in the national 
parliaments, Council of Ministers or the European Council. To improve the 
European Parliament's present operation, the Belgian Government proposes the 
following measures: simplifying the present parliamentary procedures, reducing 
them to the codecision, assent and consultation procedures; making Parliament's 
right of codecision a general rule by extending its field of application to 
every case in which a decision is taken by a qualified majority; and scrapping 
the unanimity requirement in cases where codecision already applies. The Belgian 
Government also wants to consider in detail the possibility of applying the 
principle of general codecision to the budget procedure, in order to remove the 
distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure. 
On the role of the Member States' parliaments, the Belgian Government notes that 
these already exert a de facto influence on the decision-making process and the 
activitl.es of the Union, in practice through their control over what are 
effectively national members of the Council (i.e. the Ministers), and through 
the information and consultation process (in Belgium through regular joint 
meetings between European and national MPs in the European Affairs Committee of 
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the Chamber of Representatives, a formula which it recommends to the other 
Member States). The Belgian Government considers that the relinquishment of 
sovereignty concerns the parliaments as much as the governments of the Member 
States and need not involve a democratic deficit or a loss of control and that, 
finally, closer involvement of the Member States' parliaments in the day-to-day 
running of Europe is primarily a matter of internal organization in each of the 
Member States, rather than a question of setting up additional structures at 
European level. It also favours strengthening the European Parliament's 
democratic control as the best way of remedying the democratic deficit. 
On the Commission, Belgium is a convinced supporter of its central role and 
considers that gene~ . ..J.l application of the Community method (which Belgium 
recommends) will improve efficiency and transparency in the European Union and 
give the Union institutions a clearer role, strengthening and extending the 
central and crucial role of the Commission throughout the European Union. In 
particular, the Belgian Government gives its unstinting support to full exercise 
and extension of the right of co-initiative in the field of the second and third 
pillars. 
On the Council, the Belgian Government expects to oppose any proposals for 
expanding the Council's powers to the detriment of the Commission. It believes 
that general introduction of decision-making by a qualified majorlty is the best 
way of improving the decision-making process and achieving greater operational 
efficiency throughout the Union. It supports the view that, under the first 
pillar and in fields relating to social policy, the environment and taxation, 
the Council should, in principle, take its decisions by a qual1fied majority. 
Unanimity should only be required to amend the Treaty, the language system and 
accession. On the second and third pillars the Belgian Government proposes that 
wherever possible decisions should be adopted by a qualified majority. It 
opposes upholding the Ioannlna Agreement designed to lower the U1reshold for 
vetoing a dec1sion adopted by a qualified majority. 
On the Court of Justice, the Belgian Government favours strengthening the role 
of the Court by scrapping all the limits imposed on its jurisdiction in the new 
fields of cooperation under the Treaty, particularly as regards cooperation in 
the fields of justice and home affairs. On the Court of Audito~s, with a view 
to stepping up the fight against fraud, it favours strengthening the Court's 
role by giving it powers to inform the national parliaments directly in the 
event of national fraud concerning European resources. It intends to take a 
positive attitude to any initiatives to improve the legal instruments for 
combating fraud in the Community and is in favour of stepping up cooperation 
between the European and national courts of auditors. It claims consultative 
powers for the Committee of the Regions in relation to the European Parliament 
and favours compulsory consultation of the Committee of the Regions in the case 
of Community policies which, in certain Member States, are administered by the 
communities, regions or local authorities, particularly with regard to 
vocational training, the environment and regional planning. It also believes 
there is a need to require the Council and Commission to give reasons for 
disregarding opinions handed down by the Committee of the Regions. On the 
Economic and Social Committee, the Belgian Government thinks the Committee's 
role should be maintained and increased. 
On particular aspects of cooperation between the institutions, the Belgian 
Gove~nment refers first to the question of commitology. It appears to believe 
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that where the Council is involved in implementation, and especially where it 
reserves the right of a final decision in the commitology procedure, Parliament 
should also be involved. As regards the hierarchy of legislative acts, the 
Belgian Government considers that this primarily provides an opportunity to 
introduce Community framework legislation to be backed up by national law. In 
its view this method has the advantage that the European Parliament can 
concentrate on essentials and leave the details of implementation to the Member 
States. 
The Belgian paper also raises the issue of European citizenship. In addition to 
making full use of the Treaty's present provisions, the Belgian Government would 
like to increase the number of citizens' rights, mentioning in particular 
accession by the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and other conventions which define fundamental rights and 
freedoms including the Social Charter, and incorporation in the Treaty of a list 
of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
It also mentions the option of limited extension of the present list of rights 
and obligations in the Treaty as regards the fight against racism and 
xenophobia, and favours introducing a mechanism to impose penalties, including 
the suspension of membership, on any Member States which do not fulfil their 
obligations with regard to democratic freedoms and human rights. 
With the aim of avoiding future vetoes, the Belgian Government favours 
flexibility in the approach to European integration. It is against any solutions 
involving the organization of a 'Europe a la carte' I on which it considers that 
any blockages must be surmounted in accordance with the system laid down by the 
Treaty. This means that the Member States can only make progress by consent. The 
government accordingly considers that at the IGC the Member States must try to 
reach agreements and arrangements that will facilitate a decision in this 
direction. Opposing a single-core or multi-core Europe, the Belgian Government 
thinks the option to proceed with differentiated integration deserves taking 
seriously, on the basis of the following principles: differentiation is not an 
end in itself but a last resort to protect the progress of integration from any 
veto; it should create a 'traction effect', meaning that the arrangements must 
allow all the Member States to catch up with the leadi~g bunch; the target scope 
of differentiation must be carefully selected and su1ted to the task; 
institutional derogations must be confined to the minimum; the efficient 
operation of the market must not be compromised; and the key to differentiation 
must be placed in the Commission's hands as the independent institution and 
guardian of the common interest, with the Council deciding the issue by a 
majority vote. 
The Belgian Government also raises the issue of enlargement as a factor for 
prosperity and security in Europe. It points out that accession negotiations 
should start on completion of the IGC and the results of the Conference should 
be taken into account during negotiations. It assumes that enlargement is not 
in question and that the Union's achievements cannot be diluted. At the same 
time, enlargement cannot proceed at the expense of consolidation of the Union. 
In the Belgian Government's opinion the IGC must prepare the decision-making 
process to face the two-fold challenge of a larger number of Member States and 
a greater diversity between them. On preparations for enlargement, the Belgian 
Government considers that the applicant countries should make similar efforts 
to comply with the conditions for accession laid down by the Copenhagen European 
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Council in June 1993 with regard to arrangements for democracy and the market 
economy. The European Union should also be preparing for enlargement, and here 
the paper proposes transitional mechanisms for a limited period and subject to 
certain criteria. On the institutional side, the paper raises the question of 
the number of MEPs at the European Parliament, though without taking a view. On 
the Commission, the Belgian Government favours the principle of one commissioner 
per Member State in the current phase of European integration and rejects the 
idea of 'regional commissioners', i.e. a smaller total number of commissioners, 
with the large countries having one each and other commissioners each 
representing a regional grouping of smaller Member States. On the Council, the 
Belgian Government considers that an enlarged Union's capacity for decision-
making can only be safeguarded by expanding qualified majority voting, not only 
on Community matters but also on the CFSP and cooperation on justice and home 
affairs. With regard to establishing super-qualified majorities, it th1nks that 
such majorities can only be accepted for decision-making in cases where the 
Commission has a non-exclusive right of initiative, i.e. the CFSP and 
cooperation on justice and home affairs. On the other hand, in cases where it 
does have an exclusive right of initiative, there is no reason to raise the 
qualified majority above the present level ( 71% of the total vote in the 
Council, or 62 out of 87 votes). On the weighting of votes in the Council, the 
Belgian Government considers that in the course of enlargement, and provided 
this is accompanied by consolidation of the Union, as part of a global 
institutional package, the possibility of weighting of votes should be 
considered, for example by a slight increase in favour of the large Member 
States. On the presidency system, the Belgian Government is not in favour of 
changing the present system although it does believe it worth spelling out the 
role of the presidency in the Treaty in order to h1ghlight its Community 
function. On the Court of Justice, Belgian is prepared to consider certain 
formulas with a view to enlargement, and supports the idea that the IGC should 
consult with the Court on its reform. Finally, on the language system, the 
Belgian Government does not want to change the arrangements in the Union's 
institutions and bodies even in the event of enlargement, to ensure that Union 
citizens will always be able to use their own language and receive a reply in 
their own language, in their relations with other citizens. The Belgian 
authorities are generally in favour of maintaining the Union's multilingual 
approach. 
Memorandum on the IGC from the Governments of Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, 7 March 1996 
This memorandum was adopted on 7 March 1996 by the Prime Ministers of Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, accompanied by the three Foreign Ministers, at 
the summit held in The Hague on that day. 
The three governments affirm their unswerving commitment to defending the 
irreversible nature of the progress already achieved in European integration, 
and propose that this process should continue on the basis of close cooperation 
between states which voluntarily share their sovereignty and have, to this end, 
transferred certain powers to the common institutions. On enlargement of the 
Union, they consider that widening and deepening should be accompanied by 
differentiation. The three governments accordingly submit the proposals that 
follow. 
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The first aspect considered is the general approach and objectives of the IGC. 
With regard to the deepening of the Union, the three countries feel that the IGC 
should give close attention to this subject, including the question of 
employment, with a view to creating a climate of confidence facilitating the 
transition to the third stage of economic and monetary union (which subject is, 
however, not on the IGC agenda). They consider that enlargement must go hand in 
hand with the deepening of the European integration process, on the grounds that 
a stronger Union will provide a more solid basis for taking in new member 
states. With respect to differentiation, the three countries would accept a 
differentiated approach provided it does not lead to the disintegration of the 
Union; they consider an 'a la carte Europe' to be unacceptable. They believe 
that any differentiation should fulfil the following criteria: it must be 
compatible with the objectives of the Treaty on European Union, as shared by all 
the Member States; it must be only a last-resort solution, with suitable 
provision for non-participating countries to be able to join at a later stage; 
it must not imply any questioning of the acguis communautaire or the correct 
functioning of the internal market; the single institutional framework must be 
retained; and the Commission must play a central role in the application of the 
criteria and arrangements for differentiation. 
The second point dealt with in the Benelux countries' memorandum is the 
deepening of Union policies. Firstly, on the matter of fundamental rights, it 
argues that the Treaty should contain provision for sanctions, which could 
extend to the suspension of certain rights linked to membership, and should also 
include explicit reference to the protection of the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of the European citizen, equality between men and women and action 
against racism and xenophobia. Secondly, on the question of eguali ty of 
languages and diversity of cultures, stress is laid on the need to retain the 
existing principle of the equality of all the Community languages and to respect 
and promote cultural diversity in the Union in the development of the common 
policies. Thirdly, with respect to Community policy, it is argued that the 
priority objectives should be the completion and consolidation of the internal 
market and more decisive action in favour of employment. To strengthen the 
internal market, the text proposes developing certain flanking policies, 
including, in the first place, the creation of a common social core for all the 
Union's citizens, starting with the integration of the contents of the social 
protocol in the Treaty with a view to applying them in all the Member States. 
Further proposals include greater integration of environmental policy with the 
other Community policies and action in the direction of harmonization on tax 
matters. On employment, the memorandum, while not denying the primary 
responsibility of Member States, proposes that the Treaty should contain 
explicit reference to the complementary role of the Union in promoting 
employment, with new provisions to this effect. In particular, it is proposed 
that employment policy coordination between Member States should take the form 
of annual Commission recommendations to be adopted by the Council, with especial 
stress being laid on measures to improve the operation of the labour market and 
promote mobility, training actions, action to remove the obstacles blocking the 
impact of growth on employment, measures to alleviate labour costs and measures 
to improve access to the labour market for the less-favoured. It is also 
considered that the Community should make a greater contribution to job-creating 
investment in the Member States, and that a committee for employment should be 
set up to examine the subject and make suitable proposals. The document insists 
that the social protocol should be incorporated in the TEU, in the interests of 
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greater responsibility and active contribution on the part of the social 
partners. 
Concerning the Union's foreign policy, the memorandum considers that it must be 
coherent; the Union's external action should be united, with a single 
institutional framework. It therefore proposes an enhanced role for the 
Commission in representing the Union to the world, and a review of the ruled 
governing the Commission and Council's activities and relations in the field of 
foreign policy. The text also, concretely, favours strengthening the CFSP: 
concerning its formulation, it proposes, firstly, that the Commission should 
make full use of its existing powers of initiative, and, secondly, that an 
analysis and planning unit should be set up to create close links between the 
Member States, the Commission, and, possibly, the WEU secretariat; such a unit 
could be directed by a senior official, appointed by the Council with the 
Commission's agreement, and would deliver opinions to the Council and 
Commission. The memorandum also proposes bolstering Member States' ability to 
reach agreement at the meetings of the Political Committee by setting up a 
standing group. On the CFSP decision-making process, it wishes to see 
alternatives to the unanimity rule, proposing as formulas 'partial consensus' 
or a reinforced qualified majority, decision-making by qualified majority for 
certain CFSP areas (to be determined), and decision-making by qualified majority 
for Commission proposals. Concerning implementation of the CFSP, it is proposed 
that the Commission should implement joint actions which are to be realized at 
ground level or are closely bound up with first-pillar activities, while the 
Council and Commission could appoint special representatives •,.,rho would be 
responsible for carrying out 'special' CFSP decisions and would report to the 
Council on the relevant missions. It is further proposed that the Presidency, 
in cooperation with a reinforced CFSP secretariat (involving either the 
Commission or the above-mentioned special representatives) should be responsible 
for implementing decisions requiring contacts, statements of position, 
diplomatic negotiations and political dialogue. Finally, the Benelux governments 
consider that as a rule the CFSP should be funded from the Community budget, 
with due regard for its specific nature. 
On the subject of defence and WEU-EU relations, the Benelux memorandum supports 
the development of a Union defence policy and the integration of the WEU into 
the EU's second pillar. This integration of the WEU into the EU should be phased 
in, and the 1996 IGC could adopt a decision of principle and set a timetable for 
full integration. While the merger is being carried out, there should be a swift 
institutional dovetailing of the two organizations, to enable the WEU to 
implement Council decisions under the CFSP having military implications. The 
three countries consider that the second pillar of the Treaty of Maastricht 
should in future include the Petersberg missions and collective defence, while 
admitting that the practical implementation of the latter will remain a matter 
for the Atlantic Alliance, with which the Union is called on to establish 
specific links in the defence field. They also wish to see the rapid development 
of the CJTF project under the aegis of NATO, as a vital element for the 
realization of joint European actions with military implications. At all events, 
the three countries consider that the decision-making process should be such 
that no country is obliged to take part in a military operation against its 
will; at the same time, they argue that countries not wishing to participate 
should not be able to stop the others from going ahead or impede the financial 
solidarity required by a joint action. Finally, the three countries wish to see 
closer European cooperation in the arms industry. 
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The memorandum also considers cooperation in the field of justice and home 
affairs. After noting the advantages of the Community approach for effective 
decision-making in this field, given the binding nature of such decisions and 
the built-in democratic and legal controls, it proposes, in the first place, the 
transfer to the first (Community) pillar of all matters related to freedom of 
movement and immigration policy, especially asylum and visa policy, with a set 
of clear objectives and a precise timetable. However, for a certain number of 
subjects related to the criminal law and police matters, such as action against 
crime and drug trafficking, the text argues that the third pillar offers a 
provisional framework for cooperation, and proposes a number of measures to make 
this cooperation more effective. Firstly, as far as the preparation of decisions 
is concerned, the Council and Commission should agree on the multiannual 
programmes of work and on when and by whom proposals should be submitted, the 
Commission should have the joint right of initiative on all third-pillar 
matters, the European Parliament should have the right to be consulted on all 
proposals of a legislative nature, and the national parliaments should be 
consulted sufficiently early before the Council reaches a decision. Secondly, 
with respect to the decision-making process, it would be desirable to return to 
the notion of the directive as it exists under the first pillar, thus conferring 
binding character on the decisions adopted, where necessary, and to consider in 
what fields decisions could be adopted by qualified majority vote or by some 
kind of 'consensus minus' formula. Thirdly, as regards implementation, which, 
given the nature of the cooperation concerned, falls to the Member States, 
uniform interpretation of the rules should be ensured by giving the Court of 
Justice the necessary powers in this field, on lines similar to the preliminary 
procedure provided for in the TEU. Finally, on the subject of the Schengen 
agreement, the Benelux countries consider that the cooperation provided for 
under it should be incorporated in the TEU. 
The third part of the! memorandum concerns the institutional aspects. The Benelux 
countries favour stnmgthening the effectiveness of the Union's decision-making 
and administrative processes, and evoke the questions of subsidiarity and 
transparency. On the first count, they call for greater application of the 
principle of subsidiarity, seen not as a pretext for dismantling the acguis 
communautaire but as a means of determining clearly when and why it is necessary 
for the Union to act. They also favour greater partjcipation of the national 
parliaments in Union affairs, while considering that each Member State may apply 
the principle in accordance with its own constitutional practices. On 
transparency, the three countries favour strengthening the public's right to 
information, greater publicity for the Council's decisions where it acts as 
legislator, the simplification of the Treaties with a view to legibility, and 
an improvement in the quality of Community legislation. With respect to the 
Commission, they believe that its role should be consolidated and its powers 
strengthened, given its status as the motor organ of the Community. It should 
retain its sole right of initiative under the first pillar, and should have 
enhanced prerogatives as regards implementation. It should also play a greater 
role in the third and second pillars. This means increasing the political 
responsibility of the Commission and its members to Parliament; its budgetary 
responsibility should also be increased, in particular via an enhanced role for 
the Court of Auditors. There should be only one Commissioner per Member State. 
On the subject of the European Parliament, the three countries believe that the 
codecision procedure should be extended to most of the legislative fields where 
qualified majority voting applies. They favour simplifying the codecision 
procedure as far as possible, and reducing the number of procedures to three: 
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opinion, assent and codecision. In the field of the second and third pillars, 
Parliament should be more closely associated with the decision-making process, 
on the basis of sufficient information provided in due time by the Commission 
and Council. The Commissioners should also be more responsible to Parliament. 
Concerning the Council, the three countries feel that its effectiveness should 
e increased and its working methods improved, and call for greater use of 
qualified majority voting. They consider that in an enlarged Union the threshold 
for a qualified majority should remain at around 70% of the votes, and suggest 
the use of a democratic criterion to ensure that the qualified majority 
corresponds to a majority of total population. They also favour improving the 
workings of the existing system of rotating presidencies in the interests of 
greater continuity. On the Court of Justice, they oppose any reduction in its 
powers, favouring, rather, widening its field of cooperation in the areas of 
justice and home affairs. Finally, with regard to the Court of Auditors, they 
feel that its powers should be enhanced, in cooperation with the equivalent 
national bodies, in the context of the campaign against fraud and the protection 
of the Community's financial interests. 
Agenda for Europe: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Report of the Danish 
Foreign Ministry, June 1995 
In publishing this report, the Danish Foreign Ministry seeks to provide a first 
official position to contribute to the open and public debate that will 
culminate in a review of the European Union's Treaties at the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference. The report deals primarily with the negot1at1ons 
on the future of the European Union. The Danish Government thinks that, in the 
prospect of enlargement of the Union, a number of institutional changes will be 
needed, relating principally to the composition of the European Union's 
institutions, and specifically the Council of Ministers, Commission and 
Parliament. Having established the need to ensure that the 1996 IGC is carefully 
prepared, the Danish Government paper picks out what it sees as the three main 
issues: democracy, enlargement and security. These three major challenges for 
the IGC 1996 will require amendments to the Maastricht Treaty to bring about 
greater institutional interaction and more efficiency in decision- making. It 
will mean combining the Council of Ministers' decision-making capacity with 
Commission and Parliament participation in that process. The paper devotes its 
second chapter to the challenge of enlargement and the problems this will pose 
to the present system for cooperation within the European Union, proposing a 
series of 'constitutional amendments' ; the third chapter deals mainly with 
existing problems of security in Europe; the fourth contains a series of 
proposals for increasing democracy in the European Union; and finally the fifth 
chapter raises a series of basic issues such as employment and the environment. 
On future enlargement, the Danish Government discusses the institutional changes 
that will be needed to safeguarp efficiency in the Union's institutions. It 
turns first to the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers, acknowledging 
that the present system clearly favours the smaller Member States if population 
size is taken into account. Without taking a view, it raises the question of 
allocating more votes according to population size, while considering the option 
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of applying a 1 dual majority 1 principle, whereby decisions would require a 
majority of Member States and countries which, taken together, represented more 
than half the total population of the European Union. In practical terms, in a 
European Union of 15 Member States and 370 million inhabitants, at least eight 
Member States would have to vote in favour of a proposal for it to be adopted, 
combined with a population of more than 185 million inhabitants. 
However, to Denmark the crucial issue is not how decisions are taken but what 
decisions are adopted. It suggests a new distribution of votes to take account 
of the primary interests and fundamental points of view of the various Member 
States. For instance, the Danish Government suggests that the separate countries 
should determine whether a change in the law will have positive or negative 
implications for the Member States which are most sensitive to the environmental 
issue, Member States which are more committed to freedom of movement or Member 
States which give highest priority to social cohesion in the European Union. The 
Danish paper also calls for the system of majority voting to be extended and 
applied to a greater number of sectors in order to make the decision process 
more efficient. On the Commission and the number of commissioners, it reviews 
a series of options and without expressing a final view points out that a 
country that did not have its own commissioner would be likely to lose 
confidence in the decisions adopted by the Commission. Commenting that the 
Commission can only take decisions by a simple majority in certain cases, the 
Danish Government sees no great difference in whether the commissioners sitting 
round the negotiating table are 20 or 33 in number. Nor does it take a clear 
view on the number of MEPs at the European Parliament, but indirectly appears 
to agree with the Member States who consider that 750 Members would be the 
maximum. It discusses a new model for the presidency of the European Union but 
does not put forward any specific proposals. The paper underlines the 
undesirability of continuing with the present rotational system of six-monthly 
changes, and goes on to review some of the ways in which the Union presidency 
could be strengthened. It raises the possibility of extending the duration of 
the presidency and possibly of electing the President from among the Heads of 
State and Government of the European Union. Another model to which it gives 
special attention is the 'presidential group 1 which would involve dividing 
countries into a set of four or five groups, each of which would be responsible 
for the presidency for a period of 12 or 18 months. Each group would be designed 
to include both large and small countries in the north and south, east and west, 
to ensure that each Member State participated in the Union's presidency within 
a period of no more than five or six years. The paper also discusses the issue 
of differentiated integration and the possible risks this may produce. On the 
one hand, it says, the general idea of a multi-speed Europe is attractive as it 
is more flexible and enables the different countries to participate on different 
levels in the various areas to which European Union action extends. It will 
obviously allow some countries to move ahead of the rest and other individual 
countries to decide not to participate in areas which cause them special 
problems. 
On the other hand, the Danish paper identifies the problems posed by a multi-
speed Europe in so far as the various areas of cooperation are frequently inter-
related, as happens where a decision on an environmental or social issue can 
affect the single market and vice versa. Moreover a multi-speed Europe could 
give rise to the emergence of first, second and third class Member States. 
Finally, on the changes to the European Union's policies and budget dictated by 
enlargement, the Danish paper says that the implications for the CAP, the 
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transfer of funds from richer to less-favoured European Union countries and the 
whole system of financing the Community should be discussed at the IGC or in a 
parallel forum. However, it recognizes that the discussion of such questions is 
likely to be postponed to a later date. 
The Danish Government's third chapter discusses peaceful cooperation throughout 
Europe. Pointing out that the European Union could step up cooperation on 
political, economic, commercial, environmental and technological cooperation 
that would help to prevent minor security problems in the developing countries 
from turning into real military threats, the Danish document turns to the 
question of the common foreign and security policy. Arguing that security is in 
fact the main issue at the IGC, the Danish paper goes on to discuss the possible 
decanting of intergovernmental cooperation from the second and third pillars to 
the sphere of current supranational cooperation in the first or Community 
pillar. In this respect the Danish Government points to a difference between the 
field of cooperation on foreign policy and security policy on the one hand, and 
cooperation on justice on the other, arguing that the proposals to transfer 
certain aspects of intergovernmental cooperation from the third pillar to the 
Community pillar are conceivable. With regard to the use of majority voting in 
the process for adopting decisions in the second and third pillars, the Danish 
Government thinks it more probable that there will be a move away from the 
present system of unanimity voting to majority voting in the case of the third 
pillar. Indirectly, however, the Danish Government appears to agree with the 
Member States who want to maintain the system of unanimous decision-making for 
the CFSP as a general principle. It also supports the view that arrangements 
should be made to ensure that no one Member State can veto an initiative adopted 
by the others, provided that that Member State is not required to participate 
in the initiative. 
On the role of the Commission and the European Parliament in relation to the 
second and third pillars, and without giving an explicit view, the paper implies 
that Denmark would probably support the Member States who favour extending these 
institutions' powers to cover the subjects coming under the third pillar, since 
decisions in this area of cooperation on justice and home affairs often turn out 
to be connected with Community legislation. Finally the Danish paper discusses 
cooperation with the WEU, appearing to favour strengthening links between the 
WEU and the European Union, though without leading to a merger of the two 
organizations. 
The Danish paper also discusses more democratic cooperation within the European 
Union. First, to increase the influence of directly elected MEPs on EU policy 
the Danish Government calls for greater democratic control, arguing that the 
issue of the European Parliament's powers in the legislative process will be one 
of the main priorities at the forthcoming IGC. However, it does not express a 
view on the specific areas to which a new codecision procedure could be extended 
as a way of increasing Parliament's legislative powers. On the national 
parliaments the Danish paper takes the example of the Folketing' s European 
Affairs Committee and suggests that the position of the national parliaments in 
the European Union's 'constitution' should be consolidated following the IGC. 
The Danish paper also calls for more subsidiarity and lists three possible 
approaches to the subject: first, preparation of a 'catalogue of powers' that 
would set out in the Treaty an exhaustive list of the powers of the European 
Union and the Member States; second, the possibility of improving the current 
method laid down by the Treaty, specifically including the issues which are not 
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covered by the European Union's responsibilities; third, further improving the 
wording of the subsidiarity principle itself so as to define more clearly and 
precisely where and when the Union should take action. The Danish paper also 
calls for more transparency, pointing out that it will probably be difficult for 
some countries to have European institutions which are more transparent than 
their own national authorities and legislative bodies, while conversely it will 
be difficult for other countries to accept a level of transparency in the 
European institutions lower than in those at home. On the subject of simplifying 
the Treaty the Danish Government would like the Treaty to be written in more 
readable and comprehensible language and to abolish or simplify a number of 
complicated rules governing the European Union's decision-making process. 
The paper also discusses the issue of growth and employment. With a view to 
possible changes to the Treaty in these areas, the paper puts forward the idea 
that the European Union should set itself the aim of keeping unemployment below 
a certain level. To achieve this end it raises the option of coordinating 
national economic policies to reduce unemployment, consolidate the single market 
and comply strictly with the rules of economic and monetary union. On social 
policy the paper notes that in practice cooperation on the social rights 
conferred by the Treaty has not been very effective so far and suggests that a 
solution to the problem could be to transfer the provisions in the protocol on 
social policy to the Treaty on European Union. 
Bases for negotiations: an open Europe. The 1996 IGC. Memorandum of the Danish 
Government, 11 December 1 99 5 . 
In its first part, on the importance of an 'open Europe', the memorandum of the 
Danish Government stresses that the IGC must, above all, lay the bases for the 
enlargement of the Union to embrace the countries of central and eastern Europe, 
including the Baltic states, which have applied for membership. After the IGC, 
the accession negotiations with all the candidate countries should begin 
simultaneously; the main task of the IGC is therefore to adapt the Union Treaty 
to ensure that enlargement can bring about effective and permanent cooperation 
within the Union. The Danish Government also considers that the IGC will have 
to be followed by reforms in the areas of agriculture, the Structural Funds, 
politics, etc. It also insists on the notion of a Europe that is closer to its 
citizens, and, in this connection, feels that the IGC should include discussion 
of subjects of concern to the peoples of Europe such as reducing unemployment, 
the environment, international crime and the ordinary person'S desire for 
greater external and internal security. The Danish Government also intends to 
emphasize the question of subsidiarity, transparency and simplification of 
cooperation in the Union, with the aim of eliminating the sense of alienation 
from the Union felt by individual citizens in the Member States. On the 
Edinburgh agreement, which includes a separate Danish position on four specific 
subjects, the Danish Government recalls that this agreement is not mentioned in 
the IGC agenda and cannot be changed without Denmark's consent. In this 
connection, it stresses that Denmark's position on citizenship, EMU, the common 
defence policy and justice and home affairs was decided by the referendum of 18 
May 1993, and can only be altered by another referendum. 
Secondly, the Danish document considers the basis for enlargement. In this 
connection, it feels that the main purpose of the IGC is to establish the 
foundations for enlargement to take place, via the necessary institutional 
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adaptations and suitable procedures. Consideration should be given to using 
gualified majority voting for economic cooperation and the first (Community) 
pillar. The Danish Government is willing to consider forms of quality majority 
voting which do not alter the balance between larger and smaller Member States; 
as a possible solution, it proposes that decisions should require a qualified 
majority of votes in Council plus a majority representing at least half the 
Union's total population. With regard to the responsibilities of the Council 
Presidency, the Danish Government suggests that the presidency could be held by 
more than one Member State at once. It favours reducing the number of 
cooperation procedures between the Council, Parliament and the Commission, and 
considers that Parliament should have a greater and more uniform influence in 
the various spheres of activity, but without altering the existing balance 
between the EU institutions. The Danish Government believes that the Commission 
should contain members from all the Member States. It considers that the 
European Parliament must continue to play a major role in the decision-making 
process and as a political control organ; with a view to facilitating 
Parliament's workings in practice, it would accept a ceiling on the number of 
MEPs in an enlarged Union. On the subject of the national parliaments, the 
Danish Government feels that they should play a more important part; it suggests 
stepping up the flow of information between the Union institutions and the 
national parliaments, which should be forwarded the Commission's legislative 
proposals and white and green papers sufficiently early to enable to them to 
adopt their own positions. 
Thirdly, the Danish Government's text refers to the fundamental rights of Union 
citizens, taking the view that these rights should be included in the preamble 
to the Treaty, especially in the case of human rights, democratic rights and the 
strengthening of the democratic basis of cooperation in the Union. 
Fourthly, on the subject of economic cooperation under the first (Community) 
pillar, the Danish Government stresses the need to improve cooperation within 
the Union, by means of greater cooperation in practice following the guidelines 
established by the European Council and by amending the Treaty to 1mprove the 
framework for cooperation. In this connection, the text refers, in the first 
place, to employment: it argues that an additional, coordinated effort is 
required to achieve sustainable economic growth, thus contributing to a higher 
employment rate and lower consumption of energy and natural resources. While 
considering that the main efforts will still have to be made at national level, 
the Danish Government believes that the new Treaty should include a specific 
section on employment, intended to strengthen the objective of achieving a 
higher employment level and emphasizing that employment is a common 
responsibility requiring a coordinated approach: to this end, it will be 
necessary to spell out the fundamental principles for the establishment of this 
coordination of the Member States' efforts. On the environment, the Danish 
Government says that it will do all in its power to ensure that the idea of 
'sustainable development' is included as a separate goal among the Treaty 
objectives, thus incorporating at Union level the results of the UN conference 
on the environment and development held in Rio in 1992. Denmark also feels that 
the environmental dimension should be included to a greater extent in other 
areas of cooperation, such as agriculture, transport and structural policy. In 
particular, the Danish Government wants the new text of the Treaty to make it 
clear beyond all doubt that the implementation of the internal market must take 
due account of environmental questions and interests. The adoption of common 
Union rules by the Council should have the goal of raising protection levels, 
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and must in no circumstances lead to reducing standards in Member States where 
they are already higher. On the subject of greater use of ecological taxes, 
Denmark says that at the IGC it will endeavour to ensure that the environmental 
provisions of Article 130s of the Treaty are accompanied by a declaration or 
protocol enabling such taxes to be introduced to deal with cross-border 
environmental problems, with qualified majority voting applying. It will also 
work towards wider application of the 'environmental guarantee', to be used 
where a Member State considers that the Union is not providing a sufficiently 
high level of protection. This 'environmental guarantee' should be defined more 
clearly; the Danish Government proposes that any dispute related thereto should 
be settled by the European Court of Justice, on the request of the Member States 
themselves. 
On social policy, Denmark considers that the 1992 protocol should be 
incorporated in the Treaty proper. The Danish Government believes that the 
Community rules deriving from the social protocol and from the principle of 
subsidiarity should be considered as representing the minimum, and that Member 
States should be able to give the social partners the responsibility of 
implementing EU directives, rather than choosing the legislative route. It also 
favours including certain fundamental rights of workers in the Treaty. On 
consumer policy, Denmark wishes to see further progress in this field, with 
prov~s~on of more appropriate information to consumers to ensure that their 
interests are adequately protected in any new regulations adopted at Union 
level. It is suggested that consumer organizations should be more closely 
involved in the drawing up of the relevant proposals. 
The fifth part of the Danish Government's memorandum concerns the CFSP (second 
pillar). Denmark wishes to keep the intergovernmental approach in this area; 
with a view to effective cooperation, it would accept the adoption of joint 
actions even where one or more Member States did not wish to take part, provided 
a specific decision was adopted on the conditions applying to the Member States 
not participating in the joint action. The Danish Government favours setting up 
an analysis and planning unit under Council auspices, with a view to creating 
a firmer basis for decisions affecting the second pillar. In cases where certain 
Member States might wish to take part in humanitarian actions, crisis management 
or peace-keeping operations in accordance with the UN Charter, the Dan~sh view 
is that individual Member States should be able to take part in such actions 
should they so wish. 
On coooeration in the areas of justice and home affairs (th~rd pillar), the 
Danish Government believes that intergovernmental cooperation should remain the 
norm. However, with a view to making the existing intergovernmental cooperation 
more effective in such areas as asylum law, action against cross-border 
(especially organized) crime, drug trafficking and illegal immigration, it 
raises the possibility of simplifying the existing decision-making process and 
making greater use of the cooperation possibilities already available under the 
Treaty. 
The seventh part of the Danish memorandum deals with means of improving 
coooeration. It is felt necessary to incorporate the principle of transparency 
of cooperation at Union level into the Treaty and/or to revise the Council's 
internal rules; in the latter case, it would not be necessary to amend the 
Treaty. Denmark feels that greater transparency is needed ~n the Council's 
legislative activity, especially as regards proposals for legislative acts, and 
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will insist that the Treaty should spell out the right to access to files of the 
general public, un~ertakings and organizations. The EU ombudsman should also 
have greater access to information and files. Commission proposals should be 
made publicly available for consultation by the organizations concerned, and the 
results of the consul tat ions should be made public. Denmark also supports 
greater recourse to the principle of subsidiarity, which it wishes to see more 
clearly defined, and calls for the simplification of cooperation at Union level, 
with a substantial reduction in the number of decision-making procedures. It 
also demands the repeal of all the decisions and legal acts which have become 
obsolete, and calls for a more clearly-written Treaty. On the subject of 
financial fraud against the Union, Denmark favours an energetic anti-fraud 
campaign and more effective checks. It also considers it vital that the Member 
States should implement the relevant Community acts and ensure that they are 
applied. On the institutional plane, the Danish Government believes that the 
efforts to be made in all the above fields will require close cooperation 
between the Member States, the Commission and Parliament. 
In conclusion, the Danish Government states that Denmark will do all in its 
power to ensure that the IGC lays the bases for the enlargement of the Union, 
as this is both the most important objective and the largest task. 
I. Basic positions of the Federal Government with regard to the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference 
On 11 November 1994 the Government parties - CDU, CSU and FOP - adopted the 
coalition aoreement for the current legislative period. Point VIII on 'Europe 
and Foreign Policy- Security and Defence' defines the guidelines of the Federal 
Government's European policy. The government statement by Federal Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl referred to these guidelines. 1 The tasks of Germany's pol1cy on 
Europe are accordingly as follows: 
implementation of the decisions of the European Councils of Copenhagen and 
Corfu: stabilization of the 'reform countries' in Central and Eastern Europe 
by bringing them closer to the EU with a view to accession. The Federal 
Government is also looking closely at cementing partnership with the CIS 
states on a treaty basis and at developing a concept for stabilizing the 
Mediterranean region on Europe's doorstep; 
safeguarding Europe as an industrial centre by improving the climate for 
growth and employment; 
preventing and combating organized international crime. 
The most important objective of the Federal Government's European policy is 
consolidating the European Union through consistent application of the EU Treaty 
Bulletin of the Federal Government Press and Information Office, No 108, 
24 November 1994, pp. 990-991 
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and further developing it both at home and abroad. Franco-German cooperation is 
of particular importance as the central element in the process of European 
integration. The Federal Government also calls for implementation of EMU with 
strict compliance with the convergence criteria set out in the Treaty on EU and 
with the timetable. The other priorities for the Federal Government are the 
CFSP, cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, the institutional 
development of the EU, implementation of the subsidiarity principle, prompt 
informing of Parliament of draft EU legislation, financial matters, the social 
dimension, the question of EU subsidies and European commercial policy. 
Institutional development and the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
The Federal Government has defined the objectives of institutional development 
as follows: 
strengthening the EU's ability to act; 
securing its democratic legitimacy; 
increasing the transparency of European action; 
preparing for the accession of new Member States. 
The following are seen as the priority areas for the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference: 
developing and including the CFSP and cooperation in justice and home affairs 
in the Community framework; 
continuing participation by all the Member States of the EU in the continuing 
process of European integration; 
opposition by individual Member States must not hold up progress towards 
integration. 
On 21 February 1995 Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel set out the underlying 
philosophy behind the Federal Government's priori ties for the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference1 • 
1 . The Conference must be guided by the principle of bringing European decisions 
closer to the people, the transparency of procedures and democratic 
accountability. It must not be a 'debate for technocrats only'. 
2. Securing Europe as an economic centre and developing EUROPOL are seen as 
priorities. 
3. The European Union must give itself more teeth in terms of the CFSP and must 
speedily establish clear positions on foreign, security and defence policy. 
Majority decisions on foreign policy matters should no longer be taboo. 
4. The working methods designed for a European Community of 6 Member States must 
be adapted- in institutional and procedural terms- for a Union of 15 Member 
States. The weighting of votes of Member States, the composition of the 
European Commission and the powers of codecision of the European Parliament 
must be part of the agenda item on 'increasing efficiency'. On 20 February 
English summary in Agence Europe of 22 February 1995 
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1995, Mr Kinkel called for the European Union to move speedily towards 
majority voting in all respects. 1 
5. Mr Kinkel also stressed, in the light of the coalition agreement, that as far 
as the further development of the European institutions was concerned the 
pace of the slowest Member State should not determine the pace of the 
Community. 
With regard to relations between the CFSP and the WEU, on 9 March 1995, 
Mr Kinkel called for the EU to be merged with the defence alliance. 2 
The EU must be able to take effective action and make a rapid response in terms 
of the common foreign and security policy. The Federal Government therefore 
supports: 
greater use of Community procedures, for example by moving to majority 
decisions; 
defining regional priority areas, in particular Central and Eastern Europe, 
the Mediterranean and the further development of the transatlantic 
relationship with the USA and Canada; 
enhancing the operational capability of the WEU; 
developing the WEU as the European pillar of NATO and as the defence 
component of the EU. 
Appearing before the Bundestag on 22 June 1995, Mr Kinkel stated that the 
European Union should extend majority voting to CFSP matters. In his view, no 
Member State should be forced to take part in a military mission, but all 
members of the Union should be obliged to provide logistical and financial 
support to decisions taken by a majority. 
Speaking in Brussels on 8 June 1995, the German Defence Minister Volker Ruhe 
affirmed that European foreign and security policy could no longer remain 
separate from the defence policy dimension and its military instruments. He also 
stressed that the long-term goal was the fusion of the WEU with the European 
Union and that the whole process formed part of the transatlantic framework. In 
Mr Ruhe's view, the IGC should consider the following provisions: 
A defence policy should be established which, in the long term, would be 
integrated into the Union's responsibilities on an intergovernmental basis. 
There might still be a veto in this field, but it would be possible to adopt 
decisions by a majority, while 'positive abstention' would enable compromises 
to be reached with those states finding themselves in a minority, which would 
nevertheless be unable to block the process. The Commission's role would be 
strengthened. 
VWD-Europa: Monday, 20 February 1995, p. 5 
2 VWD-Europa: Thursday, 9 March 1995, p. 2 
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The WEU would become the Union's instrument for implementing decisions 
adopted exclusively by the Council of the European Union in the field of the 
CFSP and defence policy. 
Pending the merger of the WEU and EU, the WEU would be strengthened and a 
common arms market established. 
The current Euro-Atlantic relationship should be reformed through a new 
charter covering the three dimensions of cooperation: political, economic and 
security. 
Justice and home affairs 
In addition to implementing the Schengen Agreement, and the agreement on 
external frontiers which is based on Schengen, the Federal Government regards 
the following as its priority areas in this respect: 
completion of the EUROPOL Convention and making EUROPOL a European police 
authority; 
common right of asylum, refugees policy and a just distribution of refugees 
amongst the EU Member States. 
Financial matters and economic and monetary union 
The Federal Government calls for the financial decisions taken by the European 
Council in Edinburgh to become the own resources system. In particular, it calls 
for an assessment of gross contributions on the basis of the calculation of VAT 
and the gross domestic product of the Member States. The Federal Government also 
wants ~ greater flow of budget appropriations back to Germany and more efficient 
control of fraud and auditing. The Federal Government rejects any watering down 
of the convergence criteria for EMU. 
The social dimension 
The Federal Government supports participation by all Member States 1n the 
agreement on social policy. With regard to implementation of framework 
legislation on social policy, the Federal Government will not tolerate any 
watering down of German social standards. For this reason, and with a view to 
further development of the common social policy, the Federal Government calls 
for harmonization of minimum social standards. 
Subsidiarity 
In the opinion of the Federal Government, implementation of the principle of 
subsidiarity should be one of the main features of the 1996 Conference. In this 
connection the Federal Government will extend the 'subsidiarity list', whereby 
existing legal provisions of the EU are tested for their compatibility with 
Article 3b TEU, and, where appropriate, will propose that they be rescinded. At 
the 1996 Conference the Federal Government will work towards a precise 
definition of the respective areas of competence of the EU and the Member 
States. The coalition agreement refers to tourism and disaster protection as 
examples of areas where existing Community powers need to be examined for their 
compatibility with the principle of subsidiarity. In the opinion of the Federal 
Government, Article 3b of the TEU should be tightened up to reverse the burden 
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of proof by deleting the words ' ... and can therefore, by reason of the scale 
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community'. 
Joint declaration of 15 July 1995 by the German and Italian Foreign Ministers 
regarding the 1996 IGC 
(cf. Italy, p. 100) 
Letter of 6 December 1995 from the President of the French Republic, Jacques 
Chirac, and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Kohl 
(cf. France, p. 87) 
Common foreign and security policy: guidelines adopted by the Foreign Ministers 
of France and Germany at the Freiburq seminar of 27 February 1996 
(cf. France, p. 90) 
Document: 'Germany's objectives for the Intergovernmental Conference', 
26 March 1996 
This document was submitted by the German Foreign Mlnlster, Mr Klaus Kinkel, on 
26 March 1996 on the eve of the Turin European Council. The first part of the 
text refers to the IGC as the starting point for a 'European political agenda 
for the year 2000'. The German document begins from the position that the 
European Union has been a success, as it has brought Europe four decades of 
peace, stability, prosperity and good neighbourly relations, and has also been 
a factor of major importance for the German economy, as well as having made 
German unification possible. The text points to the enormous challenges now 
facing Europe in the context of the globalization of the world economy, and 
stresses the need for internal and external changes in Europe with a view to 
adapting to the demands of this dramatic structural change in the world economy. 
ASEAN, NAFTA and Mercosur are cited as instances where the European model has 
followed. Also considered are the demands of the Union's citizens, especially 
as regards prosperity, job security, the preservation of external peace, the 
maintenance of internal security and the protection of natural resources. As the 
key elements for the 'European political agenda for the year 2000' which the EU 
will have to prepare for the transition into the twenty-first century, the 
document lists: the 1996 IGC as a starting-point; the decisions to be adopted 
in early 1998 with a view to completing EMU; the opening of the accession 
negotiations with the countries of central and eastern Europe and Malta and 
Cyprus (to begin six months after the close of the IGC); and the decisions to 
be made concerning the Union's financial situation and the own-resources system 
after the year 2000. Other key elements cited are the reform of the structural 
policies and the CAP and investment in areas vital to Europe's future, such as 
research, technology, etc. 
The German government's text argues that this accumulation of objectives is 
comparable, in terms of strategic importance and complexity, only to the 
founding phase of the Community. Germany therefore considers, as far as the IGC 
is concerned, that it is vital to avoid any risk of overloading the Conference: 
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it must concentrate on what is essential, especially as regards the workings of 
the Union, while at the same time safeguarding its internal and external 
security, preparing it for expansion and bringing the Union closer to the 
public. The IGC must be conceived from the correct angle: it is not the final 
point of European integration, but simply one more of its stages. The objectives 
for the IGC must be approached realistically, with the goal of obtaining a more 
operational Union and not jeopardizing the European policy objectives already 
mentioned as forming the 'agenda 2000'. 
Concerning Germany's objectives for the IGC, the second part of the text bases 
the, on the coalition agreement and on the joint letter of Chancellor Kohl and 
President Chirac of 6 December 1996. These objectives may be summarized as 
follows, as far as the CFSP is concerned: the reinforcement of the policy's 
effectiveness, coherence, continuity, solidarity and visibility (Germany thus 
favours the creation of a planning and analysis unit, under the aegis of a CFSP 
secretariat answerable to the Council); extension of qualified majority voting, 
but with unanimity being retained for certain areas, such as the projection of 
operational capacities; integration of the WEU into the EU in the medium term; 
inclusion of a 'political solidarity' clause in the Treaty; incorporation of the 
Petersberg Declaration in the TEU; and the development of a common policy on 
weapons. 
For the third pillar (CJHA), Germany stresses that the public expects progress 
on the front of action against transnational crime and drug trafficking. The 
German government supports: closer police cooperation, with the long-term 
objective of creating a European police office with operational powers; 
harmonization of civil and criminal legislation; bringing visa and asylum 
policy, customs cooperation and immigration under the Community pillar; 
extending the Union's responsibilities in the areas of action against xenophobia 
·and racism and fraud against the Community budget; and a greater consultative 
role for the Commission, the Court of Justice and the European Parliament. 
With respect to subsidiarity, European citizenship, democracy and transparency, 
the German government proposes that the principle of subsidiarity should be 
incorporated in a protocol to be annexed to the Treaty. 
Finally, on the subject of differentiated integration, Germany advocates a model 
of flexible integration which would not exclude any Member State from joining 
a hypothetical 'vanguard' group. It also favours introducing the double majority 
principle for voting in Council, reducing the number of commissioners and, 
generally, any formula that ensures that the EU troika always includes at least 
one of the larger Member States. 
II. Basic positions of the German Lander 
The German Lander have to be involved in the preparatory work to establish the 
German position for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. The views of the 
Lander are being developed in Lander working parties, at the Conference of 
Ministers of European Affairs and the Conference of Prime Ministers of Lander 
and, of course, in the Bundesrat. 
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Rhineland-Palatinate and Bavaria are the rapporteurs for the Lander for the 1996 
Conference (A Rhineland-Palatinate representative will be the senior negotiating 
party since the SPD-controlled Lander have a majority in the Bundesrat). Mr 
Karl-Heinz Klar, Rhineland-Palatinate delegate to the Federal Government and for 
Europe, will represent the interests of the Lander at the 1996 Conference. On 
3 March 1995 he submitted to EU Commissioner Oreja the conclusions of the 
Conference of Ministers of European Affairs of 16 February 1995, the substance 
of which is as follows: 
Clear separation of powers between the EU and the Member States. 
Compilation of a list of responsibilities per subject area for the EU. 
Transfer of major areas of the CFSP and home affairs and justice policy from 
the domain of intergovernmental cooperation to the EC Treaty. 
The Committee of Regions needs its own right of appeal, obligatory right to 
be heard (in particular with regard to the environment, vocational training 
and creation of the information society) and its own organizational 
structure. 
The European Parliament must have an equal right of codecision with the 
Council in all EU decisions where the Council of Ministers decides by 
majority vote. 
Phased implementation of the principle of electoral equality with the 
allocation of a minimum number of seats for small Member States. 
Creation of a uniform European election procedure on a regional basis for the 
European Parliament in 1999. 
Consideration of the question of including a list of fundamental rights in 
European law. 
Simplification of EU decision-mak1ng procedures by having fewer standard 
procedures but standard rules for decision-making. 
Majority voting in the Council should become the rule. The existing form of 
qualified majorities should be replaced by a dual majority, whereby decisions 
are adopted if supported by a majority of the Member States represented in 
the Council and a majority of the people represented by those Member States. 
Fixing an upper limit for the number of members of the European Commission. 
In anticipation of any future arrangements, the results of the 
Intergovernmental Conference should be implemented in cooperation with the 
European Parliament. 
Mr Klar reiterated the negotiating position of the Lander in an interview with 
the 'Europaische Zeitung' (No 4, April 1995): 
1. Hitherto there has been a lack of clarity as to the position of the Federal 
Government and the Lander. 
2. In accordance with the conclusions of the Conference of Ministers of European 
Affairs of 16 February 1995, future action by the EU should only be on the 
basis of clearly defined powers and responsibilities. The broadly defined 
list of objectives of the EU should be replaced by a list of powers relating 
to specific fields. Another possibility, as a compromise between these two 
lists, would be a list of duties relating to the specific powers defined in 
the Treaty. 
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Furthermore, on 24 June 1995, the Ministers of European Affairs of the sixteen 
Lander, meeting in Wiirzburg, adopted a document on the IGC in which they 
declared themselves in favour of greater use of majority voting in the Council 
(with the population criterion being introduced), limiting the number of 
Commissioners and drawing up a list of powers at Union, national and local 
level. 
On the basis of the conclusions of the Conference of Ministers of European 
Affairs of 16 February 1995, on 31 March 1995 the Bundesrat adopted a decision 
on the preparations for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. No substantial 
changes were made to the conclusions of the Conference of Ministers of European 
Affairs. 1 
III. Basic positions of the parties and of the groups in the Bundestagf 
The most recent position expressed by the Bundestag on the IGC is its resolution 
of 7 December 1995. This resolution, approved at the end of a major debate on 
Germany's European policy, reflects a wide-ranging consensus based on the 
linking of the subjects of widening and deepening3 . 
Of the various positions taken by the German parties in relation to the IGC, 
particular mention should be made of the proposals recently presented by the 
CDU/CSU group in the Bundestag, which constitutes the political and 
parliamentary base of the present government led by Mr Helmut Kohl4 . 
Manifesto of the CDU/CSU Group in the Bundestag of 1 September 1994 
On 1 September 1994 the CDU/CSU Group in the Bundestag proposed a wide-ranging 
reform of the European Union aimed at making its institutions more democratic 
and making it possible for new members from the countries of eastern Europe to 
join in the near future. The plan advocates a multi-speed Europe and states that 
a key aim would be to move Germany away from the dangers of nationalism and 
transform it into a focus of stability at the heart of Europe, since such 
stability would benefit both Germany and Europe. 
2 
3 
4 
Bundesrat, Reference 169/95 (decision) of 31.3.1995 
For more detailed information on the content of the Bundestag resolution 
of 7 December 1995 and the Bundesrat resolution of 31 March 1995 and 
current parliamentary work in the Bundestag, cf. note on the state of 
discussions in the national parliaments on the 1996 IGC (rev. 9 of 14 
February 1996, published by the Division for Relations with the Member 
State Parliaments). 
For an analysis of the elements of consensus among the German political 
parties deriving from the Bundestag resolution of 7 December 1995, cf. 
op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
For an analysis of the elements of consensus existing among the German 
parties arising from the Bundestag resolution of 7 December 1995, cf. 
ibid. 1 pp. 5-6. 
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The document, largely the work of Karl Lamers, CDU Group spokesman on 
international policy, was presented by Wolfgang Schauble, chairman of the 
CDU/CSU Group in the Bundestag, who is seen in political circles as a close ally 
of Chancellor Kohl. The document is thus regarded as politically significant, 
particularly since it was presented at a time when Germany held the Council 
presidency. 
The programme presented by Mr Schauble contains a package of five proposals: 
1. Further institutional development of the Union and implementation of the 
subsidiarity principle, including transferring powers back. 
2. Strengthening the 'hard core' of the European Union. 
3. Intensification of Franco-German relations. 
4. Strengthening of the Union's ability to act on foreign and secur1ty policy. 
5. EU enlargement towards Eastern Europe. 
The document also proposes combating organized crime; establishinq a common 
policy on migration; combating unemployment; establishing a common social 
policy; guaranteeing Europe's continued competitiveness and protecting the 
environment. 
1. More specifically, on the question of institutional developme~t, the CDU/CSU 
document proposes the following objectives: 
Strengthening the Union's ability to act and to make its ~~ructures and 
procedures more democratic and federal in nature. 
Drawing up of a quasi-constitutional document based on t!u• model of a 
'federal state' and the subsidiarity principle, which should d<csr ::.- ibe clearly 
the division of powers between the European Union, the Member States and the 
regions and define the Union's fundamental values. 
Reform of all the existing institutions with a view to a new institutional 
balance with the European Parliament becoming the genuine legislative body 
of the European Union enjoying the same rights as the Councll; the Council, 
in addition to its tasks at intergovernmental level, would take on the 
functions of a second chamber, probably a chamber of the Member States; and 
the Commission would take the shape of a European government. 
The new institutions should be more democratic and efficient, combining 
coherence and consistency with the flexibility and suppleness automatically 
required by the size of the Union. 
To this end, and in order to prevent the dynamics of intergovernmental 
cooperation from leading to a 'Europe a la carte', the CDU/CSU document 
suggests that the concept of 'variable geometry' or a 'multi-speed Europe' 
be institutionalized and enshrined in the quasi-constitutional document 
mentioned above. It also considers it vital that no country should be able 
to exercise its right of veto to block the efforts of other countries which 
are able and wish to go further in the process of European integration. 
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2. On the question of strengthening the 'hard core' of the European Union, the 
CDU/CSU document recommends that the process of integration should be led by 
a 'hard core' of five Member States (Germany, France, the Nether lands, 
Belgium and Luxembourg), cooperation between which should focus on the new 
policies established in the EU Treaty. The document stresses that this 'hard 
core' would be open to the possibility of including other countries such as 
Spain, Italy and the UK once they had resolved 'current problems' and if they 
wished to take part in the project. 
The basic idea is to provide the Union with a compact centre which would 
counteract the centrifugal tendencies arising from successive enlargements 
and prevent a North-South alignment. 
3. On the question of intensifying Franco-German relations, the CDU/CSU document 
states that any significant action in the fields of EU foreign or internal 
policy should be preceded by prior consultation between the two countries. 
In particular, it calls for France to respond to the clear and unequivocal 
proposals put forward by Germany on the Union's institutional and political 
development before enlargement with equally clear and unequivocal decisions 
so that the political quality of cooperation between the two countries would 
issue from a serious and open dialogue. 
4. On the question of strengthening the Union's ability to act under the CFSP, 
the CDU/CSU document calls for a strategic concept of the CFSP which clearly 
defines common objectives and interests, conditions and procedures and the 
necessary political, economic and financial means. The document lists the 
following priority areas of action for the CFSP: 
A common policy designed to bring stability to central and eastern Europe; 
Establishment of wide-ranging cooperation with Russia; 
A common Mediterranean policy including Germany as well as the countries 
bordering the Mediterranean; 
Development of strategic cooperation with Turkey; 
Reorganization of transatlantic relations with a joint policy being drawn up 
between the European Union and the United States. 
The document further stresses the urgent need to create a common European 
defence, which should be brought about immediately without awaiting the 
circumstances envisaged in the EU Treaty. NATO should be converted into an 
alliance in which Europe, the United States and Canada would have equal 
weight and form a combined whole able to carry out effective action; to this 
end, the 1996 IGC should reorganize relations between the European Union and 
the WEU in accordance with Article J.4{6) of the TEU. 
5. On the question of enlargement to the East, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia might join the European Union around the year 
2000. The document makes a number of proposals in this connection. At all 
events, such enlargement should be accompanied by intensified cooperation 
with Russia. 
The CDU/CSU document aroused strong reactions for a variety of reasons, 
particularly in connection with the idea of the 'hard core', but it was 
initially without doubt the most constructive and interesting poll.tical 
standpoint adopted in Germany on the subject of the forthcoming 1996 IGC. 
- 44 - PE 165.963 
Wh1te Paper on the 1996 IGC (Volume II) 
Discussion paper on strengthening the European Union's ability to act in the 
field of the CFSP of 13 June 1995. 
On 13 June 1995, the Steering Committee of the CDU/CSU Group in the Bundestag 
submitted the new document analysed below as its contribution to the debate on 
the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference in the field of the second pillar of the 
Union. 
Again, the main author is Karl Lamers, whose manifesto presented on 1 September 
1994 gave rise to the debate on the issue of differentiated integration. 
The discussion paper on the second pillar of the European Union states that a 
central aim of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference should be to strengthen 
substantially the Union's ability to act in the field of foreign and security 
policy. In addition, a common defence policy and a common defence should be an 
integral part of the CFSP. With a view to guaranteeing the territorial integrity 
of the EU Member States and ensuring that such a guarantee should be the same 
for all the countries, the document proposes that all EU member countries should 
join NATO. NATO remained the indispensable basis of European security but 
Europeans should take on a greater share of responsibility in the tasks of the 
alliance. Starting from the premise that national states can now guarantee the 
external security of their own citizens only to a limited extent, the document 
affirms that the EU's ability to make its own military contribution to 
maintaining peace in Europe and protecting its citizens against external 
pressures represents a vital element of the EU's identity, in which the identity 
of each Member States should nevertheless be ensured. 
The second part of the document affirms that the priority tasks of the CFSP are 
determined by the new challenges facing Europe today. Specifically, the document 
lists three principle and most urgent tasks and challenges: establishment of a 
European peace order, establishment of a genuine Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
and development of a broader transatlantic link. In this context, the document 
proposes that the first countries of central and eastern Europe to fulfil the 
economic and political conditions should be admitted to the European Union 
shortly after the entry into force of the revised Treaty around the year 2000. 
Such countries might enjoy transitional periods as in the past, while the 
remaining countries of central and eastern Europe should be offered concrete 
prospects of membership at a later date. The document takes the view that such 
an approach would enable a close link to be established between this timetable 
and the opening up of NATO, highlighting the correlation between the two stages 
of integration, although it would be possible to join NATO before becoming a 
member of the EU. Further east, in relation to Russia, the document proposes 
establishing a wide-ranging and balanced partnership between the EU and Russia 
which would go even further than the cooperation agreement signed between the 
EU and Russia and the partnership for peace agreement between NATO and Russia. 
The document also highlights the importance of EU relations with Turkey, taking 
the view that the customs union is important and necessary, and declares itself 
in favour of developing good neighbourly relations with the countries of the 
Mediterranean basin from the Middle East to North Africa with a view to 
guaranteeing economic, political and social stability in the area. The document 
also recognizes the stabilizing role played by the United States in Europe and 
proposes strengthening the transatlantic alliance by consolidating the European 
pillar and establishing a broader transatlantic link in the political, economic 
and security fields. 
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The third part of the document affirms that the 1996 IGC should create four 
conditions necessary for the success of the CFSP: improved decision-making 
process; measures on institutional organization; guarantee on funding; and an 
agreement on a common defence policy and common defence. Strengthening the 
Union's ability to act should also be accompanied by a parallel development of 
the corresponding instruments of parliamentary control. 
On the question of improving the decision-making process, the document stresses 
that the political will to take joint action is the key condition for a European 
foreign policy and takes the view that the current decision-making process 
required for joint action is the main cause of the CFSP's weakness. 
Consequently, the document reaffirms two objectives. Firstly, foreign and 
security policy issues which have no military aspects should be resolved under 
the gualified majority system with the introduction of a double majority system, 
i.e. a majority of states and a majority of the population represented by those 
states. Secondly, all decisions on foreign and security policy issues with 
military implications, specifically use of military means, must be taken in such 
a way as to ensure that a minority of Member States cannot prevent the majority 
from committing themselves to joint action and that no country is obliged to 
take part in joint action against its will. This includes the possibility that 
only some of the EU Member States might undertake joint actions under the 
auspices of the Council, and non-participating states would be obliged to 
demonstrate solidarity by, inter alia, contributing to the joint funding of such 
action. 
On the question of measures relating to institutional organization, the document 
proposes, firstly, the urgent creation of an appropriate permanent body, which 
it does not define but which would be responsible for analysing, planning, 
proposing and monitoring the execution of Council decisions in the field of the 
CFSP. Secondly, while guaranteeing the Union's institutional balance, the 
document proposes that the resources already existing in the Commission, the 
Council, the WEU and, above all, the Member States be combined so that 
appropriate proposals might be submitted to the Council in good time, in 
agreement with the Commission, with a view to implementing the CFSP and 
moni taring the application of provisions by the Council. Furthermore, such 
resources should also be combined so that, in cases of crisis and conflict, 
proposals for action can be submitted to the Council as soon as possible, 
together with a precise assessment of their political implications and 
consequences. Finally, these combined resources should make it possible to 
ensure that the EU adopts a concerted position vis-a-vis third parties. 
Nevertheless, the document does not declare itself in favour of any of the 
specific options or models currently being discussed in the EU, merely noting 
that any solution adopted by the IGC should encompass the three criteria listed 
above and prepare the way for increased application of Community provisions. 
On the question of guaranteed funding for the CFSP, the document affirms that 
the EU budget should set aside appropriations for the CFSP, particularly as 
regards operating expenditure arising from joint action, which should be decided 
on a case-by-case basis. 
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The document goes on to discuss defence policy and a common European defence, 
declaring itself in favour of bringing defence within the scope of the EU in 
future. The aim of such a common European defence policy and common European 
defence would be to enable the EU to make its own contribution to safeguarding 
peace and security in Europe and protecting its members against external 
pressures. In particular, the document proposes integrating the WEU into the EU 
jn the medium term. To this end, it proposes that the IGC should draw up a fixed 
timetable for such integration. 
The document declares that a European identity in the field of security and 
defence policy would strengthen the transatlantic alliance. NATO would remain 
the indispensable ba~is of security in Europe, but the document also proposes 
a series of basic principles for putting a European defence into action. 
Firstly, the EU's basic decisions on security policy would have to take account 
of transatlantic interests. Secondly, responsibility for collective defence 
rests with the Atlantic Alliance. Thirdly, the EU and the WEU would make their 
own contribution by means of the military measures envisaged in the Petersberg 
Declaration, where NATO did not wish to act but where the interest of the 
European Union required concerted action; in such cases, the European armed 
forces committed to such actions under the CFSP should remain under European 
command. As a fourth principle, the document affirms that the policy of 
enlarging the European Union, the WEU and NATO should be based on the princ1ple 
of equal security, and proposes that the accession of new Member States to the 
EU, the WEU and NATO should take place simultaneously. 
The document also stresses that priority should be given to the following tasks 
with a view to integrating the WEU into the EU: ensuring that the WEU had full 
operative capabilities for the tasks set out in the Petersberg Declaration; 
establishing a close organizational link between the WEU and the EU, in 
particular a clearly defined European decision-making structure for the military 
measures required for crisis management; guaranteeing the interoperability of 
armed forces and joint provision of equipment, which would include harmonizing 
the export policies of EU Member States. On the specific question of the WEU's 
operational capacity, the WEU should be developed into a common defence 
structure capable of putting the actions set out in the Petersberg Declarat1on 
into practice and open to the participation of associated members, associated 
partners and observers on a case-by-case basis. Establishing an operational 
capacity for the EU via the WEU would involve implementing the concept of 
combined joint forces enabling members of the WEU or a coalition of members of 
the EU to make their own contribution to peace-keeping and humanitarian missions 
using joint installations and NATO capacity after consulting the North Atlantic 
Council, but always under European command. Regarding the close organizational 
link between the EU and the WEU, in particular decision-making structures in a 
crisis, the document proposes that the European Council be granted the necessary 
competence to draw up general guidelines for European defence; that a uniform 
decision-making structure be set up at senior political level in the EU in cases 
of crisis, while the WEU's role would be restricted to that of an executive body 
acting in accordance with political instructions issued by the EU; that a close 
organizational link be established between the WEU secretariat and the permanent 
body for the CFSP referred to above; and finally that the WEU planning cell 
should provide back-up for the EU Planning and Analysis Unit in the field of 
foreign policy. 
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Lastly, the document declares itself in favour of parallel development of 
parliamentary control mechanisms and increasing the Union's ability to act. 
Given that the introduction of majority decision-making would reduce the 
monitoring opportunities of national parliaments, the document proposes that the 
monitoring functions carried out by the European Parliament in connection with 
the ·CFSP be extended beyond their current limits along the following lines: 
firstly, the European Parliament should be consulted before the European Council 
adopts any general guidelines on foreign and security policy; secondly, the 
European Parliament should be informed where the Council takes a decision on 
f.oreign and security policy by a qualified majority. 
Discussion document on 'more rule of law at European level' of 13 June 1995. 
This discussion document of the Steering Committee of the CDU/CSU parliamentary 
group in the Bundestag on developing the bases of Community policy in the field 
of the third pillar is also largely the work of Karl Lamers. The document 
affirms that the basic aim is to bring Member States' policies on justice and 
home affairs closer together, for the structures pertaining to the rule of law 
in the Community to be harmonized and for an impetus to be given to the Union's 
constitutional policy. 
The second section of the document concerns extending the provisions of the rule 
of law at European level. The main proposals set out in the document are: 
firstly, progressively· extending Community procedures to certain areas of 
justice and home affairs, so as to overcome the inefficiency and sluggishness 
of the current procedure based on intergovernmental cooperation. Secondly, all 
the fields included in Article K.1 should be placed on a firmer institutional 
basis; in this context, the principle of mutual administrative and judicial 
assistance of national authorities and courts in all the Member States 
represents the best way of guaranteeing a greater degree of integration. 
Thirdly, the document proposes progressively attributing rights of initiative 
to the Commission on matters covered by Article K.1 of the Treaty in order to 
strengthen the identification of supranational interests; subsequently, in 
specific fields such as asylum policy, there should be a progressive transition 
from intergovernmental cooperation to Community competence in the Council, which 
would adopt its decisions by a majority as defined in Article 148 of the Treaty; 
where the Community procedure could not yet be applied, the European Parliament 
should be granted a general right of compulsory prior consultation in all the 
areas covered by Article K.1 of the EU Treaty. Fourthly, the document declares 
itself in favour of implementing an integrated system which would make it 
possible to combat crime at European level; given the absence of a Union penal 
code or criminal justice procedure at Union level, the document proposes 
approximating and harmonizing the definition of the constituent elements of a 
punishable offence and the procedure applicable as far as possible, which would 
apply to serious cases of international crime such as terrorism, stockpiling 
arms, trafficking in human beings and money laundering; as regards the police, 
the document advocates more effective powers for EUROPOL and, for the crimes 
listed above, transforming it into a European police investigation office, 
calling for the EUROPOL Convention to be concluded promptly. 
The document also discusses uniform legislation on border crossinq. asvlum 
policy. refugees and immigration. In all these areas the document proposes 
making the current legislation of the Member States as uniform as possible while 
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taking account of the geographical and geopolitical differences between each of 
them. The document affirms that key issues arising from asylum, visa and 
immigration policy can be resolved only at Community level, taking the view that 
the Schengen method, i.e. conventions which must be ratified by national 
policies, is not sufficient to meet the challenges posed in such areas. The 
document therefore proposes that all these areas be integrated as far as 
possible into the Community sphere of competence by amending or supplementing 
the Treaty or, at the very least, harmonizing the various national legal systems 
and their fields of competence to a greater extent. The cooperation already 
embarked on in accordance with the provisions of Article K of the EU Treaty and 
Article 100c of the EC Treaty should provide a basis for common regulations and 
measures, in particular in the field of asylum policy, controls on the crossing 
of borders by persons and the fight against illegal immigration, and in areas 
such as drugs trafficking and other serious forms of international crime. 
The document also sets out further measures aimed at constitutional integration. 
It affirms that, over the coming decade, the EU should gradually move from a 
Community based on law to a constitutional Community. This evolution should be 
based on the specific Community law emanating from the Treaties so that, in the 
long term, the Community and EU Treaties should be progressively transformed 
into a kind of constitutional Treaty. At all events, current Community 
legislation should be developed further under the aspect of constitutional 
policy and should be supplemented in an appropriate manner. In particular, in 
addition to strengthening the powers of the European Parliament as described 
above, the document underlines the importance of guaranteeing full democratic 
equality between all the citizens of the Union as regards the electoral law 
governing elections to the European Parliament. The document also calls for 
fundamental rights to be made as uniform as possible so as to make progress on 
a people's Europe. In this context it declares itself in favour of the European 
Union formally acceding to the European Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
Finally, the document discusses the subsidiaritv principle. It affirms that this 
principle should be observed and applied as regards both planned legislation and 
questions of procedure. Some of the powers conferred on the European Union by 
the Treaties should be examined in the light of the subsidiarity principle and, 
if appropriate, transferred back to national level. On the question of 
procedural matters, the European Union should make use of regulations only where 
a directive would be insufficient, since directives enable Member States to take 
greater account of specific national features and differences and, in the 
majority of cases, are more compatible with the subsidiarity principle than 
regulations. 
* * * 
The two documents on the second and third pillars outlined above were approved 
by the executive bodies of the CDU/CSU at their meeting of 13 June 1995 in 
Berlin. Meeting in Bonn on 4 July 1995, the CDU Federal Bureau subsequently 
debated and approved its guidelines on European affairs with a view to preparing 
the 1996 IGC. These guidelines will be submitted to the Federal Conference of 
the CDU for approval in October. The guidelines in the latter CDU document, 
drawn up by the leader of the CDU/CSU members within the PPE Group of the 
European Parliament, Mr Rinsche, and the Secretary of State in the Chancellery, 
Mr Pfeiffer, do not differ from the two documents on the second and third 
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pillars analysed in the previous section. Nevertheless, the document setting out 
guidelines on European affairs also includes further chapters. On the decision-
making procedure for areas coming under the first pillar, the general rule 
proposed is that the Council would decide by a majority except on questions 
affecting taxes, finances, enlargement and amendments to the Treaty, where 
voting by unanimity should be maintained. With regard to economic and monetary 
union, the document does not propose any date for the start of the third phase, 
but it underlines the importance for Germany of the establishment of an 
integrated European economic area. The document also comments on the application 
of the subsidiarity principle, taking the same view as the document analysed 
above. The powers of the European Parliament should be extended so as to make 
it a co-legislative body enjoying the same powers as the Council. The number of 
legislative proposals should be reduced, simplified and made more open; the 
codecision procedure between Parliament and the Council should be improved and 
simplified. Parliament should also be given a greater part in the decision-
making process and consulted to a greater extent on matters concerning 
intergovernmental cooperation. Finally, the document comments on the enlargement 
of the European Union to include the countries of central and eastern Europe, 
but does not differ from the views already expressed by the second CDU/CSU 
document on the second pillar. 
~ 
Document of January 1995: 'Towards a citizens' Europe 
development' : memorandum for the 1996 IGC 
democracy and 
In January 1995 the Greek Government submitted an initial document setting out 
its initial position concerning the 1996 IGC. 
The document takes the view that the Treaty of Maastricht needs revision on 
three counts: democratic reform of the European institutions, enhancement of 
democratic legitimacy in Community decision-making, and future enlargement to 
take in new Member States. 
According to this document, Athens believes in a citizens' Europe, and 
accordingly opposes any notion of a two- or three-speed Europe. Greece, it is 
stressed, will not accept any proposals contrary to the principle of the equal 
rights and duties of all the peoples of Europe, and especially not in the 
economic field. Total opposition is expressed to any idea of allowing mew Member 
States to join and then relegating them to second-class status. 
The document affirms that the development of the Union must be based on the 
principles of legality, respect for human rights, solidarity, subsidiarity, 
respect for Member States' national identity, and cohesion. These are all, in 
the Greek Government's view, both objectives and conditions for the Un1on's 
proper functioning; furthermore, greater transparency is called for 1n 
decision-making and the implementation of decisions. 
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With respect to institutional reforms, the Greek position tends towards 
federalism: Greece believes that the Commission's role should be strengthened 
vis-a-vis the Council. In the interests of improved democratic control, the 
Greek Government proposes increased powers for the Committee of the Regions, the 
ESC and the Ombudsman, adding that if necessary the creation of new Community 
institutions could be an option. Concerning the existing institutions, it 
proposes the following: 
Commission: 
To increase the number of Commissioners is not compatible with ease of working; 
there should be only cne commissioner per Member State. The large Member States 
are excessively favoured by having two commissioners each; the Commission should 
not be linked to the national governments. 
Parliament: 
The powers of Parliament should be increased. In particular, it should have more 
pol1tical powers, acting as a counterweight to the Commission and the other 
inst1tutions. 
COREPER: 
This body should cooperate more closely with the Commission. 
Council: 
The Council's responsibilities should only be extended in the case of creation 
of new policies. Greece will not accept a UN-type model for the Council with a 
small number of permanent members and rotating membership for the smaller 
countr1es. It follows that any reform of the Council must not make it possible 
for a group of Member States (be they large or small) to decide for the rest. 
The text states that the Greek Government does not endorse the present system 
of qualified majority voting; it proposes that the 'federal state model' (as 
existing in the US) be adopted instead. It supports the notion of the veto as 
safety-valve, as opposed to an opt-out facility for important decisions. 
Court of Justice: 
The official role of the Court of Justice should be enhanced. 
On the subject of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), the document 
states that Greece believes that an effective CFSP calls for the second pillar 
to be brought closer to the first, in the context of a substantial democratic 
advance for the Union. The fundamental common interests and benefits relating 
to joint action by the Member States should be defined; criteria and objectives 
should be established for cooperation with other international organizations, 
including NATO, in the sectors and geographical areas of common concern. With 
regard to the objectives and institutional structure of the CFSP, its goals 
should include protecting the territory of the Union: this can be done by 
precisely defining its borders. According to Athens, security is no longer a 
purely military problem: it is also economic and political. The Union must take 
steps to guarantee this 'multidimensional' security. For all these reasons, any 
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future new Member States must respect human rights in a context of 
constitutional democracy and free competition. 
In the institutional sphere, the document proposes that the Commission should 
exercise a greater planning role; the promotion of Community action should be 
the responsibility of the European Council and the Commission, subject to the 
financial and political control of Parliament and subsequent control by the 
Council. With such a reform of the CFSP, unanimity would be required for 
decisions on policies and joint actions, with due regard for the vital interests 
of the Member States. With respect to the common defence policy, the document 
considers such a policy to be more essential than ever, given that the Treaty 
of Brussels (the WEU Treaty) is due to expire in 1998. In addition, since the 
principles governing this sector must at all times be based on the notion that 
the Union's security is the security of its members, Greece takes the view that 
the negotiations on the CFSP and the common defence policy must involve the 
members of the EU rather than those of the WEU. 
With regard to the third pillar, as far as Articles K.1 and K.3 of the Treaty 
of Maastricht are concerned the document calls on the Council to explain its 
positions more clearly; it is also felt that there should be more specific 
immigration and asylum policies. Greater powers of control for Parliament are 
advocated in this field. Concerning Article K.7, it is considered that 
divergences between policy and legal rulings should be avoided. 
The document also sets out the Greek position on EMU. With respect to the 
transition to the third stage, it is stressed that so far each Member State has 
endeavoured to fulfil the Maastricht conditions; Greece rejects outright the 
notion of reserving the third stage initially for certain Member States only, 
believing that it should apply either to all or to none. If EMU is to evolve in 
a positive sense, the Member States must implement parallel economic policies 
with a view to achieving an ideal level of socio-economic development, while 
keeping a federalist perspective constantly in mind. With regard to any later 
extension of EMU, the document argues that it will inevitably take years for the 
prospective Member States to reach the same level: accordingly, while not 
advocating stricter criteria, Greece feels that a clear distinction must be made 
between present and prospective Member States. Greece stresses its desire to 
take part in the third stage in 1999, and considers that, to ensure that no 
present Member State is excluded, the criteria should be revised as regards 
inflation, interest rates and the public sector deficit. 
With regard to the Community budget and to development, the Greek Government 
emphasizes the need for transfers of funds to the less-developed areas, 
especially once the third stage of EMU is under way. At that point it will be 
necessary to examine the overall budget level and the criteria for distributing 
funds, taking account of the altered situation produced by the entry of new 
Member States; regional disparities will also have to be reduced. In this 
connection, the document calls for the Structural Funds, the EIB and the 
Cohesion Fund to give priority to promoting development and aid for the 
less-favoured regions. Greece points out that the accession of Central European 
countries will lead to changes in the logic of structural policy, involving a 
greater budgetary effort. 
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With respect to employment, the document stresses that, in the context of 
Community social policy, Maastricht has laid the bases for new policies in the 
areas of technological innovation and employment: it will be necessary to 
examine employment as a macroeconomic phenomenon, with a more integra ted, 
Europe-wide dimension. 
As far as the common policies are concerned, the Greek Government considers that 
the outstanding needs in this field are: to strengthen and reform the existing 
economic policies; to establish new policies; and to revise the decision-making 
methods. 
In the political sphere, the Greek proposal advocates greater protection for 
workers' rights: equality between men and women should be promoted, and specific 
regulations should be introduced for part-time work and pregnant women; the aim 
should be to devise a model respecting the differences in national education 
policies and incorporating vocational training and the social dimension. With 
respect to health, the Greek Government wishes greater attention to be paid to 
both prevention and treatment (concerning AIDS, drug use, tumours, etc.). On 
consumer protection, greater cooperation is advocated between the various 
levels. Greece feels that efforts must be made to operate a specific industrial 
policy for the Union, capable of facing the new challenges on the world market. 
In particular, according to the document, the Union and its Member States must 
play a central role in the development of the 'information society', with the 
aim of stimulating competition in the sector and enhancing the quality of life. 
In addition, Greece calls for institutionalization of the new energy policy, so 
as to improve dialogue with the world's other regions (especially with Asia); 
for an intervention policy at Community level to ensure an adequate response to 
natural disasters; and for a policy for the decentralization of power. Finally, 
Athens takes the view that to require unanimity in the field of the common 
policies amounts to immobilizing the policies themselves; Greece therefore 
proposes that qualified majority voting should apply in the areas of workers' 
rights, culture and the environment. 
Conclusions of the interministerial committee of the Greek Government 
(Athens. 7 June 1995) 
Recently, on 7 June 1995, the interministerial committee set up by decision of 
the Prime Minister to work out the Greek stance and positions in preparation for 
the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference reached its conclusions, which were then 
submitted to the Prime Minister. 
The Greek representative to the Reflection Group will follow the framework of 
the instructions agreed upon by the interministerial committee. 
Following those conclusions, the Greek positions are oriented towards the 
following directions: 
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a) The basic priority is the social. economic and political cohesion of the 
European edifice. The ties that ensure cohesion within the European Union 
must be further strengthened, not loosened. The principle of Community 
solidarity must prevail at all levels: 
for institutional equality of all Member States; 
in the permanent pursuit of economic and social cohesion at the level of the 
EMU; 
as a safeguard of the Union's external borders and as a principle of mutual 
assistance between Member States at the level of the CFSP. 
b) At the institutional level, the fundamental Greek position is that of egual 
participation of all Member States in EU institutions. Greece rejects the 
notion of a multiple-speed Europe. Within the present framework, equal 
participation does not rule out a more efficient functioning of the Union's 
institutions. At this level, it is also self-evident that the 
Intergovernmental Conference will function, by definition, on the basis of 
the principle of unanimity (consensus). 
c) In the long term the strengthening of the CFSP is an indispensable condition 
for European existence and survival. In this context, when the issues at 
stake concern vital national interests of the Member States, the rule of 
unanimity (consensus) cannot be abandoned. 
The promotion of a European defence identity and the gradual shaping of a 
common defence policy through CFSP procedures is an option that, if accepted, 
could possibly solve the problem of organizational diversity, as regards, in 
particular, EU-WEU relations, provided that critical issues, such as the 
safeguarding of external borders and mutual assistance between Member States, 
can thus be managed more effectively. 
d) Enlargement - decided upon by the European Council - should not be a pretext 
for the reversal of the economic and social conditions that support the 
present eguilibrium within the European Union. 
Enlargement must be associated with the issue of own resources, in the cases 
of countries the accession of which is bound to cause excessive pressure on 
the Community budget and Funds. In this context, enlargement including the 
accession of Cyprus and Malta is a primary goal of Greek foreign policy, in 
line with the decision already taken by the European Council and the Council 
of Ministers. 
e) There is no doubt about the need to strengthen the democratic character and 
the rule of law in the European Union. This process will be based on the one 
hand on the increased role of the European Parliament and of the national 
parliaments- in terms of each Member State's internal EU-related procedures 
- and on the other hand on the institutional prospects of cooperation in the 
field of home affairs and justice. Within this framework, the 
'communi tarization' of procedures could very well be the ·answer to the 
questions concerning the safeguarding of the rule of law and the protection 
of human rights; on the other hand the selection of rules sim1lar to those 
applied to the CFSP could give answers to certain issues that might concern 
vital national interests. 
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f) A basic goal for a country l1ke Greece is the safeguarding and strengthening 
of the cultural 1dentity of Europe, by means of the safeguarding and 
strengthening of the cultural and linguistic identity of each Member State. 
g) Economic and monetary union seems to support so far only a specific form of 
convergence - the nominal one - something that does not guarantee the 
prospects and the pace of European integration. Consequently, irrespective 
of any changes in the criteria of nominal convergence, Europe must face the 
problem of real convergence and of economic and social cohesion among Member 
States. 
European integrat~on is in need of stability and credibility. In other words 
it needs social and political legitimacy. In this context - and always in 
view of the problem of resource allocation - Greece believes that common 
policies should be developed in new sectors such as tourism and energy. 
Memorandum of the Greek Government of 24 January 1996 on the IGC: Greece's 
positions and comments 
Greece submitted a new memorandum on the IGC on 24 January 1996, following the 
coming to power of the new Prime Minister, Mr Costas Simitis. 
The document begins by discussing the first (Commun1ty) ~illar Tn the first 
place, on the subject of the European Parliament, two types of ~easures are 
proposed: strengthening Parliament's legislative role by extendlnq its powers 
into certain areas of the second and third pillars and reinforci~g its powers 
of control over the executive bodies; and extending the codecision procedure to 
all legislative acts (certain exceptions apart) whose adopt ion requires an 
absolute majority. The Greek Government also call~ for the codeci8ion procedure 
to be simplified, and says it would accept a ceiling of 700 MEPs pcovided this 
did not endanger the representation of the smaller Member States. 
On the subject of the Commission, the Greek Government considers it unacceptable 
under any circumstances to question its existing powers, autonomy and exclusive 
right of initiative. With respect to the number of commissioners, Greece fully 
supports the notion of one per Member State, and clearly rejects any other 
formula. The Greek Government feels that the Commission should reta1n decision-
making by unanimity, to avoid any discrimination between the votes of 
Commissioners from larger and smaller Member States, and favours extending the 
Commission's powers into the areas of the second and third pillars, if 
Parliament's powers of control are strengthened at the same time. 
Concerning the Council, Greece considers that the extension of qualified 
majority voting to certain first-pillar areas is not to be rejected out of hand, 
provided it is accompanied by codecision of Parliament. At all events, for 
certain sensitive areas, including constitutional matters, accession of new 
Member States and new association agreements, Greece believes unanimity should 
be retained. On the weighting arrangements, Greece in principle opposes any 
redistribution of the existing weighting by Member State, while accepting the 
possibility of certain practical adaptations to safeguard the balance between 
larger and smaller Member States. It opposes weighting based on population, on 
the grounds that the Council represents Member States, not populations; the 
Greek view here is that populations as such are already represented in the 
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European Parliament, and the formation of a majority should not be reduced to 
a mere arithmetical exercise that fails to take account of the national and 
cultural identities of the peoples of Europe. Concerning the Counci 1 Presidency, 
Greece favours the existing system of six-month presidencies; rejecting the 
notion of a collective presidency lasting one or more years for reasons of 
efficiency and cohesion, the Greek Government nonetheless says it would accept 
any reforms that did not alter the institutional balance or undermine the 
principle of equality between Member States. 
Regarding the European Council, Greece feels that it should retain its existing 
political role and its present powers concerning the definition of the Union's 
general policy lines, while not interfering in matters whose practical handling 
falls within the competence of the Community bodies concerned. On the subject 
of the national parliaments, Greece favours their closer involvement in the 
European integration process, in particular via enhanced contacts with the 
European Parliament, some of whose meetings could include national 
parliamentarians. It also proposes that Commissioners could, where necessary, 
address the national parliaments and that the 'assizes' should be reinforced. 
On EMU, Greece stresses the need to rebalance its monetary and socio-economic 
aspects (Articles 104 and 2 of the Treaty), so as to ensure social cohesion 
between the Member States. It therefore supports incorporating a special title 
on employment in the revised Treaty. The Greek memorandum also refers to the 
budgetary consequences of enlargement, and argues that there must be parallel 
discussion of the subjects on the IGC agenda, on the one hand, and the budgetary 
aspects of enlargement and the principle of sufficient resources, on the other: 
such vital subjects as the structural policies, the own-resources system and the 
CAP must not be overlooked when making the reforms that will be needed to 
accommodate the new members. The Greek document also examines the Community 
policies, among which particular stress is laid on the environment, health and 
culture. As far as new polic1es are concerned, Greece unreservedly favours the1r 
institutionalization in the fields of tourism, energy and civil protect1on, 1n 
line with the declaration attached to the Treaty of Maastricht. On the subject 
of civil protection, Greece proposes creating an urgent intervention mechanism 
to handle natural disasters. It also calls for specific Community measures for 
the economic and social development of the Union's island regions. On Union 
citizenship, the document supports the strengthening of the concept of 
citizenship, the elimination of all forms of discrimination, greater and more 
effective protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the 
development of the Union as a space of liberty and internal security. Greece 
endorses incorporation of the 1989 Social Charter into the Treaty and accession 
of the Union to the Coun~il of Europe's Human Rights Convention, and, should the 
latter not be possible, suggests including a list of fundamental rights and 
freedoms in the Treaty. On the matter of flexibility, Greece opposes any form 
of differentiated integration which might destabilize the existing situation of 
unity and equality as between Member States. It accepts the possibility of 
transitional arrangements for Member States unable to apply Community policies 
at a given moment, but rules out differentiated integration altogether. 
The Greek memorandum also considers the common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP). Greece believes that strengthening the CFSP and creating a common 
defence policy must be priority tasks for the Union, in a context of democracy, 
solidarity and respect for human rights. It feels that the lack of effectiveness 
of the CFSP as it stands derives from a lack of political will and from the 
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existing system of pillars, and therefore favours bringing the CFSP under the 
first pillar, in other words cornrnunitarizing it. On the decision-making 
procedure, Greece considers that any extension of qualified majority voting will 
depend on the form given to the second pillar. In any case, it believes that 
unanimity must be retained for decisions affecting vital national interests, 
defence included. Greece feels that the objectives of the CFSP should be 
extended, to include a clear guarantee concerning protection of the external 
frontiers of the Union and the Member States and a mutual assistance clause. On 
the representation of the CFSP, the Greek position is that this could be 
entrusted to the Council Secretariat. Greece does, however, fully support the 
creation of a planning and analysis unit which would comprise representatives 
of the Member States, the Council and the Commission, under the aegis of the 
Council Secretariat. Concerning funding, Greece favours the unification within 
the Community budget of all expenditure in the area of the Union's external 
relations, as the best means of ensuring budgetary control over CFSP expenditure 
in a transparent and democratic fashion. On defence, Greece feels that the main 
objective should be to develop a Union defence identity and gradually create a 
common defence policy. It therefore supports the phased absorption of the WEU 
into the EU, pending which it considers that a legally or politically binding 
protocol should be drawn up in which the WEU would commit itself to implementing 
the defence decisions entrusted it by the Union. Greece also believes the WEU 
as such should have special responsibility for security, while defence matters 
proper should continue, for the immediate future, to be the responsibility of 
NATO. At all events, Greece favours including the 'Petersberg tasks' in the 
Treaty. 
Finally, the Greek Government's text examines coooeratlon in the areas of horne 
affairs and justice (the third pillar), favouring the 'cornrnunitarization' of 
certain aspects of the third pillar, which should be brought as close to the 
Community pillar as is possible. Greece believes that the Commission's right of 
initiative should also cover the third pillar, and that the roles of the 
European Parliament and the Court of Justice concerning it should also be 
enhanced. Should total 'cornrnunitarization' of the third pillar not be possible, 
Greece insists that it should be done at least in part. On the decision-making 
procedure in this sphere, Greece, after affirming that the lack of efficiency 
in third-pillar matters has been due to the unanirnlty rule, calls for the 
introduction of qualified majority votlng in certain fields, such as anti-drugs 
action, while recognizing that unanimity will have to be retained in other areas 
more closely bound up with national sovereignty. 
Document of 2 March 1995: 'The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: starting 
points for a discussion' 
As regards the Spanish position during the actual Intergovernmental Conference, 
the Spanish chair of the Reflection Group and the foreign ministry have already 
drawn up a substantial initial 100-page document entitled 'The 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference: starting points for a discussion' . This is a 
strategic document, but above all, more than reproducing specific points of 
view, it lists the problems and alternatives that will be discussed at the IGC, 
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explaining and probing into the subject-matter in detail. The document was 
submitted to the Spanish Parliament's Joint Congress-Senate Committee on the 
European Union on 2 March 1995. Although, in the above-mentioned statements in 
mid-February, Carlos Westendorp already said that the document would in no way 
embody the opinions which Spain intended to support in the Reflection Group, it 
is obvious that the text, to a large extent, gives an indication of the ideas 
which the Spanish delegation will seek to champion throughout the IGC and in the 
course of the preparations leading up to it. 
A very wide range of matters are covered in the document, relating not only to 
the Conference agenda, but also to the following broad areas or topics: possible 
modi operandi for the Conference, depending on the prevailing context, key 
issues for the IGC, enlargement of the Union, and the need for consensus and 
openness. 
The document begins by considering various possible models for the conference, 
in the context of the reigning climate, marked by the fall-out from the economic 
and political crisis since the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht. Concerning 
the duration of the IGC, the Spanish text anticipates a possible slowing-down 
of its work until after the UK elections (which may take place in the spring of 
1997). Three possible models are offered for the development and final range of 
reference of the IGC: 
* Limited model: negotiation of a m1n1mum of aspects which must be dealt with 
if enlargement is to happen (essentially, institutional questions and the 
CFSP). With this minimalist and realist approach to the IGC, a final 
agreement could be swiftly reached and the enlargement negotiations could 
begin promptly. 
* Open model: negotiation of all the aspects whose revision is already provided 
for, as well as whatever other aspects are proposed by individual Member 
States or institutions (as at Maastricht) . The document suggests three 
possibilities: 
- examination of the matters raised but not resolved at earlier conferences 
(e.g. the charter of the fundamental rights and duties of citizens; the 
uniform electoral procedure for elections to the European Parliament; reform 
of the own-resources system; communitarization of Article K.1, paragraphs 
1 to 6; inclusion of the EDF in the Community budget; amendment of Article 
N ( 1); possible inclusion of a 'list of powers'; reform of the cohesion 
instruments; development of industrial policy; reform of the budget 
procedure, etc.); 
- a root-and-branch reform of the Treaties. Acceptance of such an approach 
by all concerned is highly unlikely in present circumstances. It would, in 
particular, require acceptance of the notion of 'variable geometry', either 
right from the beginning of the conference or at the final stage; in 
addition, it would be necessary to amend Article N, which would only be 
possible with the unanimous agreement of the Member States; 
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- regression or involution of the system (a possible but unlikely scenario, 
according to the document) through something like a I Europe a la carte I 
approach. This would endanger the survival of two key components of the 
existing system, namely the single institutional framework (Article C of the 
Treaty on European Union) and the preservation of the acguis communautaire 
(Article N(2), taken in relation with Articles A and B). 
* An intermediate formula: this would entail coordinating a two-pronged 
negotiation. Two components would be negotiated and implemented either 
simultaneously or separately. The first would involve dealing with the 
aspects provided for at Maastricht, Ioannina and Corfu and clearing the way 
for the accession negotiations; the second would consist of negotiations to 
bring about a major qualitative leap, especially once a certain number of 
Member States had embarked on the third stage of EMU around 1999, thus making 
it possible to conclude the great eastward and southward expansion. 
The choice of model is considered to be a separate issue from the question of 
the legal form to be taken by the results of the conference. The document argues 
that the outcome could be either a new treaty or a European constitution (the 
latter would confer greater transparency on the process of European integration, 
but would also unleash a significant nationalist backlash). Whatever the 
political option chosen, the Spanish document considers that the final text must 
be clear and concise, and as accessible as possible, in the interests of 
transparency; it should simplify the existing legal and formal s~ructures, 
supersede such texts nS have become obsolete or redundant, and be drafted with 
maximum comprehensibility and precision. The last pages of the document are 
concerned w~th the importance of consensus and transparency and the need for the 
debate on the IGC to ~nclude political bodies, social forces and the media, and, 
indeed, society as a whole. 
Another of the key issues taken up by the Spanish document is that of the 'great 
questions' of the 1996 IGC. The text makes preliminary reference to the various 
existing concepts of Europe, and argues that the choice is now between two 
approaches. One option is to continue with integration on the basis of 
exclusively free-market and largely intergovernmental criteria, with minimal 
cost to the budget, a wide margin of national autonomy and subsidiarity as the 
golden rule (the document attributes this approach to the UK, France and even 
Germany); the other is to strengthen the central authority, thus ensuring the 
operation of generously financed common pol~cies and greater political 
neutrality in approaches to policy and decision-making (the proponents of this 
supranational option are named as Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg and - until 
recently- Italy). The text also makes preliminary reference to the various 
compromises between the two approaches which have been advanced in the context 
of 'variable geometry' or 'reinforced solidarity', considering this to be the 
most practicable means of superseding the anti thesis between widening and 
deepening of the Union. Any such compromise would, however, be subject to six 
conditions: 'last-resort' status; openness to all; the existence of accompanying 
measures to strengthen global coherence and ensure the convergence of those 
lagging behind; preservation of the entire acguis communautaire; retention of 
the single institutional framework; and compatibility with political stability 
in Europe. 
The specific issues discussed in the document include economic and monetary 
union. In this connection, it seems clear that Spain would prefer not to raise 
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the subject, so as to avoid the introduction of new convergence criteria such 
as unemployment or the trade deficit. It is, however, recognized that the 
modification of the qualified majority threshold laid down in Article 148 of the 
Treaty will inevitably affect the transition to the final stage of EMU (since 
Article 109j(2) requires that the relevant Council decision be made by qualified 
majority vote); note is also taken of Article 104c, with its provisions for 
sanctions in the case of excessive deficits. The document also considers the 
solidarity mechanisms and the question of economic and social cohesion. Although 
these aspects are not, in principle, included on the IGC agenda, the document 
notes that they may nonetheless be raised in the context of global reform or 
examination of the financial implications of enlargement, and, should this be 
the case, proposes consideration of the following subjects: total elimination 
of the regressive effects of the third own resource (VAT); strengthening of the 
Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund; introduction of a fifth, progressive own 
resource; and, possibly, new alternatives such as introduction of a fiscal 
'equalization mechanism'. It is considered that in real terms the provisions on 
economic and social cohesion are unlikely to be modified before the year 2000, 
unless change is made necessary by new accessions. 
The Spanish text also raises the question of incorporating new powers in the 
fields of energy, tourism and civil protection. No positions are anticipated in 
this respect, but it seems likely that Spain will continue to advocate a joint 
energy authority, while remaining unconvinced of the need for a Community 
tourist policy; as far as civil protection is concerned, Spain will probably 
call for an explicit reference to the principle of 'the necessary means', to 
ensure that the Union does not take decisions committing the Member States to 
expenditure outside the Community budget. 
With regard to policy areas falling outside the ourelv economic sohere, such as 
education, health and culture, Spain is clearly in favour of strengthened 
Community action, and is, accordingly, opposed to any attempt to reduce the 
Union's powers in these fields. In the case of policies entailing a substantial 
cost to the Member State economies, in such areas as the environment, consumer 
protection, R & D, social policy, taxation and the major networks, the Spanish 
text argues that the main problem lies in replacing unanimity by qualified 
majority voting, given the considerable political, economic and social 
implications. It may be concluded that Spain will lay particular stress on 
identifying certain 'excepted' areas to which unanimity will still apply and/or 
designing weighted voting arrangements which will ensure maximum protection of 
national interests. 
Concerning the 'second pillar' (the CFSP), the Spanish text confines itself to 
suggesting fairly limited reforms and proposing various practical measures. It 
makes a distinction between the areas of foreign policy and common defence and 
security. With regard to foreign policy, the document lists a number of subjects 
which could be raised, including: unanimity versus qualified majority voting 
(the former is seen as tending to favour the lowest common denominator); the 
desirability or otherwise of creating some kind of nerve-centre for the CFSP at 
Union level (the document takes the view that the proposals in this area seem 
to ignore the potential of the CFSP directorate which has been set up at the 
Council secretariat); the role of the Commission and the possible strengthening 
of its power of initiative (no specific proposals are made); the role of 
Parliament (on which the document simply summarizes the wide range of existing 
views); participation of the members in the UN Security Council (this is felt 
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to be more a legal than a political possibility); indirect reform of the EU's 
system of representation (presidency/troika) laid down in Article J.S (a higher 
profile for the presidency is advocated); and cooperation between EU Member 
States in third countries. The document also considers other aspects not 
necessarily involving a formal revision of the Treaty. These include: the 
establishment of priori ties for the Union extending beyond the six-month 
presidencies; the need for a less cumbersome system for political dialogue 
between the EU and third countries or groups of countries; the need to clear up 
the legal ambiguities surrounding the common positions adopted under the CFSP; 
and clarification of the question of the CFSP's financing. 
With regard to common defence and security matters, the document proposes that 
the provisions on security should be revised on the basis of two procedures, 
conceived as distinct but complementary: more use should be made of, on the one 
hand, the conciliation mechanisms (common positions) in the context of 
international organizations and conferences which are provided for in Article 
J.2, and, on the other, the provisions for joint action in the area of the CFSP. 
Concerning the redefinition of EU-WEU relations, the document sets out three 
basic options: full inclusion of defence as an integral component of the Union; 
maintenance of the status quo, preserving the autonomous but interrelated 
character of both organizations; and various in-between measures which would 
pave the way for a gradual convergence. The option chosen would imply an attempt 
to respond in one way or another to a whole series of questions, including: 
financing; parliamentary control; how many countr~es, and wh~ch, should take 
part; and such operational matters as the relation to the EU or the WEU of 
multinational European military units and the creat~on of a common market in 
arms following revision of Article 223. 
On the subject of the third pillar (justice and home affairs), one may infer 
from the document that there is a clear prior unwillingness on Spain's part to 
contemplate replacing the present unanimity requirement with qualified majority 
voting (this clearly affects the prospects for 'communitarization' ), above all 
with respect to the free movement of persons and the external frontiers (given 
the Gibraltar problem). The same applies to asylum (as long as the law of some 
Member States allows asylum to be granted to nationals of other Member States) 
and immigration (until a genuine overall immigration policy is devised). Spa~n 
would, however, appear to be favourable to replacing unanimity by qualified 
majority voting in the areas of drugs legislation and harmonization of civil and 
criminal law. The document further proposes replacing the existing bilateral 
extradition agreements by a multilateral agreement or other provision; this 
would simplify extradition and make it automatic between Member States. No 
specific positions are expressed on police cooperation or on the notion of 
common customs facilities at the external frontiers. Finally, the document 
implies that Spain is in favour of strengthening the institutional apparatus by 
enhancing the role of all the other Community institutions, including the Court 
of Auditors. 
Another of the key aspects of the IGC discussed in the document is institutional 
reform. The main positions expressed on the subject are as follows: 
* With respect to the Council, the document anticipates a possible 
strengthening of its powers. On the matter of the voting rules, the first 
aspect discussed is the replacement of unanimity by gualified majority 
voting. It is already clear that Spain believes that in the case of decisions 
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in such areas as the second and third pillars, fiscal harmonization, 
industrial policy, social security and social welfare in general, the major 
networks, the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, the quality of public 
services and the environment, the unanimity rule should either be retained 
or replaced by a requirement involving an 'extended qualified majority' (or, 
on a rather less likely hypothesis, by excluding the area concerned from the 
Union's competence, or else by a combination of the above options). As 
regards the blocking majority/minority, the document sets out a number of 
alternatives: maintenance of the Ioannina compromise or something similar 
after enlargement; revision of the existing weighting arrangements in such 
a way that two large countries (or six including Spain and Poland) plus one 
small or medium-sized country could obtain a blocking minority, by awarding 
such a grouping two extra votes for the purpose; fixing the blocking minority 
at a higher level as a general rule, but exceptionally providing for an 
alternative arrangement entailing a smaller number of votes representing at 
least three Member States with a total population of over 100m; introducing 
a double voting system (number of votes plus a certain percentage of total 
population, or number of votes plus a minimum number of Member States); or, 
finally, introducing 'sectoral' blocking minorities, i.e. establishing 
different weighting arrangements in accordance with the subjects or policies 
voted on, following the precedents set by Article 28 of the ECSC Treaty or 
Article 129d of the Treaty on European Union. 
The document also considers possible changes in the weighting of votes, the 
aim being to bring individual Member States' weight in Council more into line 
with population. It is argued that the most satisfactory arrangement would 
be to give two extra votes to Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Spain and, when 
the time comes, Poland, in the context of a future enlarged Union of thirty 
or so members. In addition, reference is made to the double weighting system 
(votes plus population or votes plus number of Member States) as ment1oned 
above, as well as the problems raised by 'micro-states'. With respect to the 
leadership and coordination of the Council and the presidency, the document 
appears to favour a stronger presidency. It summarizes a number of formulas 
which could help give the presidency greater continuity: a longer time 
period; the creation of 'presidential teams', consisting of four or five 
large groupings of Member States representing different 'national 
peculiarities', each corresponding to some 100 m inhabitants, which would 
serve for one year or 18 months; a 'troika'-type presidency (consisting of 
one large country and two small or medium-sized countries), with a term of 
office of at least 18 months; an 'elective' presidency, with a term of office 
of at least one year; and a presidency responsible for external 
representation over a two-and-a-half-year period (the presidential role would 
be filled by a 'personality', with the pres1dents of the Council and 
Commission as vice-presidents). With regard to simplicity and transparency, 
the document suggests that endeavours should be made to devise a formula for 
opening up debates to the public where the Council is acting in its 
legislative capacity, while maintaining confidentiality where it meets in its 
executive role. 
* Concerning the Commission, the document firstly considers the issue of its 
membership and size, raising the following possibilities: there could be 
substantially less commissioners than Member States, with genuinely viable 
portfolios and a permanent commissioner's post for each large country plus 
rotation of the remaining portfolios among the smaller Member States; there 
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could be as many commissioners as Member States (this is felt not to be 
efficient); the status quo (two commissioners for each large country and one 
for each of the rest) could be kept, but with the creation of a distinction 
between 'full' and 'assistant' commissioners; or, finally, a Council-type 
system of weighted voting could be introduced for the Commission. With regard 
to the appointment of commissioners, the document sets out a number of 
options without advocating any of them; the same applies to the question of 
control and political responsibility of the Commission. The text raises the 
possibility of Parliament being entrusted with the day-to-day monitoring of 
the Commission's actions, while on the question of initiative it confines 
itself to presenting the various possibilities without opting for any 
particular one. 
* Regarding the European Parliament, the document expects that the IGC will see 
a crucial and heated debate on the various aspects of the strengthening of 
Parliament's powers. With regard to the extension of Parli.?l!lgrJ.t ' _ _;;;_J~_gislati ve 
powers, the text predicts that there will be considerable scope for progress 
through an extension of the field of application of the codecision procedure; 
this concept should, it is argued, logically be v1ewed in clcse relation to 
majority decision-making. A debate is also proposed on the unificatlon of all 
the existing legislative procedures into two or three modelE. or even one 
single model, in the interests of simplification. In the secc~d place, the 
document argues that the discussions will focus on the questions of 
legislative h1erg_rc_tly and legislative initiative; no soer~·cJ::cc ,croposals are 
made here. Th1rdly, concerning the number and distrlb~ti~D-~t. ;;eats and the 
voting procedure§, the text proposes that the number of M~Ps should be 
between 650 and 700, and advocates reducing the present d1sproportionate 
aspects of the ration of seats to population: there should be an 
across-the-board cut in the number of seats allocated to each Member State. 
Reform of the voting procedures is advocated with respect to the decislon-
making processes and to certain majorities, such as that required for a vote 
of censure against the Commission. 
The document suggests that the debate should include the controversial issue 
of the uniform electoral procedure; it would not be necessary to amend the 
Treaty in this connection, as the Council could adopt any decision 
unanimously, but such a reform should mean the direct incorporation of the 
procedure into nat1onal law, which would in some cases require constitutional 
reforms. It is considered to be impossible in practice to obtain acceptance 
of the notion of monitoring of the Council by Parliament; it is, however, 
felt that Parliament can be given more powers in the areas of the second and 
third pillars, and the possibility is also raised of the debate including £ 
review of Parliament's budgetary powers, to encompass Parliament's long-
standing demand concerning abolition of_the distinction between compulsory 
and non-compulsory expenditure, a decision regarding the creation of 
Community taxes and the possible elimination of the assent procedure for 
legislation. 
On the subject of relations between the European Parliament and the national 
parliaments, the document summarizes the main options already put forward: 
generalization of the so-called 'Danish system' (i.e. each national 
parliament would have a select committee concerned with EU matters); joint 
meetings of the European Parliament and the national parliaments, whether in 
the form of large-scale sessions ('Assizes') or via the institutionalization 
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of a large joint assembly of the European Parliament and the national 
parliaments; and the creation of a 'second chamber' which could function as 
a senate or chamber of the regions, a chamber wholly or partially 
representing the national parliaments, or a joint chamber with 
representatives of both the European Parliament and the national parliaments. 
In fact, the document appears to favour the formula of setting up 'joint 
committees' of the European Parliament and the national parliaments on 
subjects related to the second and third pillars only, via 
institutionalization of the existing informal arrangement known as COSAC (the 
Conference of bodies concerned with Community affairs in the Parliaments of 
the European Community). 
* With respect to the Court of Justice, the Spanish text proposes that its 
powers of 'creating' law should be reduced, but that it should be 
compensatorily given the status of 'constitutional court'. Such a move would 
be supported from German - and English - legal doctrine, on the basis of an 
extensive interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity, and would entail 
the revision of Article 177 of the Treaty, which has been the main source of 
the Court's law-creating power in recent years. The document stresses, 
however, that the Court's main and fundamental role is to provide exclusive 
interpretations of Community law, and suggests that its jurisdiction should 
be extended, with the necessary safeguards, to the second and third pillars. 
It also proposes that the appointment of judges should be subject to 
consultation of the European Parliament and/or the European Council. 
* Concerning the other institutions, the document refers firstly to the Court 
of Auditors, raising the following possibilities: review of its number of 
members; review of Article E (equality for the other institutions in respect 
of the second and third pillars) and of Article 173(3) (appeals to the Court 
of Justice); and strengthening of its anti-fraud powers. W1th regard to the 
Committee of the Regions, the document expects that the Spanish delegation 
will be among those interested in promoting its institutional development, 
and suggests that, while the committee is unlikely to become a second 
chamber, it should be upgraded from a purely consultative body into an 
institution proper, with the role of ensuring the correct application of the 
principle of subsidiarity at local and regional level. On the subject of the 
Ombudsman, the document raises the possibility of extending his powers to 
cases of non-application or incorrect application of Community law by the 
Member States. Finally, the Spanish text does not propose any major changes 
for the other institutions or organs (such as the European Central Bank, the 
European Investment Bank or the Economic and Social Committee). 
The Spanish document also gives detailed attention to the question of the 
institutional equilibrium, stressing that any position assumed by Spain on 
this subject must be guided by two principles (as seen above): the acguis 
communautaire and the single institutional framework must be preserved; and 
the existing institutional balance must not be altered, but, rather, must be 
taken as the basis and subjected only to 'upward' modification to avoid any 
leaps in the dark. In this context, the document invokes the principle of 
subsidiarity, recalling that in the past Spain felt that its inclusion 1n the 
Treaty would be unnecessary and counter-productive. With respect to the 
possibility of the IGC witnessing a fresh attempt to revise Article 3b(2l, 
it is clear that Spain will firmly oppose any notion of establishing a l1st 
of the Community's powers; this points to a possible impasse in the 
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negotiations. Furthermore, it may be presumed that any attempt to repeal 
Article 235 of the Treaty will be opposed by Spain with equal firmness. 
Overall, the document takes the view that subsidiarity must under no 
circumstances be used as a weapon, either to limit or to increase the powers 
which have been transferred to the Union; rather, it should be conceived 
purely as an instrument for determining in individual cases, in areas where 
competence is shared without unambiguous delimitation, 'who should do what'. 
The Spanish view is that subsidiarity is no more than an aid for establishing 
whether a particular action, in terms of its scope or its effects, can be 
more effectively carried out at Union or at Member State level. 
The document also discusses the principle of 'the necessary means' enshrined in 
Article F(3) of the Treaty on European Union. It proposes that this principle 
(which is at present not automatically operative, as it is included under 
Title I ['Common Provisions'), rather than Title II) should be brought under the 
Community pillar; this would mean that all decisions would have to be 
accompanied by a specific budget allocation, and that the principle itself could 
be invoked in the Court of Justice. Alternatively, the Spanish text advocates 
mechanisms for the specification and clarification of this principle, offering 
two suggestions, namely a): all proposals for decisions should be accompanied 
by an assessment of their economic impact on the Member States, following which 
the decision should incorporate provision for the necessary resources; and b): 
the financial impact of a decision should be limited by a ceiling on national 
cofinancin9 (which should never exceed 50%}, thus ensuring correct management 
and control of expenditure on programmes and actions by the individual Member 
States. 
With respect to the common policie~, the Spanish document suggests that the 
debate on the possible reform of some of these policies could be relaunched at 
the IGC (this would apply to the cohesion policy, the CAP, the common fisheries 
policy, the common transport policy and policy for the single market). A similar 
proposal is made regarding other policies (competition policy, fiscal 
harmonization, industrial policy, energy policy and social policy) . On the 
subject of Union citizenship and fundamental rights, the text puts forward two 
practical alternatives: either the catalogue of rights contained in the existing 
chapter on 'Citizenship of the Union' should be substantially extended, to 
include, inter alia, a specific article condemning racism and xenophobia; or 
there should be a charter of fundamental rights of the citizens of the Union, 
including, with a view to future enlargements, all the rights considered as 
basic in the context of the acguis communautaire, which would thus receive 
protection from both the Union institutions and the Member States. Reference is 
also made to the need to further specify the concept of 'democratic principles', 
referred to in Article F(1) as the foundation of the Union, for eventualities 
such as a change of regime or violation of those principles. 
On the matter of the language regime, the text confines itself to stressing 
Spain's concern to see Spanish entrenched as one of the Union's working 
languages, since it is quite obviously a major international language. 
Concerning the ratification and implementation of the text emerging from the 
IGC, the document suggests two possibilities: either those Member States with 
reservations could be satisfied by 'opt-out' formulas; or Article N could be 
revised on the basis of a similar formula to that proposed by Parliament in 1984 
in the 'Spinelli project', by means of which resort to unanimity could be 
avoided. It is also suggested that where a Member State failed to ratify 
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following a 'no' vote in a referendum, that country should hold a second 
referendum, and that if that referendum too failed, the country should leave the 
Union. 
A further major theme considered in the Spanish document is the enlargement of 
the Union. The text argues that the major issue here is neither when enlargement 
should happen (after the end of the IGC) nor which countries should be admitted 
(the republics of the former USSR are not considered eligible, at least under 
present circumstances, with the exception of the Baltic republics), but how 
enlargement should take place. According to the text, enlargement will require 
both a genuine deepening of the Union via the IGC and the resolution of the 
problems which will arise in its wake. These problems will be of various types, 
namely: 
- institutional problems: the existing equilibrium will be disturbed in the 
political and economic spheres, and sectors such as Mediterranean agriculture 
could find themselves in a minority; 
- social problems: these are essentially linked to migration, which may well 
principally affect only a small number of Member States; 
- oolitical and security problems: the frontiers of the Union will be extended 
up to the former Soviet republics, thus enlarging the Union's external policy 
concerns and transferring the new members' security problems to the Union; 
- economic problems: the candidate countries must be considered as relatively 
less-favoured, with an income level which in the best of cases is no higher than 
30% of the Community average; 
- above all, financial problems: these will mainly concern CAP funding and the 
economic and social cohesion instruments. With regard to the CAP, the Span1sh 
text advocates an approach based on lengthy transition periods (with frontier 
controls being retained), alongside other measures to be decided later, to 
ensure that enlargement does not harm the interests of the existing Member 
States. On economic and social cohesion, the document suggests two scenarios: 
on the one hand, additional funds could be allocated to the new Member States, 
which would mean a considerable increase in the Community budget; or, should the 
existing level of expenditure be maintained, the existing cohesion funds 
applying to a fifteen-member Community would be diverted to the new eastern 
members, in which case the enlargement bill would fall squarely on the shoulders 
of the existing Community's least-favoured Member States and regions. The 
Spanish text concludes in favour of allocating substantial new funds, arguing 
that this would be more than compensated by the political and economic benefits 
of enlargement. In preference to a revision of the cohesion criteria, the 
document advocates modifying the existing system of own resources or introducing 
a fiscal equalization mechanism as a 'fifth resource'. Concerning the right 
moment for examination of these problems (at the IGC, during the accession 
negotiations or on renewal of the financial perspectives in 1999), it is argued 
that the whole issue of funding should be considered in the mul tiannual 
negotiations on the financial perspectives: it should not be discussed at the 
IGC, since this could jeopardize the conference's success. Spain considers that 
the interinstitutional agreement of 29 October 1993 should not be modified, and 
that, since both agriculture and cohesion are endowed with their own specific 
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review mechanisms in the Treaty, these subjects should be debated not at the IGC 
but in the accession negotiations which will begin after the conference. 
Discussion paper of 4 July 1995 on the WEU: contribution to the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference 
In addition to the presidency of the European Union, Spain currently holds the 
presidency of the WEU. In the Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers held 
in Lisbon on 15 May 1995, the Ministers instructed the Permanent Council of the 
WEU to submit a report for their next meeting in November 1995 in Madrid. To 
this end, the Spanish presidency undertook to submit a discussion paper on the 
WEU's contribution to the IGC, which would provide a basis for the report of the 
Permanent Council. The document analysed below is designed to lay the 
foundations for initial discussions on the matter within the WEU. At the same 
time, it includes an assessment of progress made so far and proposals for the 
future from three angles: WEU relations with the European Union; WEU relations 
with the Atlantic Alliance; and the WEU's operational role. WEU/EU relations and 
WEU/NATO relations are complementary and each strengthens the other, even where 
the nature of the various organizations differs. The document is therefore based 
on the assumption that the existing interaction and links between them will be 
fundamental when the decisions emerging from the IGC are adopted. 
The first section of the document includes an assessment of the 2~Qoress made 
in the field of European security and defence since t;he._E:V_._T_L~.<!tx:- It analyses 
the development of relations between the EU and the WEU, assess1ng the results 
and identifying shortcomings. Secondly, the document analyses relations between 
the WEU and NATO, also assessing progress and difficulties. Finally, the 
document considers the progress made and problems encountered in developing the 
WEU's operational role. 
On the question of relations between the WEU and the European Union, the 
document notes a number of significant steps forward and some shortcomings. 
Progress is generally being made in implementing the plans for establishing 
cooperation between the Councils and Secretariats of the WEU and EU begun in 
Autumn 1994. Significant progress has also been made in setting up systems for 
information and consultation between the Commission and the WEU and in 
synchronizing their respective presidencies as from 1 July 1994. The invitation 
to participate in the WEU has been accepted by all the countries of the Union 
which were not members of the WEU, but disparities as regards status have led 
to asymmetry between the two organizations which is hindering the WEU's full 
development as the Union's defence component. It has not yet been possible to 
synchronize the meeting dates and harmonize the working methods of the two 
organizations, and the issue of harmonizing the rotation of their respective 
presidencies has also yet to be resolved. Furthermore, closer cooperation 
between the parliamentary assembly of the WEU and the European Parliament has 
not in fact been set in motion. Finally, neither of the two organizations has 
adopted the practical agreements necessary to enable the WEU to carry out its 
task of drawing up and implementing those decisions and actions of the Union 
which have repercussions in the field of defence, an issue which is a key 
element of relations between the WEU and EU. 
On the question of relations between the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, the 
Spanish presidency document considers the way in which paragraph 4 of the WEU 
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Declaration of 10 December 1991 has been implemented. That paragraph affirms 
that the objective of relations between the WEU and NATO is to develop the WEU 
as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To 
this end, the Spanish document assesses the way in which the role, 
responsibilities and contribution of the EU Member States to the Atlantic 
Alliance have been strengthened and analyses the measures taken to develop 
further the relations and links between the work of the WEU and the Atlantic 
Alliance. In relation with this second line of action and on the question of 
coordination between the WEU Member States vis-a-vis the affairs of the Atlantic 
Alliance, the document notes the major political and practical difficulties 
encountered in making more frequent use of the possibility of putting forward 
joint positions in the consul tat ion process of the Atlantic Alliance. The 
document also reflects that there has as yet been no opportunity to asses the 
implementation of the process of consultation between the WE and NATO on how to 
respond to future threats. However, the document notes that clear progress has 
been made in holding joint councils, which have increased from one in 1992 to 
four annual meetings in 1995. Other procedures have been used to coordinate 
matters of common interest such as the exchange of documents between the two 
organizations, correspondence between their respective secretaries-general, 
joint meetings of experts, liaison meetings between the two secretariats, etc. 
The Spanish document also refers to the progress made in a number of low-key 
areas such as synchronizing the dates and places of meetings (in line with a 
tacit agreement that ordinary meetings of the Permanent Councils of the WEU are 
held on different days of the week and WEU ministerial councils are held before 
those of the Atlantic Alliance), and in harmonizing the working methods of the 
two organizations. On the question of closer cooperation between the WEU and 
NATO secretariats, the Spanish document notes that significant progress has been 
made following the security agreement reached between the two organizations 
(mutual attendance at meetings, exchange of · information, joint use of 
communication systems, cooperation in developing the CJTF concept (combined 
joint task forces), contacts between the respective secretariats and military 
bodies, etc). Finally, the document affirms that a positive assessment can be 
made of the progress achieved as regards relations between the WEU and NATO. 
even though that progress corresponded more to what was possible than to that 
which might have been considered necessary and a large number of questions 
concerning WEU-NATO relations remain to be resolved. The third main topic of the 
first section of this document analyses the WEU's operational role. It begins 
by evaluating the implementation of the agreements made in Maastricht and the 
declaration of 10 December 1991 on studying and defining the tasks, structures 
and instruments of the WEU. The document notes significant progress as regards 
implementing the measures adopted to strengthen the WEU's operational role, but 
points out that the process cannot be considered concluded nor sufficiently put 
to the test as regards its actual operation. It stresses that the Spanish 
presidency's programme for the second half of 1995 highlights the aim of putting 
the new political-military structures agreed at the Lisbon Ministerial Council 
of May 1995 into operation, involving the setting-up of a new political-military 
group to support the Council, a situation centre and an intelligence section in 
the WEU planning cell. The Spanish presidency also proposes an exercise in 
crisis management to test whether such instruments will actually help evaluate 
the effectiveness of procedures and redefine once more the concept of military 
forces answerable to the WEU (FAWEUs). The document notes that agreements on 
funding with regard to the WEU's activities and the operations to be carried out 
are of particular relevance. 
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The second section of the Spanish document concerns the future of the European 
security and defence identity. In the light of the critical assessment outlined 
above, the Spanish document lists a series of suggestions aimed at achieving the 
objectives set out in the Treaty on European Union. These proposals mainly refer 
to the question of institutional relations between the EU and the WEU, without 
forgetting operational aspects and the Atlantic dimension. Given the wide range 
of perceptions in the Member States in relation to this issue, the Spanish 
presidency has chosen to submit a document setting out various options which 
might eventually lead to the drawing-up of a joint position by those Member 
States which belong to the WEU regarding the future institutional links between 
that organization and the European Union. 
The document begins by listing a series of Premises on which, in the opinion of 
the Spanish presidency, there is consensus in all the EU Member States and on 
which the WEU's contribution to revising the institutional system of the Union 
Treaty should be based. These premises are: the key objective is to make 
progress in constructing the European security and defence identity; the current 
points of view of each Member State whose national security and defence is 
affected must be respected; whatever form the future institutional development 
of the two organizations might take, the system which currently makes it 
possible for associated members of the WEU, observers and associated partners 
to participate in the construction of the European security and defence identity 
must be maintained; the principle of national sovereignty should continue to 
govern relations between European countries as regards security and defence and, 
consequently, the decision-making process in such areas must continue to be 
based on the consensus rule as opposed to any other decision-making procedure 
based on majority voting in any form; and the possible participation of 
supranational bodies in the decision-making process must be restricted. The 
document also affirms that the European security and defence identity must not 
abdicate the task of collective defence in the form already enshrined in the WEU 
Treaty, even though implementation would preferably take place in the context 
of the Atlantic Alliance. At all events, a common defence policy should include 
a guarantee of mutual defence as an expression of solidarity between Europeans. 
the document also establishes the premise that the Atlantic Alliance must remain 
a central element of European security and that relations with NATO should not 
be substantially changed, regardless of the institutional form which the 
European security and defence identity might take in future. Decisions taken at 
the forthcoming IGC in this area should therefore also aim to strengthen common 
defence in the context of the Atlantic Alliance. Finally, the Spanish document 
affirms that the development of the European security and defence identity 
should go hand in hand with a close relationship between Europe and its North 
American allies. A further priority aim should be to strengthen European 
operational capacities and implement the agreements needed to ensure that 
European cooperation on defence reaches the necessary level of effectiveness and 
credibility. 
On the basis of these premises, the Spanish document sets out a series of 
possible theoretical options for the future of the European security and defence 
identity, taking account of the various approaches taken in European countries 
towards the institutional development of the WEU and the European Union. The 
document studies three basic options: enhanced cooperation between an autonomous 
WEU and the EU; a range of intermediate options designed to bring about a 
convergence between the EU and the WEU; and the possibility that the EU would 
itself assume the European defence role. 
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With regard to the first of these options, i.e. enhanced cooperation between an 
autonomous WEU and the EU ('option A'l, the document concludes that this would 
involve concentrating the WEU's work on developing European operational 
capacities in crisis management while maintaining the institutional status quo 
established in Maastricht in the short and medium term, and that there would 
therefore be no change following the Intergovernmental Conference. The Spanish 
document states that there is a general consensus on the need for such 
operational improvements, which would apply to all the options considered. 
Nevertheless, this solution would postpone, at least in the short term, the 
question of the institutional framework for the European security and defence 
identity, whose subsequent development might help make the actions of the EU and 
the WEU more consistent and take account of any enlargement of the two 
organizations. 
Under option A, therefore, the current legal form of the European institutions 
responsible for defence would remain unchanged. The WEU would remain an 
autonomous organization based on its own independent treaty, and the 
institutional relationship between the EU and the WEU would basically remain the 
same as under the EU Treaty. Endeavours would be made to ensure that the WEU 
acted in closer cooperation with the EU at all levels, with the initial priority 
being to foster the WEU's ability to carry out the tasks entrusted to it by the 
Petersberg Declaration. The current differentiated institutional structure vis-
a-vis third states belonging to either organization would remain, but with 
cooperation being strengthened, and associated WEU States, observers and 
associate members might be offered the possibility of taking part in WEU actions 
where necessary, on a case-by-case basis. With regard to the decision-making 
procedure on matters with defence implications, the basic rule of consensus 
should be strictly maintained as at present, both in the field of the CFSP and 
within the framework of the WEU. Furthermore, the implementation of a Union 
decision by the WEU would still require the full consent of all the EU Member 
States and all full members of the WEU. Maintaining the current institutional 
structure would also involve preserving the existing bodies of the WEU, which 
would remain completely independent of the bodies of the EU. In particular, the 
Council of Ministers, the Permanent Council and the Parliamentary Assembly would 
retain their present roles and functions, although enhanced cooperation between 
the two institutions would be given political form by setting up a WEU Summit 
which might hold joint meetings with the European Council where necessary. In 
order to increase its effectiveness, this enhanced cooperation between the EU 
and the WEU should include coordinating objectives in individual operations, 
agreement on the powers and responsibilities of their respective bodies, the 
drawing-up of joint assessments and cooperation between the CFSP secretariat and 
WEU bodies in monitoring major operations. This would involve closer working 
links between the WEU and the EU at lower levels in addition to the summit, 
while WEU and EU institutional relations with NATO would remain unchanged. 
As 'option B', the Spanish document sets out a series of intermediate options 
aimed at ensuring convergence between the European Union and the WEU. Option B 
would involve a number of changes to the current institutional situation aimed 
at implementing the military operational aspects of EU decisions more quickly 
and more effectively, underlining the WEU's role as an executive body of the EU 
and setting a clear goal for the development of current l1nks between the EU and 
the WEU. The various intermediate options would retain the distinction between 
membership of the EU and of the WEU, the current differences in status, and 
respect for individual national positions concerning security and defence 
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matters. More specifically, participation in any military operation where troops 
are committed would be subject to a national decision in each particular case. 
On the question of the decision-making procedure, the possibility for the WEU 
to decide automatically on its own actions, without prejudicing any actions 
which it might be required to undertake to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it by 
the EU, would be retained as at present, while EU procedures for adopting 
decisions directed at the WEU under the CFSP should be improved. The 
intermediate options would also involve retaining the current structure of WEU 
bod1es with the same improvements already proposed in option A, with the aim of 
facilitating relations with the Union, which would be made all the more 
necessary given the greater influence EU decisions would have over the 
functioning of the WEU. The document outlines a number of possible solutions. 
The 1ntermediate options would 1nvolve concluding financial agreements between 
the WEU and the EU so as to ensure that the EU provided the funds necessary for 
the WEU to carry out the operations decided on by the Union. Relations with NATO 
should be maintained and strengthened. The key difference between the various 
intermediate options described below and the initial option of retaining full 
institutional autonomy for the WEU clearly lies in the establishment of firm 
legal and/or political agreements between the two organizations. Depending on 
the form which such agreements might take, the Spanish document outlines three 
1ntermediate options and arrangements: 
As option B.1, the Spanish presidency document proposes provisions enabling the 
EU to establish general guidelines for WEU actions. In this case, the revision 
of the Treaty on European Union would grant the Union a greater political role 
in defence matters which would enable it to establish a framework for military 
action by the WEU, particularly in a crisis. To this end, the European Council 
would also be responsible for drawing up general guidelines for action on 
matters with defence implications. Such blueprints would be addressed both to 
the other EU bodies and to the WEU as the organization empowered to implement 
the appropriate military measures required by decisions adopted by the Council 
of the European Union. This would take the form of a political agreement 
reflecting the new requirements of the revised Treaty on European Union, which 
the WEU would subscribe to by amending the Declaration of 10 December 1991. 
As intermediate option B.2, the Spanish document proposes provisions enabling 
the EU to give instructions to the WEU. In such cases, Article J.4(2) of the 
Treaty on European Union might be reworded so as to clarify that the WEU is 
politically and operationally subordinate to the EU and that its main function 
1s to implement the decisions adopted by the EU. As part of the same approach, 
the revision of the EU Treaty might also make it possible for the EU to adopt 
decisions on joint actions with defence implications. 
Finally, as intermediate ootion B.3, the Spanish document suggests the 
establishment of a legally binding relationship between the EU and the WEU. This 
option would retain the separation of the EU and the WEU and, therefore, the 
validity of the amended Brussels Treaty. It would however alter the legal form 
of the EU-WEU institutional framework by establishing the legally binding nature 
of agreements between the EU and the WEU with a view to strengthening the WEU's 
role as a body responsible for implementing the decisions adopted by the EU. The 
document goes on to outline the features to be addressed in such a legally 
binding agreement. 
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Option C would entail the EU assuming the European defence function. Under 
option C, which would mean fusing the WEU and the EU, the problems arising from 
institutional diversity - which would remain under options A and B above - would 
be resolved once and for all. Moreover, the fusion of the two organizations 
would be consistent with a process of European integration which has always been 
considered incomplete because of the lack of a security and defence dimension 
within the framework of the EU. The Spanish document is realistic in 
acknowledging the difficulties which might be posed by simply fusing the WEU 
with the EU, bearing in mind the specific nature of defence issues, and the 
document itself suggests that a fusion agreement at the IGC appears unlikely, 
but that the IGC might indeed reaffirm the long-term goal of EU-WEU integration 
and might even set a timetable for achieving this aim. To this end, the document 
proposes three different procedures which might be seen as a series of steps. 
In general terms, the third option would involve the Union's assuming all the 
functions currently fulfilled by the WEU as regards security and defence. The 
first legal consequence of WEU-EU fusion would be the disappearance of the 
amended Brussels Treaty, making use of the provision for revoking the Treaty 
after 1998 contained in Article 12. At the same time, a legal framework for 
defence matters would be established within the EU, and its provisions would be 
integrated into the Community system when the EU Treaty is rev1.sed. At 
operational level, EU-WEU fusion would involve the full integrat1.on of the 
various crisis management instruments, while reducing the extent of duplication 
in the decision-making process, which tends to delay action. Joint actions with 
defence implications would be more workable and would have the advantage of 
joint funding under the Community budget or through specific agreements. 
Contributing troops would remain subject to a national decision, while 
participation through other forms of support and joint action and in joint 
funding would make European crisis-management operations more effective. The 
operational means necessary for such actions might be obtained through specific 
agreements with NATO or by developing complementary WEU and EU possibilities. 
Under this option, current relations between the WEU and NATO would be replaced 
by a direct relation between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance. According to the 
Spanish document, the legal framework of the new European security and defence 
identity envisaged under option C might take one of the three forms outlined 
below, depending on the EU area in which the collective defence commitment was 
placed and on the decision-making process itself. 
Firstly, European defence should be made part of the second pillar (option C. 1). 
This would involve incorporating all defence aspects in the CFSP and the main 
body of the EU Treaty, while offering those states not able to participate in 
the collective defence agreement the possibility of an opt-out clause on defence 
issues. Direct links should be established between the EU and NATO, and the 
remaining European allies should be involved in the defence aspects of the CFSP. 
This approach would thus involve incorporating the main provisions of the 
amended Brussels Treaty in the main body of the new Union Treaty, especially as 
regards Article V (collective defence commitment) and perhaps also Articles IV 
(relations with NATO), VI (relations with the UN) and VII (ban on direct 
alliances against another contracting party). Under this option, the basic rule 
of consensus would be preserved and the bodies already set up for the CFSP would 
basically remain unchanged. The Parliamentary Assembly would disappear and its 
defence functions would be taken on by the European Parliament in accordance 
with its own rules under the CFSP, while the Commission would be involved in 
such tasks in the same way as it is currently involved in the CFSP. Delegates 
from the armed forces, the planning cell, the Institute for Security Studies, 
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the satellite centres and the WEU' s operational capacities and cooperation 
structures relating to arms would be assigned to the EU bodies. 
Ootion C.2 would involve a procedural exception being made for defence within 
the framework of the CFSP. If the current CFSP decision-making system were not 
maintained as in option C. 1 above, and if, for example, a majority-voting system 
were adopted in the near future, an exception should be made for defence 
matters, to which the provisions of the previous CFSP would continue to apply. 
In order to preserve sovereignty and the rule of consensus with regard to 
matters of European security, if the revision of the Union Treaty were to 
involve adopting a majority-voting system as a general rule for CFSP decisions 
and strengthen the current role of the Commission and Parliament in this 
context, appropriate provisions should be introduced to ensure that security 
matters continued to be dealt with under a different system. An exception for 
defence matters would make it possible to continue applying the procedure laid 
down for the current CFSP. More specifically, there would be no majority voting 
on defence matters, there would be no co-decision for the European Parliament, 
the Commission would have no exclusive right of initiative and its participation 
in this field would not go beyond the limits set down in the present EU Treaty. 
Finally, as option C.3, the Spanish document addresses the possible adoption of 
a protocol on defence matters annexed to the EU Treaty. In this case, only 
security and defence matters linked to crisis management would be incorporated 
in the second pillar, with a direct link being made between the CFSP and its 
military application, while at the same time a defence protocol would be 
adopted, to be annexed to the Union Treaty, including the collective defence 
clause currently contained in the Brussels Treaty; those states which are 
currently unable to sign this protocol might do so in the future. Defence would 
thus be integrated into the European Union in such a way as to ensure that no 
country was obliged to accept the collective defence clause, nor to take the 
explicit step of opting out from this area. The bulk of the provisions on the 
European security identity, in which all the Member States might participate, 
would thus be included in the main body of the new Treaty, while a collective 
defence protocol open to all Member States of the EU wishing to join it would 
be incorporated as an annex to the Treaty. 
In its conclusions, the Spanish document focuses on strengthening the European 
security and defence identity in operational and institutional terms. In 
connection with the former, the document stresses that there is a broad 
consensus on the need to acquire the necessary operational capacities for 
European military action, particularly in the field of crisis management in 
accordance with the tasks conferred in Petersberg, while pointing out that the 
bulk of the organizational measures agreed in Maastricht in this connection have 
yet to be fully developed and that additional efforts are necessary to provide 
appropriate, effective and credible military means. At the same time, agreements 
need to be reached allowing NATO resources to be used by the European allies 
within the framework of the WEU so as to avoid duplication of resources and the 
adverse effects of certain measures on the Atlantic Alliance itself, and 
relations with NATO and the transatlantic link need to be strengthened. Such 
operational measures are required to develop the WEU as the defence component 
of the EU and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance. On the question of strengthening the European security and defence 
identity in institutional terms, the Spanish document sets out the series of 
options and possibilities analyzed above, taking the view that these are 
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theoretically possible and that they already enjoy the support of some Member 
States, while at the same time recommending that a detailed discussion take 
place to reduce the range of options to only one or two. According to the 
Spanish document, existing national differences concern the timetable rather 
than the ultimate goal, which is in each case the gradual development of an 
authentic European security and defence identity without excluding a common 
European defence as a long-term objective. The seguence of options and 
procedures proposed in the Spanish presidency document might follow the order 
outlined above, starting with the options requiring the smallest degree of 
institutional change: option A- option B (B.1. B.2. B.3) -option C (C.3. C.1 . 
.Q.,_ll. 
Finally, the Spanish document affirms that the WEU's contribution to the IGC 
might recommend this sequence of institutional steps, which might even be 
reflected in a proposed timetable for implementation, taking account of the 
various aspects of European security and defence and the requirements of 
European integration. 
Document: 'Elements for a Spanish oosi tion at the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference'. 28 March 1996. 
This document was sent to the parliamentary groups by the Spanish Foreign 
Ministry on 28 March 1996. Its structure and, indeed, its wording and content 
are to a large extent based on the 5 December 1995 report of the Reflection 
Group, chaired by Carlos Westendorp, later Spain's Foreign Minister. The 
document of 28 March 1996, together with the opinion of 29 December 1995 of the 
Joint Committee on the European Union of the Spanish Cortes on the consequences 
for Spain of enlargement of the EU and of its institutional reform (IGC 1996), 
sets out the guiding lines of the Spanish position on the IGC. The first-named 
document adopts, in general terms, the more integrationist approach of the 
Reflection Group's report, thus appropriating it and augmenting its 
effectiveness and impact in the context of the negotiations. 
Like the Reflection Group's report, the Spanish text of 28 March 1996 is divided 
into three main parts. The first is entitled: 'The reform of the European Union: 
a challenge for the future'. It begins by setting out the reasons for reform, 
the mandate of the IGC and the new challenges facing Europe. On these aspects, 
the Spanish text effectively repeats the positions and proposals of the 
Reflection Group's report. The same applies to its discussion of the principles 
and objectives of the IGC. On the subject of differentiated integration, Spain 
rules out any formula which might lead to a 'Europe ala carte'; as far as 
guidelines for flexibility are concerned, the text follows the criteria of the 
Reflection Group. This is also the case for the context and calendar of the 
Conference and the subject of enlargement. In this connection, Spain considers 
it essential that the acguis communautaire should be preserved and developed 
(Articles Band N), seeing this as a basic principle for the existing Member 
States and as a crucial sign that the applicant countries do not wish to see the 
Union's common policies dismantled. At the same time, this should not prevent 
the applicant states from being able to phase the acguis in gradually. Spain 
believes that the IGC should approached separately from the quest1on of the 
impact of enlargement on the future of the Community policies. Spain is in 
favour of enlargement, but opposes any reform of the common policies, especially 
of the CAP. In this connection, Spain insists that, in order to facilitate 
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enlargement, there must be respect for the acguis communautaire and for the 
principle of additionality of resources: the accession of new Member States 
should not require the modification of the Union's policies, but, rather, will 
call for flexible adaptation on the basis of longer or shorter transition 
periods enabling the prospectlve Member States gradually to replace their 
existing national policies by Union policies. Similarly, Spain insists on the 
need to preserve the existing economic and social cohesion between the fifteen 
present Member States, and argues that the costs of bringing in new members 
should be financed by additional resources, with all the partners bearing a 
part. On the scope of the IGC and the need for transparency, the Spanish text, 
once again, faithfully reproduces the positions of the Reflection Group. Spain 
considers that the Conference should provide suitable responses to the internal 
and external challenges facing the Union, advocating a global, inclusive 
approach to the Conference's subject-matter. It is particularly concerned that 
the work of the IGC should be as transparent as possible, to enable the 
institutions, the representatives of civil society and the prospective member 
states to be duly heard when expressing their concerns, and to ensure that 
public opinion is kept suitably informed. Spain believes it vital that the 
substance and work of the IGC should correspond to the expectations that led to 
its convening, feeling that there is an obligation on all parties to the 
Conference to achieve an adequate result. Repeating the positions of the 
Reflection Group, the Spanish government stresses that the priori ties for 
Spain's position at the IGC should concern three main areas of negotiation: 
ensuring that Europe serves its citizens better; improving the workings of the 
Union and preparing it for enlargement; and bolstering the Union's capacity for 
external action. 
The second part of the Spanish document, following the same order as the 
Reflection Group's report, deals with citizenship and the Union. In general, the 
main points of the two texts are here almost identical. Spa1n, like the 
Reflection Group, considers that there are certain common values which the Union 
should protect and develop, and, on the subject of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, supports the inclusion in Article F.2 of the Treaty of an explicit 
reference to the obligation of Member States to respect for such rights and 
freedoms, adding that where such respect is not shown the Union should be 
empowered to act in consequence. With a view to ensuring full respect for 
fundamental freedoms in relations between the EU and Member States and between 
Member States and individuals, Spain supports inclusion in the Treaty of an 
article under which a Member State which seriously and repeatedly violated 
fundamental human rights or basic democratic principles would have its rights 
suspended. Spain supports strengthening the protection of fundamental rights, 
either by incorporating a catalogue of such rights in the Treaty or by including 
provisions in the Treaty enabling the Union, once endowed with legal 
personality, to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. It also 
favours inclusion in the legislative part of the Treaty of the agreement 
attached to the social protocol, as an expression of common European values 
aimed at ensuring that economic integration is accompanied by a suitable social 
climate. Spain supports the inclusion of socio-economic rights, and, in 
particular, the incorporation of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights, as a declaration annexed to the Treaty. On the question of 
non-discrimination, it is in favour of including a general non-discrimination 
clause in the Treaty: this would build on the outlawing of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality in Article 6, also covering gender, race, religion, 
disability, age and sexual orientation. Spain also supports the strengthening 
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and extension to all fields - beyond the principle of equal pay for equal work 
enshrined in Article 119 - of the principle of the full equality of men and 
women: this should be expressed in the Treaty in positive terms, rather than 
solely as the result of an anti-discrimination provision. The Treaty should 
include a reference to integration in all Union programmes and policies from the 
perspective of gender equality. Finally, Spain considers that the Treaty should 
contain an explicit condemnation of racism, xenophobia and intolerance, by means 
of a provision similar to that proposed by Parliament in 1993. With respect to 
Union citizenshiP, Spain advocates its development through further progress 
concerning the concrete citizens' rights already included in the Treaty 
(achievement of unrestricted freedom of movement and residence; full institution 
of diplomatic and consular protection in third countries), the inclusion of new 
rights and the simplification of the Treaty articles relating to citizenship. 
The citizen should have a specific right to information on Union matters and the 
workings of the Union. Open-minded consideration should also be given to 
establishing a form of voluntary service for humanitarian actions. On the 
subject of public services of general interest, Spain believes that the IGC 
should take account of this concept as a principle complementing market 
criteria. What should be protected is general access for the consumer to certain 
services, not the nature of the provider; the Treaty should accordingly contain 
more provJ.sJ.ons, of a more wide-ranging character, on the role of public 
services and services of general interest, to ensure that competition does not 
affect the availability, quality and universal character of the services 
provided to the public. 
On the subject of freedom and internal security, Spain sets out its priorities 
for the IGC. Firstly, action against terrorism must be considered a key 
priority, and effective and urgent results must be insisted on. Spain believes 
that in democratic states where the rule of law prevails it is totally 
unacceptable to classify terrorism as a political offence. The Spanish position 
at the IGC will be that anti-terrorist action must be the primary objective of 
European police cooperation and that the Treaty must explicitly state that 
terrorism is not a political offence and that political grounds must not be 
invoked to justify a refusal to extradite from one Member State to another. 
Spain also argues that the Treaty should explicitly outlaw the possibility of 
a citizen of one Member State being given political refugee status by another. 
Spain considers that in the area of police and judicia-L cooperatJ.On (in both the 
civil and the criminal fields) there should be closer intergovernmental 
cooperation, at least for a certain period, and that meanwhile the 'passerelle' 
procedure under Article K.9 should be made more flexible. Closer cooperation 
would require improvements in the legal instruments (agreements should be 
replaced in some cases, or should enter into force following majority 
ratification) and in the role of the institutions (general joint powers of 
initiative for the Commission, consultation of Parliament and judicial control 
by the Court of Justice). Spain favours considering the possible 
communitarization, in this area, of all aspects relating to the crossing of the 
external frontiers, i.e. of the rules governing foreigners, immigration policy, 
asylum policy (with asylum between Member States being ruled out) and joint 
rules for external frontier controls. At all events, given the nature of all 
these third-pillar subjects, Spain considers that the Conference should support 
greater involvement of the national parliaments, and that the subJects concerned 
should be regulated by means of suitably effective instruments- e.g. directives 
-which provide legal security. The simplification and reduction of the levels 
of decision-making would also increase efficiency in third-pillar matters. Spain 
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supports consideration of incorporation by the Union of the Schengen agreement 
and its acguis, by means of flexible adaptations related to the advances 
achieved in the field of justice and home affairs. 
On employment, Spain considers it vital that the IGC should discuss this subject 
and come up with practical proposals, and takes the view that the Commission, 
the Economic and Finance Council and the Social Affairs Council should continue 
to devote the special attention which they have been deputed to pay to the 
subject: their work of supervision, coordination and information should give 
rise to a framework of joint strategies and reinforcement of the Union's 
economic and social dimensions. Spain proposes that the legal bases of these 
policies should strengthen the objective of job creation, and considers that 
this should be included in the activities listed in Article 3 of the Treaty. It 
also advocates inclusion in the TEU of specific provisions on employment policy 
which would permit more coordinated action and reinforce the status of job 
creation as an objective inherent to all Union policies. Spain therefore 
proposes that the Treaty should institutionalize the conclusions of the Madrid 
European Council. 
On the environment, Spain believes that the initial goal should be to achieve 
suitable implementation of the existing rules, and that it is not necessary to 
reinforce the Treaty provisions. The IGC should examine means of improving the 
effectiveness of Union action and determining where action should remain the 
internal responsibility of Member States. Spain favours retaining the existing 
exceptions in this sphere whereby decisions are made by unanimous vote on quasi-
constitutional matters affecting areas of major sensitivity to Member State 
sovereignty or having a substantial financial impact at national level. Should 
qualified majority voting become the norm for some of these areas in a manner 
satisfactory to Spain, provision should be made to ensure application of the 
twin principles of sufficient resources and subsidiarity. 
Concerning improving transparency in the Union, Spain favours action to ensure 
that the Union's business is more easily accessible and comprehensible to the 
general public. There should be greater use of publicity, information and 
consultation techniques by the Union bodies and institutions, which should pay 
particular attention to facilitating the work of the national parliaments. 
Commission proposals should be announced earlier; there should be more 'green 
papers'; and increasing use of interinstitutional agreements should go hand in 
hand with the necessary general publicization and awareness of their content. 
Transparency can also be increased via application of the principle of 
subsidiarity. Any changes in the Council's organization and working methods 
should be in the interests of greater transparency: individuals should have 
greater access to information, and legislative texts should be better and more 
clearly drafted. Spain believes that the existing text of the Treaty should, 
wherever possible, be simplified so as to be clearer and simpler, thus becoming 
more accessible to members of the public wishing to read and study it. In this 
connection, Spain would support far-reaching changes aimed at producing a more 
straightforward Treaty with a different structure. 
On subsidiarity, Spain does not favour amending Article 3b of the Treaty 
although it could endorse inclusion of the Birmingham and Edinburgh declarations 
in a protocol. Spain believes that the principle of sufficient means should be 
reinforced in the Treaty text as a way of moderating the exercise of Community 
powers. The aim would be not to establish a guarantee that all Community 
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decisions implying Member State expenditure would have Community funding, but 
to encourage the ex ante control of proposals, thus preventing the Union from 
placing unacceptable financial burdens on Member State budgets. The principle 
of sufficient means calls for consistency between the aspirations of those 
making proposals and the resources of those paying for them. The Spanish 
government considers that the correct application of the principle of 
subsidiarity and suitable recognition of the principle of sufficient means 
should facilitate the transition from unanimity to qualified majority voting. 
The third and last part of the Spanish text of 28 March 1996, again following 
the structure and content of the Reflection Group's report, examines the notion 
of an effective and democratic Union. After stressing that the aim of the 1996 
reform is to improve the quality of the Union's workings and that the operation 
of its instruments should be guided by the criteria of efficiency, democracy, 
solidarity, transparency and subsidiarity, the text endorses the principle of 
scrupulous respect for the equal treatment by the institutions of all the 
Union's working languages, stressing that this is an obligation which should be 
strengthened without any need to alter the Treaties. 
Concerning the institutions, Spain believes that, as a matter of priority, any 
reform must entrench the single institutional framework within the TEU as a 
whole, independently of its structure. Institutional reform must also respect 
the institutional balance and the character of the Union. On the European 
Parliament, Spain would accept a ceiling of 700 members, as proposed by 
Parliament itself; concerning the uniform electoral procedure, it considers that 
Article 138{3) of the Treaty should be read as requiring such a procedure to be 
introduced in all the Member States, and favours speedy action to this end. On 
Parliament's legislative role, the text considers, in the first place, the 
question of legislative initiative, arguing that Parliament's powers under 
Article 138b are sufficient. Spain favours reducing the number of leg~slat~ve 
procedures to three: codecision, assent and consul tat ion. Concerning the 
codecision procedure in particular, Spain believes that it should be improved 
and simplified without altering its nature, and would extend its scope to the 
areas currently subject to the cooperation procedure. The text makes no specific 
proposals as regards Parliament's budgetary powers. However, on the matter of 
political control it refers to Parliament's role in the appointment of the 
Commission, considering that the existing approval procedure under Article 158, 
applied for the first time for the present Commission, represents a satisfactory 
balance and does not need changing. On the other hand, as far as control over 
the Commission is concerned, the document takes the view that, irrespective of 
the Commission's membership, its democratic legitimacy should be increased via 
suitable control by Parliament. With respect to the monitoring of 
implementation, the Spanish text distinguishes between implementation by the 
Commission and implementation by the Member States in application of Community 
law, arguing that the powers of Parliament and the Ombudsman should be 
strengthened with respect to anti-fraud action and, in general, scrutiny of the 
executive powers of the institutions. Concerning Parliament's role in the CFSP, 
Spain feels that this cannot be the same as in Community legislation: the 
national Parliaments themselves do not use the same participation mechanisms in 
the definition and monitoring of external policy as they do in internal matters. 
However, Spain considers that the existing Treaty mechanisms should be more 
effectively used in pract~ce, on the basis of Parliament's right to be ~nformed 
and consulted ~n this area. The question of Parliament's role in the field of 
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the third pillar (CJHA) has already been dealt with in the discussion of that 
area above. 
On the subject of the national parliaments, Spain believes that their main role 
in relation to EU decisions should concern the monitoring and control exercised 
by each Member State parliament on the actions of its government in the Council, 
and that it is up to each Member State, not the Union, to determine how this 
activity should be exercised. Spain considers it essential that the national 
parliaments should be supplied with all the requisite information from the Union 
and its institutions, so as not to be taken by surprise. Concerning the 
Commission and Council, Spain proposes that they work in such a way as to 
facilitate the task of the national parliaments; the Treaty could be amended to 
enable each national parliament to receive clear and full documentation in its 
official language and in sufficient time on all substantive legislative 
proposals by the Commission, so that they could study and debate the proposals 
before their discussion and adoption by the Council. On relations between the 
European Parliament and the national parliaments, Spain supports inclusion in 
the Treaty of certain points of Declaration 13 (currently annexed to it). While 
favouring the COSAC formula, Spain does not consider further 
institutionalization of that committee to be required, on the grounds that it 
is precisely its lack of formality which has made it successful. At all events, 
closer links with the national parliaments should not lead to the creation of 
a ne~ institution or permanent body with its own staff and premises, or of a 
second chamber of national MPs. Spain would not, therefore, support the 
institutional~zation of a 'higher consultative committee' of the Union 
consist~ng of national parliamentarians. Equally, it does not favour, as a 
general procedure, holding conferences of the national parliaments as provided 
for ~n Declaration 14 (annexed to the Treaty), in view of the lack of success 
of these when they have actually been held. Finally, as one of the most 
effective means of developing the role of the national parliaments, Spain 
suggests that Commissioners should be able to address those parliaments where 
circumstances make it desirable. 
On the European Council, Spain believes that this body should retain its 
existing functions and that its capacity for action should be strengthened 
through changes to the Treaty and improved working practices. Concerning the 
decision-making mechanisms, the document firstly considers unanimity and 
qualified majority voting. Spain would retain unanimity in decisions concerning 
primary law (Articles N and 0) and the Union's own-resources system, the 
quantitative aspect included. In all cases, these decisions would have to be 
ratified by the national parliaments. Concerning derived law, Spain would be 
willing, for reasons of efficiency, to see qualified majority voting become the 
general rule: this would facilitate decision-making and permit greater coherence 
between the development of the internal market (already governed by QMV) and the 
accompanying policies. Spain believes that under the Community pillar unanimity 
will have to remain for a limited number of decision-making areas, including: 
Article 235 of the TEU; certain decisions with obvious budgetary implications 
for the Member States, such as those of fiscal or social character; the 
Structural Funds; environmental measures; and certain other quasi-constitutional 
decisions such as reform of the Treaties, decisions on new accessions to the 
Union, agreements with third countries, etc. Spain would also tie the QMV 
threshold to the arrangements for the weighting of votes, on the grounds that 
it is high time for population to be properly taken into account in decision-
making: this would require a new system for the weighting of votes in Council 
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and the adoption of a double majority system taking into account both votes and 
population. Spain considers it a matter of priority that the IGC should 
introduce a QMV system enabling the EU to reinforce its effectiveness and 
legitimacy. Spain believes that there should be a new weighting system taking 
greater account of population, and a double majority system based on both votes 
and population. Without going into detail, the Spanish document argues that 
decisions should be taken by a double majority based on both votes and the 
population of the Union. 
Concerning the Council's organization and working methods, Spain believes that 
the General Affairs Council should once again have the role of general 
coordinator of Union business, ensuring the overall coherence of the work of the 
Council in all the fields of the Treaty. To this end, Spain would strengthen 
COREPER in its central role of preparing the meetings of the Council in the 
interests of global coherence. On the matter of publicity, Spain agrees that the 
Council's activities should be more widely publicized: however, as in practice 
it is not easy to separate the Council's legislative debates from its 
discussions as a political institution with executive powers, it feels that what 
is involved in reality is an intensive process of continuous negotiation which, 
if it is to be genuine, should not be open to the public. On the Presidency, 
Spain makes no specific proposals, confining itself to endorsing the importance 
of its role and its crucial responsibility in conducting the Council's affa1rs, 
making a positive evaluation of the system of six-month rotating presidencies 
under the present Treaty. Nonetheless, Spain recognizes that in an enlarged 
Union there may be practical problems which will have to be resolved within the 
limits of the existing Treaty. 
On the Commission, Spain follows the Reflection Group in stressing that the 
raison d'etre of that institution is the defence of the general interest of the 
Community and that its exclusive prerogative of legislative initiative is a key 
element in the Community's institutional balance (without prejudice to the right 
of evocation referred to in the Treaty or the possible inclusion of an 
obligation to reply to requests). Spain considers that legislative proposals 
should lapse at the end of a parliamentary term unless the Commission 
specifically determines otherwise. The Commission's role as guarantor of the 
Treaties is seen as an essential function of the 1nst1tut1on which must be 
retained. As far as its executive powers are concerned, Spain favours continuing 
with the existing division of powers under which the executive role is shared 
by the Commission and the Council. It views the Commission, as a collegiate 
body, as being under the obligation to exercise its powers on the basis of full 
responsibility, and therefore opposes any transfer of the Commission's executive 
powers to specialized agencies. Spain believes an effort must be made to ensure 
the full and equitable application of legislation and Community obligations. The 
subject of the Commission's powers under the third pillar has already been dealt 
with above; its role in the CFSP will be considered later, in the analysis of 
that policy. On the important subject of the membership of the Commission, Spain 
refers to two possible approaches: either the existing system based on Article 
157(1) of the Treaty is retained, i.e. there continue to be two Commissioners 
each for the larger Member States and one each for the others; or an optimum 
number of Commissioners for dealing with the Commission's task on settled on, 
and there are therefore less Commissioners than Member States. Spain considers 
that the option by which there would be one Commissioner per Member State, do1ng 
away with the second Commissioner whom the five largest Member States now have, 
would be a cause of imbalance and a step in the wrong direction: it would amount 
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to 'renationalizing' the Commission, turning into a species of Council deciding 
by simple majority vote, with a negative effect on the representation of 
population in decision-making. Spain therefore believes that this option should 
only be considered if it is accompanied by a reform of the voting arrangements 
on the Commission by which weighted voting based on population would be 
introduced. 
Concerning the other Union institutions and bodies, the Spanish text, once again 
following the wording and order of the Reflection Group's report, first 
considers the Court of Justice, whose position, Spain believes, must be 
reinforced as a matter of priority. Spain stresses the importance of the Court's 
rule in presiding over the Community's legal dimension and ensuring consistency 
in the legal interpretation of Community matters and the protection of 
individual citizens' rights. It believes that the IGC should, for reasons of 
legal security, strengthen the Court's positions in the sphere of justice and 
home affairs, and that the Court should speed up its procedures and improve its 
translation service. Concerning the Court's membership, Spain considers that the 
judges should serve a nine-year, non-renewable term, and that, with a view to 
enlargement, the factors taken into account for determining national 
participation should include not only the judges but also the advocates-general. 
On the Court of Auditors, Spain believes that there should be an explicit 
obligation on the internal official bodies of the Member States and the national 
audit boards to cooperate with the Court of Auditors, and that its powers of 
control over the Union's accounts should be clarified, with respect not only to 
the Community pillar but also to the CFSP and CJHA spheres. On the Committee of 
the Regions, Spain considers that this institution should have its own 
administrative structure and that its consultative functions should be more 
effectively employed and, indeed, expanded. Parliament should have the right to 
consult the Committee, which should, in its turn, be enabled to bring act1ons 
before the Court of Justice so as to protect its competences. On the Economic 
and Social Committee, Spain considers that better use should be made of its 
potential contribution to the preparatory consultative phase of the legislative 
process. 
Spain does not favour including a catalogue of the Union's powers in the Treaty, 
preferring the present system which establishes the legal basis of Union actions 
and policies for each separate case. It therefore supports retention of Article 
235 as it stands at present, as an instrument capable of handling the 
evolutionary character of the interpretation of the Union's objectives. On the 
question of the hierarchy of acts, Spain does not favour its adoption at the 
present stage of European integration; it considers that the Union should 
preserve its specific nature, characterized by a specific classification of acts 
including regulations, directives, decisions and recommendations. Spain believes 
that this specific system should be clarified as regards the powers of each 
institution, in the context of respect for the institutional balance. On 
commitology, Spain is willing to consider simplified procedures, provided they 
do not vitiate the Council's executive functions; it admits the need to simplify 
the present commitology set-up, which it sees as cumbersome and confusing, and 
therefore not viable beyond the next enlargement, and favours improving the 
quality of the legislation adopted under those procedures. It recalls that the 
revision of the 1987 decision on commitology does not require any changes to the 
Treaty. On the monitoring of the implementation of legislation, Spain believes 
that the Commission should fully exercise its powers under Article 171 to 
penalize the non-application of Community law, and that it should also be 
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obliged to draw up annual reports on the effectiveness of policy and make 
available more effective means of action for private individuals to lodge 
complaints against failure to implement Community law. 
On action against fraud, Spain believes that the Community institutions should 
step up their campaign, while recognizing that the main responsibility lies with 
the Member States; at all events, Parliament and the Court of Auditors should 
make full use of their powers in this field, which require strengthening, and 
all the institutions and bodies should be subject to the necessary controls. On 
the matter of resources, Spain recalls that the 1993 interinstitutional 
agreement (valid up to the end of 1999) on budgetary discipline and improvement 
of the budget procedure provides for these subjects to be discussed at the 1996 
Conference. Accordingly, as far as the own-resources system is concerned, Spain 
does not think it necessary for the matter to be raised at the IGC, given also 
that the expiry of the present financial agreement in 1999 will be the right 
moment to discuss all the aspects of the subject. However, since the own-
resources system is one thing and the amount available under it is another, 
Spain considers that, should the IGC include in the Treaty the legal bases of 
a new own-resources system for the Community with participation by the Community 
institutions in these decisions, a new revenue system should be established 
taking account of the relative prosperity of the Member States. On the control 
of expenditure, Spain, as seen above, favours a stronger anti-fraud role for the 
Court of Auditors, accompanied by cooperation with the national audit boards. 
Concerning possible new policies, Spain considers that the Community should 
concentrate on improving what it already does rather than acquiring more powers. 
On the possible inclusion of such areas as energy. tourism and civil protection 
in the sphere of the common policies, Spain believes that it would be preferable 
simply to develop cooperation between Member States in these fields. Finally, 
Spain wishes to see, as a matter of priority, the inclusion in the leg1slative 
part of the Treaty of a protocol establishing the permanent character of the 
special status of the outermost regions of the Community. 
The last section of the Spanish text concerns the Union's external action. The 
first aspect discussed is the extent to which external policy is comprehensive 
and coherent. For Spain, the priority is to evolve a global approach aimed at 
transcending the mismatch between the Community's external dimension and its 
external policy as such: one of the shortcomings of the existing Title v is felt 
to be the lack of articulation between the political, economic and military 
domains. Spain therefore stresses the need for the Union to acquire 
international legal personality, to enable it to conclude international 
agreements in the spheres of the second and third pillars. It also favours 
abolition of the division into pillars: the specific nature of the procedures 
for proposal, decision and execution should be maintained within a unitary 
Treaty, following the example of EMU. Spain also advocates a more specif1c 
formulation of the fundamental interests of the Union referred to in Article 
J. 1 ( 2), considering that the objectives should be expanded to include such 
notions as: diplomatic solidarity between Member States, protection of the 
common frontiers and the preservation and defence of human rights and democracy. 
The distinction between joint positions and joint actions should be clarified 
in more detail, so as to improve the coherence of the Union's external action. 
Finally, in the interests of greater coherence in the preparation of the 
Council's work, Spain proposes clarifying the ~elationship between COREPER and 
the Political Committee and strengthening the former's coordinating and 
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focalizing role as the committee responsible for preparing the work of the 
Council in all of its areas of competence. 
On the common foreign policy, Spain considers, as far as its preparatory phase 
is concerned, that it would be desirable to set up a body or unit for analysis, 
forecasting, early warning and planning. This unit should be located within the 
Council Secretariat, whose structures should accordingly be reinforced; it would 
cooperate with the Commission in forecasting and analysis activities, and would 
thus include both Commission staff and officials from the Member States. As a 
preparatory body, it would have no formal rights of initiative. On the decision-
making process, Spain would extend QMV, allowing the possibility of intermediate 
or ad hoc formulas su~h as unanimity with 'positive or constructive abstention' 
or a 'super-qualified majority' arrangement. To complement QMV, Spain believes 
that it should be accepted that a fundamental or vital interest may prevent 
adoption of a common position or action. Concerning execution, Spain would 
support formulas combining retention of the central role of the rotating 
presidency in the external representation and execution of the CFSP with other 
elements introducing greater permanence, visibility and coherence. At all 
events, it believes that there must be greater coordination between the 
presidency and the Commission: to avoid any further confusion of functions, in 
preference to the formulas by which the CFSP would be represented by a new 
individual figure Spain advocates the option by which the CFSP would be directly 
and jointly run by the President of the Council, the Commission, and a 
'political' Commission Secretary-General who would be responsible for the 
analysis and planning unit and would have reinforced powers. On the financing 
of the CFSP, the Spanish view is that solidarity in general, and financial 
solidarity in particular, should inform the funding formulas, which should also 
apply in the case of positive abstention or opting-out. The CFSP should in any 
case be funded from the Community budget. 
On security and defence policy, Spain believes that the IGC should contrlbute 
to the gradual development of a European identity in this field, as agreed by 
the WEU members at Maastricht. Mechanisms should be created to permit a European 
response to certain types of crisis: this would include military operations 
complementing political, economlc or humanitarian action under the CFSP. As far 
as means are concerned, Spain believes that the WEU's operational capacity 
should be further boosted, while accepting that the Atlantic Alliance and the 
transatlantic relationship still have a vital role to play in Europe's security. 
For Spain, the development of a European security and defence identity should 
reinforce the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and include development 
of the transatlantic link. On CFSP decision-making, Spain believes that the 
principle of national sovereignty should continue to govern relations between 
European countries in the field of defence, and that the intergovernmental 
nature of such decision-making should be retained and applied on a basis of 
consensus. The rule of consensus should not, however, exclude the possibility 
of a specific defence role being played by supranational European bodies in the 
future. At all events, Spain would endorse introducing an element of flexibility 
in this field, and therefore proposes the application of a non-binding principle 
to the effect that, while no-one can be obliged to take part in a Union military 
action, no-one can prevent a majority of Member States from going ahead with 
such an action. This would be without prejudice to the necessary political 
solidarity or a suitable sharing of the financial burden. Finally, Spain 
considers it essential to improve the Union's action in such fields as conflict 
prevention, peace-keeping and humanitarian operations. 
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The Spanish text finally examines the future of the EU's relations with the WEU. 
Spain believes that there must be further improvements in relations, on the 
basis of full respect for all Member States' national defence policies. It 
considers that the road to creating a European security and defence identity 
lies in the gradual integration of the WEU with the EU, in parallel to the 
development of the EU's operational capacity. The European defence dimension, 
for crisis management missions as well as for the existing collective defence 
guarantee under the Treaty of Brussels, would be incorporated, when the time was 
ripe, in the Union's single institutional framework. Spain believes that 
integration will only be possible in the medium term, and therefore considers 
that the IGC should, on the basis of the WEU's continued existence for the time 
being, determine measures for encouraging the institutional convergence of the 
EU and the WEU, with full integration as the ultimate goal. This could be done 
by means of a political or legal agreement under which the WEU would become 
subordinate to the EU in matters related to the preparation and operational and 
military application of EU decisions and actions (similar to the Petersberg 
missions), acting as the Union's implementing organ in the field; the WEU would, 
however, still be enabled to make autonomous decisions concerning its own 
actions. Spain believes that the arrangements for such an integration could be 
decided either at the IGC or later, and that one possibility could be to 
transfer all the WEU's functions and capacities to the second pillar, 
constituting a defence function within the CFSP. Another, initially more 
feasible mode of integration would be to endow the CFSP with crisis management 
functions along the lines of the Petersberg missions, while leaving the 
collective defence guarantee to a defence protocol to which those Member States 
so wishing could accede, on the basis of conditions to be agreed. 
Even though the French Government has not yet presented an official document on 
the Intergovernmental Conference, the main ideas of the previous government were 
summarized in our note of April 1995 (cf. Task-Force note 55.95) on the basis 
of the various alternatives and proposals put forward chiefly by the former 
Prime Minister Edouard Balladur and the former Minister of European Affairs 
Alain Lamassoure, and by the former President Fran~ois Mitterrand. 
Addressing the National Assembly on 3 November 1994, the French Foreign 
Minister, Alain Juppe, announced the institutional reform priorit1es in 
connection with the IGC, the main thrust of which is as follows: the powers of 
the Council should be strengthened, providing for a longer term of office and 
a more extensive role for the presidency; the Commission should not claim to 
constitute a kind of federal government; the system for electing Parl1ament and 
the means by which it could exert influence should be altered; and the role of 
the national parliaments should be increased. The overall unifying framework 
would be provided by 'reinforced forms of solidarity' open to all those willing 
and able to take part, and not confined to a 'hard core' of countries. 
During his presidential campaign, President Chirac put forward a number of 
specific proposals, the main thrust of which is as follows: 
Structure of Europe 
European integration must spread eastwards, very rapidly and without fail. 
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The European Union, which today has fifteen members and tomorrow will have 
been enlarged to include twenty or thirty members, must continue to form the 
foundations of the European edifice. It must encompass a customs union and 
common policies in the trading sphere and areas of common interest. It must 
have a genuine common foreign and security policy, a necessary consequence 
of which will be tight checks at its external borders. 
Within the founding family that is the Union, those Member States which so 
wish must be in a position to forge special bonds and reinforced forms of 
solidarity ... Member States which wish to go faster and further together 
must be allowed to do so ... I would add that once these strengthened joint 
actions have been launched, they will be open to such Member States as mlght 
be willing and able to take part. 
One point, however, needs to be made clear: the Franco-German partnership 
will remain at the heart of the system. 
Role of the institutions 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
The Council: It is quite obvious that the role of the Council needs to be 
strengthened ... Why not lay down a longer presidential term, in order to 
guarantee the continuity required for any ambitious enterprise, and, at 
the same time, provide additional support in the form of two vice-
presidencies? Making the Council a more active prime mover of proposals 
is a further idea that cannot fail to spring to mind, given that the 
Commission now exercises a virtual monopoly in this area. In addition, 
should not the current vote weighting system be revised so as to reflect 
political reality more accurately? 
Voting system: The different criteria, including, no doubt, population, 
need to be linked together in order to create a more effective decision-
making system. This does not detract from the principle of fair dealings 
among the Member States whereby the Union should refrain from obliging a 
Member State to accept a decision contrary to its vital interests. 
The European Council: I believe that a three-year European Council 
presidency should be introduced. The main task of the President would be 
to represent the Union in its external relations, uphold its interests, 
and foster its identity. 
The Commission: The focus of the Commission's activities must be shifted 
back towards the powers accorded to the Commission under the Treaties, 
having regard to the subsidiarity principle. The Commission must have 
complete freedom to make proposals, this being part of its role, and 
discharge its executive responsibilities. Under no circumstances, however, 
should it replace the Council, to which it must be accountable. Common 
sense likewise dictates that the size of the Commission be reduced, taking 
the necessary action in accordance with specific negotiating briefs and 
guidelines laid down by the European Council. 
The European Parliament: The European Parliament, which, apart from its 
particular role in the institutional machinery, has helped to promote 
awareness of problems extending beyond Europe's frontiers, for example the 
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defence of human rights or environmental protection, needs to bring itself 
into line with the orders of magnitude prevailing in the new Europe. 
Economic and monetary union 
I voted in favour of the Maastricht Treaty and am personally committed to 
full implementation of economic and monetary union once the conditions 
specified by the Treaty have been met. At present, only one country satisfies 
the convergence criteria laid down in the Treaty. France, which, along with 
Germany, should form the backbone of future economic and monetary union, must 
take the steps required without fail. 
The national parliaments 
The national parliaments need to be involved more closely in the Community 
enterprise, for nothing permanent will be achieved without the support of the 
peoples. It is necessary to study new procedures whereby the national 
parliaments can play a part in shaping Community law. 
Under Article 88-4 of the French Constitution, proposed Community acts 
containing provisions of a legislative nature are already referred to the 
National Assembly and the Senate. The two Houses have persuaded the 
Government to enforce the 'proviso of parliamentary consideration' vis-a-vis 
Brussels in order that they may deliver their opinions. However, there is a 
need to go further. I shall ask the Government to ensure that proposed acts 
having legislative implications in the spheres of common foreign and security 
policy, justice, or home affairs, and draft interinstitutional agreements, 
may be submitted to Parliament under the same conditions. 
As regards r'evision of the Treaty, I hope that the national parliaments will 
be able to wield influence over Union legislation by exercising a right to 
invoke an 'exception on the grounds of subs~diarity'. 
It should also be recalled that, during his election campaign, Jacques Chirac 
- who had launched his campaign at the end of November 1994 by calling for 
a further referendum on EMU, a demand which he later withdrew -·repeatedly 
proposed holding a referendum to ratify the revision of the Union Treaty 
emerging from the IGC. 
After Jacques Chirac' s success in the presidential elections, Alain Juppe was 
appointed Prime Minister, while Michel Barnier became Minister of European 
Affairs and Herve de Charette became Foreign M~nister. In his first 
television appearance, the latter announced his intention to launch a new 
policy aimed at bringing about a new Europe. 
Addressing the National Assembly on 23 May 1995 in his first statement on 
general policy, the new Prime Minister, Alain Juppe, also spoke on his 
government's position vis-a-vis the IGC. Even though the Prime Minister saw 
employment as the central feature of his government programme, he also took 
the view that the EU should make a special contribution in this connection. 
He also announced that France was ready to submit proposals on strengthening 
the Council and its presidency, rationaliz~ng decision-making procedures, 
clarifying relations with the Commission and strengthen~ng democratic 
controls by ~ncreasing the involvement of the national parliaments. A further 
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issue to be resolved at the lGC was the question of the relations between an 
independent central bank and the Council of Ministers responsible for the 
conduct of economic policy. As a general principle, Alain Juppe declared that 
France was committed to a single Europe, i.e. a Europe which preserved its 
acguis communautaire and common policies, which asserted its personality and 
interests in the international sphere and which provided itself with the 
necessary means to ensure its identity and security. With regard to common 
policies and the CAP in particular, the Prime Minister declared himself in 
favour of maintaining the entire system while new enlargements were taking 
place, with provision being made for the corresponding transitional periods; 
specifically, he declared himself in favour of maintaining the principle of 
Community preference. 
Letter of 6 December 1995 from the President of the French Republic, Jacques 
Chirac, and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Kohl 
On 6 December 1995 in the course of the Franco-German summit in Baden-Baden, the 
two abovementioned leaders addressed a letter to the President of the European 
Council, Mr Felipe Gonzalez, setting out the priority objectives of their 
governments for the European Council in Madrid on 15 and 16 December 1995. 
President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl first referred to the five challenges which 
the Member States of the Union must confront in order to prepare Europe for the 
twenty-first century. They recalled that these challenges had already been 
identified at the informal summit in Majorca in September 1995 and stressed that 
they must be met over the next five years. The challenges in question were to 
carry through the adjustment of the Treaty on European Union, complete the 
transition to a single currency in accordance with the timetable and conditions 
laid down, prepare and conduct the enlargement negotiations with the associated 
countries of central, eastern and southern Europe in a cordial and determined 
manner, define the essential criteria for funding the common policies after the 
year 1999 and, finally, actively pursue the policy of dialogue, partnership and 
cooperation already launched with the Union's neighbours, especially Russia, 
Ukraine, Turkey and the Mediterranean countries. 
The two leaders believe that the Intergovernmental Conference will be a vital 
stage in the future enlargement of Europe and must be given thorough 
preparation. In this connection, they commended the excellent work performed by 
the Reflection Group under the chairmanship of Mr westendorp. 
With reference to the Madrid European Council, President Chirac and Chancellor 
Kohl propose that the Intergovernmental Conference should focus on four priority 
objectives: the common foreign and security policy; the creation of a 
homogeneous area where freedom of movement is guaranteed by common provisions; 
improving the efficiency of EU institutions; and consolidating a democratic 
Europe by bringing it closer to its citizens. 
They consider that the Union should have a more visible and more decisive common 
foreign and security policy implemented in a way that ensures improved 
efficiency, continuity, consistency and solidarity in its actions. This will 
require the foreign and defence policies of each Member State to be aligned to 
a significant extent around clear priorities and objectives. They believe that 
the relationship between the EU and the WEU must be more clearly defined with 
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a view to the expiry of the Treaty of Brussels in 1998. They also think it 
necessary to consider what adjustments are needed in order to equip the CFSP 
with resources and instruments consistent with the Union's ambitions so as to 
give it a higher profile and allow it to harness both Community instruments and 
the Member States' own capacities. 
As the second main objective, they propose to complete the creation of a 
homogeneous area where freedom of movement will be guaranteed by common 
provisions, particularly in the field of asylum and immigration policy, and 
through closer cooperation to provide genuine security for citizens from 
terrorism, international organized crime and drugs. 
As the third priority objective, they propose to give the Union more effective 
institutions. This will entail major adjustments on the part of both the Council 
and the Commission. With regard to the Council, they propose an extension of the 
sphere covered by qualified majority voting, together with a revised system of 
weighting votes. For the Commission, they propose that consideration should be 
given to its appointment, composition and powers. F~nally, they also propose 
that ways and means should be considered of streamlining and making more 
transparent the procedures between the Council, Commission and Parliament. 
Finally, President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl feel that consolidat~ng democracy 
by bringing the Union closer to its citizens should also be a priority 
objective. In this connection, they believe that this would involve the European 
Parliament having a greater share of responsibility for matters relating to the 
process of building Europe, as well as closer involvement of the national 
parliaments. In addition, they call for the subsidiarity principle to be given 
proper weight and to be more firmly applied. In general, they feel that the 
Union should be easier for its citizens to understand and should listen more 
closely to their needs. 
On the question of differentiated integration, they believe that all Member 
States should be able to participate on the same terms in the progress of 
European integration. However, where one of the partners faces temporary 
difficulties in keeping up with the pace of progress in the Union, it would be 
desirable and feasible to introduce a general clause in the Treaties enabling 
those Member States which have the will and the capacity to do so to develop 
closer cooperation among themselves within the single institutional framework 
of the Union. 
Memorandum on France's guidelines for the 1996 IGC, published in the daily 
newspaper 'Le Figaro', 20 February 1996 
This is an internal French government document, published in 'Le Figaro' on the 
date mentioned above, whose main purpose is to serve as a guide for the work of 
the committee chaired by the two ministers Mr de Charette and Mr Barnier which 
meets approximately every ten days to make detailed preparations for the IGC. 
The most interesting points and proposals of this document will now be 
summarized . , : 
The objectives to be pursued by France at the IGC are the following: improved 
application of the princ~ple of subsidiarity; greater ~nvolvement of the 
national parliaments in the European integration process; action to improve the 
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efficiency of the institutions; strengthening the content of the CFSP; and 
responding to the desire of the Union's citizens for greater security by 
reinforcing its action in the field of justice and horne affairs. The proposals 
are based on a realist approach entailing retention of the distinctions between 
the existing three pillars of the EU. France considers that the IGC is not the 
place to reopen the subject of EMU or the discussion of the common policies. 
Concerning the first (Community) pillar and decision-making in Council, two 
changes are proposed: improved weighting of votes in Council taking account of 
population, economic factors and Member States' financial contributions; and 
increasing the number of decisions which can be adopted by a vote, to avoid the 
risks of blockage arising from the need to decide by consensus. France takes the 
view that any Member State should still be able to invoke, where necessary, the 
existence of a significant national interest, thus justifying postponement of 
the vote and the continuation of negotiations along the lines of the 'Luxembourg 
compromise' . 
On the subject of the Commission, France advocates reducing its numbers in order 
to strengthen its powers of initiative and decision-making and facilitate the 
coherence and discipline of the institution. It is also proposed that the 
Commission should be given clear and urgent mandates in order to improve its 
role of applying Council policy. It follows that the Cornrn1ssion should consult 
the Council whenever it cannot continue negotiations with third countries 
without going beyond the Council's mandate. 
Concerning the European Parliament, France believes that the legislative 
procedures should be simplified, but without modifying the existing balance of 
powers between Council and Parliament. It also suggests that an upper limit 
should be set on the number of MEPs at the same time as the project for a 
uniform electoral procedure is put into practice. Finally, France stresses the 
need to ensure respect for the 1992 decision on Parliament's places of work, 
which states that its part-sessions are to be held in Strasbourg. 
With respect to the national parliaments, France favours creating a body 
consisting of their representatives, to be consulted on all matters relating to 
respect for the principle of subsidiarity, on the grounds that the national 
parliaments are best equipped to judge on this subject. The confidential 
document suggests that this 'High Parliamentary Council', which could, for 
example, comprise two representatives from each Member State, could be created 
by institutionalizing the existing COSAC. 
On the second pillar (the CFSP), the document proposes replacing the existing 
rotating six-month presidency by a new figure, a 'high representative of the 
Union', who would have a mandate lasting several years (three to f1ve) and could 
have an organizational and representative role in the area of the CFSP. This 
figure would be appointed by the European Council, and would be responsible for 
exercising the functions assigned him by that body or by the Council of 
Ministers. The Council Secretariat could be strengthened in order to provide 
this figure with the necessary support and resources. The memorandum also 
stresses the need to clarify the division of labour between the CFSP, with its 
intergovernmental approach, and the external aspects of the Union's common 
policies. 
- 89 - PE 165.963 
White Paper on the 1996 IGC (Volume II) 
On the subject of common defence, the document takes the view that endeavours 
should be made on three fronts: arrangements should be determined for bringing 
the WEU under the aegis of the Union; there should be a specific decision-making 
procedure for security matters so as to avoid paralysis in Council; and the 
WEU's operational capacities should be developed, g1v1ng it sufficient 
flexibility to allow some Member States to combine in more advanced forms of 
cooperation. 
On the third pillar, the text suggests that as far as asylum and immigration are 
concerned the necessary precautions should be adopted as and when these subjects 
are brought within the Community sphere. With respect to police cooperation, it 
is felt that the existing arrangements for intergovernmental cooperation 
continue to represent the most desirable and suitable formula. Certain 
improvements are, however, proposed for cooperation on legal matters; it is 
argued that action should be taken to encourage harmonization of Member States' 
civil and criminal law. With this in mind, three proposals are made. Firstly, 
the Commission should be given powers of initiative in this area, while acting 
in tandem with the Member States; secondly, the national parliaments should 
participate in the drafting of legislative texts, and, in particular, the 'High 
Parliamentary Council' should take part where the proposed legislation affects 
civil or criminal law, to ensure that these bodies' intervention does not happen 
at the moment of ratification alone; and thirdly, consideration could be given 
to allowing legislative texts prepared in this way to come into effect without 
waiting for the instruments of ratification to be deposited, according to a 
formula already established for international law. 
Finally, the document proposes the introduction of a general clause on 
reinforced cooperation, with a view to enabling those Member States which have 
the desire and the ability to develop closer forms of cooperation to do so. It 
is suggested that it would suffice for certain Member States to submit 
cooperation projects to the Council. These projects, once approved by the 
Council, would be considered as having been confirmed by the Union as a whole; 
such an arrangement would introduce the necessary flexibility into the Treaties 
without reducing the coherence of the Union. 
Common foreign and security policy 
Guidelines adopted bv the Foreign Ministers of France and Germany at the 
Freiburq seminar of 27 February 1996 
On the occasion of the Franco-German ministerial meeting held in Freiburg on 27 
February 1996, the respective ministers, Mr Klaus Kinkel and Mr Herve de 
Charette, adopted the following guidelines for the preparation of the 1996 IGC. 
Both ministers take the view that the main objectives of the CFSP are to 
stabilize the Union's relations with its neighbours to the east and south, to 
consolidate the transatlantic relationship and to develop ties with Russia and 
Ukraine. With a view to improving the effectiveness of the CFSP, they propose 
a number of practical improvements. Firstly, in the interests of greater 
efficiency, the Union's powers of action under the CFSP should be reinforced via 
improvements to the decision-making process and the implementation procedures, 
with greater powers of control for the European Council. With specific 
references to the decision-making procedures laid down in the Treaty, attempts 
- 90 - PE 165.963 
Wh1te Paper on the 1996 IGC (Volume II) 
should be made to overcome the rigidity inherent in unanimity; accordingly, 
consideration should be given to: reviewing the distinction between political 
decisions of principle and implementing decisions; invocation of the principle 
of constructive abstention on CFSP matters; and recourse to qualified majority 
voting for decisions at the implementation stage. By that stage, no Member State 
should be forced aga~nst its will to send troops or undertake policing 
operations; at the same time, however, no Member State should be allowed to stop 
the others from implementing the measures agreed once the decision to do so has 
been adopted. With a view to making the CFSP more coherent, it is proposed that 
the Council, the Member States and the Commission should mandatorily have to 
apply in full the coherence obligation already present in the Treaty, so as to 
achieve an effective and credible foreign and security policy. In the interests 
of mutual loyalty and solidarity, it is suggested in particular that the 
Commission should take on the same degree of commitment vis-a-vis Council 
decisions as the Member States, and that procedures should be established to 
this end to ensure that the Commission submits in due time the initiatives 
required for CFSP decisions adopted by the Council. It is further proposed to 
set up an advanced research and analysis unit, which would comprise staff from 
the Member States, the Commission and the WEU Secretariat and would be attached 
to the Council Secretariat. This unit would have as its main responsibilities 
the pooling of its members' experience and knowledge and the preparation of 
specific proposals for action. To improve the visibility and continuity of the 
CFSP, it is proposed that the institutions should adapt themselves in such a way 
as to enable the Union to be clearly identifiable in its external relations, to 
speak with one voice and to have its continuity and visibility ensured. Without 
going into detail, it is suggested in this connection that a 'new post' should 
be created to give the CFSP greater visibility and coherence. 
Finally, the text raises the question of greater solidarity, especially in the 
fields of security and defence. In this context, it is proposed that the Treaty 
should include a 'political solidarity clause' applying to all the Member 
States, with solidarity defined in such a way as to take account of individual 
Member States' legitimate interests. The European Council should lay down 
guidelines for security and defence on the basis of which the WEU could, at the 
request of the EU, undertake actions on the latter's behalf. This would include 
the 'Petersberg missions', which should be incorporated in the TEU. The Union's 
role should also be strengthened as regards the definition of a common European 
defence policy. There should be a European capacity for action in all 
circumstances, even where certain partners do not take part in the military side 
of an operative action. In such cases, the non-participant Member States should 
express their solidarity through public support and, where necessary, financial 
aid. Both ministers expressly support the joint objective of incorporating the 
WEU into the EU, and consider that the IGC should produce clear and specific 
undertakings in this direction. Concerning CFSP funding, both France and Germany 
feel that in general CFSP operational expenditure should be financed from 
outside the Community budget. Finally, both countries favour developing a 
European armaments policy, whose objectives would be the strengthening, 
improvement and realization of European cooperation in this field and the 
establishment of a European armaments agency. 
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White Paper on Foreign Policy: 'External challenges and opoortyni ties' • 
26 March 1996 
The third of the sixteenth chapter of this Irish Government white paper concerns 
the European Union and the new shape of Europe. This chapter sets out Ireland'S 
viewpoints and priorities for the 1996 IGC, which are also outlined in the 
agenda for Ireland's external policy with which the white paper begins. 
The Irish Government undertakes to ensure, in general terms, that Ireland will 
make a constructive and imaginative contribution to the IGC. Ireland will occupy 
the IGC presidency for the second half of 1996; this will be one of the major 
tasks of the Irish presidency, which will at all moments endeavour to propel the 
IGC forward in a positive and open-minded fashion. The general comments in the 
Irish Government's text include a reference to differentiated integration; on 
this subject, Ireland considers it essential to avoid the creation of an 
exclusive 'hard core' consisting only of certain Member States. Ireland believes 
that provisions favouring certain Member States by enabling them to pursue the 
same objectives at varying speeds, as in the case of EMU, should be instituted 
only where necessary and on a case-by-case basis. 
Ireland's declared priority for the IGC will be to ensure that the changes to 
the Treaty agreed result in a Union and institutions which are more sensitive 
to the genuine concerns of public opinion. The four main concerns will be: the 
preservation of peace and stability; the need to increase the efficiency of the 
Union's decision-making procedure; the need for greater responsibility and 
transparency in the Union; and the need to deal more effectively with the 
problems of most direct concern to the public, including employment, social 
exclusion and action to combat international crime and the social problem of 
drug addiction. 
Concerning institutional reform, Ireland stresses that the Union must be 
enabled, in institutional terms and in due time, to confront its forthcoming 
enlargement; at the same time, the democratic character of its institutions must 
be preserved and, where necessary, enhanced. Ireland will not support any 
proposals tending to undermine any of the existing institutions in respect of 
their basic functions under the Treaty; nor will it endorse any proposals 
altering the institutional framework which has served the Union so well thus 
far. Ireland will support: the numerical reduction and simplification of the 
EU's legislative procedures; extension of the codecision procedure with a view 
to strengthening the vital contribution of the European Parliament to democracy 
in the Union; and greater use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in Council. 
The Irish Government reiterates the need to preserve the existing institutional 
balance in the Union, which constitutes its most salient success; it will oppose 
a number of notions which it considers to run counter to European integration. 
In particular, it will not accept two possible approaches in relation to the 
strengthening and democratization of the decision-making process. Firstly, on 
the grounds that the existing institutional balance must essentially be 
preserved, Ireland will oppose any attempt at making decision-making a more 
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intergovernmental matter at the expense of the Community mechanisms which govern 
the main EC activities; in this connection, it will firmly resist any endeavours 
to undermine the role of the European Parliament, the Commission or the Court 
of Justice. Secondly, Ireland will not permit the IGC to be used to alter the 
general equilibrium existing between the Member States. Among the aspects 
concerned here are the membership of the Commission and the European Parliament, 
the system of rotating presidencies and the weighting of votes in Council. In 
particular, Ireland strongly opposes any proposal that it should lose its right 
to appoint a fully-fledged Commissioner. Ireland believes it is highly unlikely 
that governments representing a majority of the Union's citizens could be 
outvoted by a bloc of small Member States. Furthermore, in the context of future 
enlargements, Ireland considers that it is only fair and reasonable that the 
larger Member States should accept that they would each have only one 
Commissioner proper. The existing institutional equilibrium of the Union must 
be preserved. 
On the matter of openness and transparency, the Irish Government supports the 
reinforcement of both aspects via the IGC. It fully supports simplifying the 
Union's legislative procedures and reducing their number, and recognizes that 
a higher profile for the national parliaments would help bring decision-making 
closer to the citizens. 
On the CFSP, Ireland will play a constructive part in revising the relevant 
Treaty provisions. A more effective CFSP would coincide with Ireland's 
interests; Ireland will therefore use the IGC to make practical and constructive 
proposals for improving the workings of the policy. At all events, its revision 
should be based on a realistic evaluation of the functioning of the present 
system and correct identification of what needs improvement. As regards the 
reform of CFSP decision-making, Ireland believes that decisions on sensitive 
foreign policy subjects should be based on broad support among the Member 
States. The provision in the Treaty of Maastricht allowing QMV for decisions 
implementing external policy guidelines agreed on by consensus in Council could 
be used more often. Ireland would favour the development of planning and 
analysis capac1 ties within the Council Secretariat. There should be close 
cooperation between any unit set up for that purpose and the Commission, given 
the latter's competences in the field of external economic relations and the 
need to ensure coherence between the economic and political aspects of external 
policy. A higher profile for the Council Secretariat would reinforce its 
capacity to aid the Presidency in the implementation of the CFSP, while also 
contributing to enhanced continuity between presidencies as regards the policy's 
development and execution. 
On home affairs and justice, Ireland will support all efforts to reinforce the 
provisions in this field. It would consider proposals to transfer some of the 
areas currently falling under Title VI of the TEU to the Community pillar and 
the EC Treaty, so as to facilitate decision-making and accelerate progress. This 
would apply to immigration and asylum policy. Ireland would also agree to all 
decisions concerning matters covered by Title VI adopted by the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council being subject to appropriate parliamentary control, at both EU 
and national levels. Concerning action against drug trafficking, a subject which 
Ireland considers to be of major importance, the Irish Government notes that it 
has set up an interministerial committee to consider means of achieving greater 
progress at EU level. This committee is also assisting the Irish Government in 
preparing a specific national position on anti-drugs action for the IGC. 
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On other matters which may arise at the IGC, the Irish text refers, in the first 
place, to employment. Ireland will play an active part in considering possible 
constructive amendments to the Treaty on this subject; no specific proposal is 
made, however. On the environment, Ireland recalls that its member of the 
Reflection Group has already raised the possibility of strengthening the nuclear 
safety provisions of the Euratom Treaty. On social policy and the possible 
desire of some Member States to introduce new elements into the Treaty, the 
Irish Government says it will consider such proposals, taking due account of 
their potential impact on competitiveness and employment. Ireland considers that 
if any new proposals are not applied to all the Member States they could worsen 
the existing disparity in the conditions of competition applying in the 
different Member States, thus undermining the objective of a level playing field 
On the subject of a 'non-discrimination clause', especially in the case of 
persons with disabilities, Ireland considers that the implications of such a 
clause must be examined both at EU level and nationally; at all events, the IGC 
should mark a change of attitude by the EU in this field, which should mean that 
the rights and needs of persons with disabilities are suitably reflected in the 
Treaty. 
Concerning the principle of subsidiarity, Ireland considers that any attempt to 
improve the definition of this concept at the IGC must not affect the balance 
of powers between the Community and the Member States. On the language regime, 
the Irish Government would like to see an appropriate increase in the use of 
Irish (Gaelic). On the role of the national parliaments in Union affairs, 
Ireland considers that any enhanced profile for those bodes should not affect 
the position of the European Parliament or lead to any further complication of 
the existing procedures at Union level. Ireland would support a strengthening 
of the Treaty provisions concerning European citizenship, e.g. by incorporating 
certain rights or anti-discrimination clauses. 
Finally, in the fourth chapter of the white paper (on international security), 
Ireland considers security and defence. After examining three possible options 
for Ireland in its future relations with the WEU, the text concludes that it is 
too early to establish negotiating positions, thus confining itself to stressing 
Ireland's basic philosophy on the matter. Ireland believes that a common defence 
policy must take account of the level of political and economic integration 
attained by the EU and its achievements in the wider context of European 
security, as well as reflecting the diverse capacities and experiences of the 
Member States. Specifically, in the discussion of both the 'Petersberg missions' 
and a global EU defence policy, Ireland's guiding principles may be summarized 
as follows. Firstly, Ireland promises constructive participation on the matter 
at the IGC, with a view to influencing the outcome; this also applies to its 
willingness to take part in implementation. Secondly, a common EU defence policy 
must have as its main objective the preservation of peace and the strengthening 
of international security, in accordance with the UN Charter and the principles 
of the OSCE. Thirdly, the Union's defence policy must be considered in the wider 
context of the UN system, since the UN alone has final legitimacy in the sphere 
of world peace and security. Fourthly, the Un1on's defence agreements should 
form part of a broader cooperation framework for security in Europe, so that 
efforts to create an EU security and defence policy do not result in new 
divisions and greater instability in Europe. Fifthly, a common defence pol1cy 
should be compatible with a broad-based approach recognizing the cruc1.al 
contribution to security of economic progress, resolut1.on of the causes of 
conflict, action against crime and drug trafficking and protection of the 
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environment. Finally, such a policy must not run counter to Ireland's continued 
pursuit of its objectives regarding disarmament and arms control. 
To ensure that Ireland's traditional policy of military neutrality is unchanged, 
unless the Irish people should decide otherwise, the Irish Government's text 
recalls its undertak1ng to hold a referendum on any proposals emanating from the 
coming negotiations which could entail Irish participation in a common defence 
policy. The Irish Government will not propose that Ireland join NATO or the WEU 
or sign their mutual defence agreements. 
The most clear-cut views to have been expressed to date by the Italian 
Government on the IGC have been contained in the statement on foreign policy 
matters which the new Government made to the Chamber of Deputies on 23 February 
1995 and in the statement made to the Chamber of Deputies on 23 May 1995. 
Account should also be taken of the Joint Declaration on the IGC made by the 
German Foreign Minister, Mr Klaus Kinkel, and the Italian Foreign Minister, 
Mrs Susanna Agnelli, on 15 July 1995. 
On 5 December 1995 the Prime Minister, Mr Lamberto Dini, submitted a government 
communication to the Chamber of Deputies on Italy's six-month presidency of the 
European Union. After a long debate, the Chamber adopted, on 7 December, a 
number of resolutions supporting the government's position as regards the 
presidency. On 1 January 1996 Italy took over the presidency of the Council of 
Ministers and 1ts various organs. There is no doubt that the landmark event of 
this presidency was the open1ng of the IGC in Tur1n, on 29 March 1996. As far 
as the IGC is concerned, the key priority of the Italian presidency of the 
Council is to guide the negotiations on the basis of three principles. Firstly, 
the IGC must remedy the gaps and insufficiencies in the Treaty, and, above all, 
prepare the ground for the forthcoming enlargements of the Union. Secondly, on 
the basis of the Reflection Group's report and the conclusions of the Madrid 
European Council, the Italian presidency considers that the main aspects to be 
discussed in the negotiations should be all those related to the goal of a 
Treaty which the public can understand, which strengthens the Union's democratic 
character and the efficiency of its institutional mechanisms, which develops the 
Union's capacity to play a leading, coherent and responsible role on the world 
stage and which enables cooperation in justice and home affairs to serve to 
protect the freedom and security of the citizens in a meaningful way. Finally, 
the Italian presidency believes that the IGC should, from the outset, include 
the participation of public opinion. 
Italian Government statement of 23 Februarv 1995 on foreign policy guidelines 
The statement issued by the Government on 23 February 1995 concerning foreign 
policy matters and the Intergovernmental Conference lays down guidelines on the 
following four subjects: institutional matters, enlargement and relations with 
Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, consolidation of the second and third 
pillars, and measures to strengthen the 'people's Europe' . As regards the 
institutional aspects, the Italian Government believes that the weighting of 
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votes needs to be changed and majority voting made the general rule within the 
Council. The size of the Commission should be reduced, and the presidency 
strengthened in order to make the Union more visible at the external level and 
more effective at the internal level. The document maintains that the 
Intergovernmental Conference should also strengthen democratic involvement in 
Union decision-making and accordingly proposes that a genuine hierarchy of norms 
be drawn up with a view to improving the operation of the codecision procedure, 
in which the Council and the European Parliament each have a say. The Italian 
Government is likewise calling for Treaty provisions to be organized according 
to a new technical and legal system, in order to make them more readily 
comprehensible to the public, and for certain essential constitutional 
principles to be spelt out explicitly, one such being the basic rights of 
European citizens, which must be properly protected and subject to review by the 
Luxembourg Court of Justice. As far as institutional organization is concerned, 
the document proposes that a way be found to reconcile general observance of 
certain key rules and policies, in practical terms, the four freedoms and the 
internal market, and opportunities for specific forms of involvement in other 
policies, subject to standard institutional procedures and equal conditions of 
eligibility, albeit depending on the distinct stages of activity. In short, the 
Italian Government warns against any attempt by particular countries to set up 
steering committees and maintains that 'opt-out' clauses and permanent 
exceptions should not be permitted. 
With regard to enlargement and relations with Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean, the Italian Government believes that the success of the 
Intergovernmental Conference is a prerequisite for future enlargement of the 
Union. It considers that the gradual adoption of Community legislation by the 
Central and Eastern European countries is a matter requiring careful attention 
and that the Union should likewise seek to foster integration by developing 
basic facilities and intensifying cooperation. At all events, it is likely that 
some policies, in particular the common agricultural policy, will need to be 
revised and adjusted. The document also warns against the possibility that 
enlargement towards the east might have made the Union lose sight of its 
interests in the Mediterranean area and consequently sets the utmost store by 
the Euro-Mediterranean Conference to be held in Barcelona in November 1995. In 
addition, it makes a number of points relating to consolidation of the second 
and third pillars. As regards the second pillar, it rejects the idea that there 
is no need to go beyond the intergovernmental level for the time being, 
maintaining instead that the CFSP needs to be strengthened and given a strong 
identity of its own. It proposes that the CFSP Secretariat be equipped with the 
resources required to improve its capacity for analysis and forecasting and 
encouraged to embark on specific steps and ventures in agreement with the 
Council and Commission and in keeping with the wishes of the Union presidency. 
The Italian Government is calling for the operational capability of the WEU to 
be strengthened and for the WEU's complementary relationship to the Atlantic 
Alliance to be consolidated and worked out in more detail. It believes that the 
concept of security and defence of the Union should be closely linked. In 
particular, the WEU should, according to the document, be converted into the 
defensive arm of the European Union. As far as the third pillar is concerned, 
the document points to the need to step up judicial and police cooperation and 
for national laws on the free movement of persons to be closely harmonized. The 
Italian Government says that it is especially interested in 1.ntensifying 
cooperation in the fight against corruption and 1.n bringing the judicial and 
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police systems of the Central and Eastern European countries gradually into line 
with those of the Union Member States. 
Italian Government statement of 23 May 1995 on the Intergovernmental Conference 
to review the Maastricht Treaty 
This statement contains a number of preliminary remarks designed to provide the 
platform for the Italian representative to the Reflection Group. It focuses on 
the options proposed in order to meet three separate challenges: the challenge 
of diversity, the challenge of security, and the challenge of democratization. 
The Italian Government statement advocates two basic responses to the challenge 
of diversity. On the one hand, some of the Union's operating rules must be 
changed and, on the other, the concept of differentiated integration needs to 
be properly defined. With regard to the institutional system of the Community, 
the Italian Government proposes that the number of decisions the Council of 
Ministers takes by consensus should be drastically reduced, while at the same 
time the extension of majority voting should be accompanied by efforts to give 
greater weight to citizens of the Member States in voting procedures. For this 
purpose, the Italian Government's statement advocates a double majority of the 
votes of the states and their populations, to prevent decisions they do not 
support being imposed on a majority of the Union's citizens. The Italian 
Government believes that the Commission should continue to act as guardian of 
the Treaties and maintain its capacity for initiative and analysis in the areas 
for which it is responsible. The Italian Government does not consider that a 
reduction in the number of Commissioners would increase the supranational nature 
of the institution and proposes a system whereby, although the number of 
Commissioners would not be reduced below the number of Member States, provision 
would be made for the larger Member States to have a Deputy Commissioner instead 
of two Commissioners as at present. With regard to the question of 
differentiated integration, the statement notes that it will be difficult to 
avoid arrangements of this kind for the new policies (foreign and security 
policy and justice and home affairs) where countries will move at different 
speeds although towards the same goal. The Italian Government believes that this 
will be the key for resolving the dilemma over deepening and widening, in other 
words, between unity and flexibility. The Italian Government considers that 
certain conditions must be set if integration is to proceed at different speeds, 
including first and foremost the principle of institutional unity, with a single 
Council, a single Parliament, and a single Court of Justice, all having the 
flexibility necessary in order to manage policies in which not all the Member 
States participate. A further necessary condition must be the preservation of 
the acquis communautaire. Subject to these two conditions, the Italian 
Government is willing to accept compromise arrangements to enable Member States 
to gradually become integrated in the policies in which they are temporarily not 
participating, provided that this is done on the basis of equal and 
predetermined conditions. In any case, more extensive integration should remain 
open to all Member States and should not be limited in an arbitrary and 
discriminatory way to certain specific sectors such as economic and monetary 
union. In this connection, the Italian Government's statement points out that 
the procedures and mechanisms for the single currency are not among the subjects 
due to be reviewed at the Intergovernmental Conference 
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In order to meet the challenge of security, the Italian Government believes that 
the Union's main priority should be to develop an international identity and a 
coherent foreign policy consistent with the world without frontiers of which it 
is a part. After condemning the outdated way of thinking that characterized the 
European concert of nations, which led the old continent into so many disasters 
and catastrophes, the Italian Government expresses the view that the progress 
made with the Maastricht Treaty is still incomplete and deficient. For the 
Italian Government, securing a consensus between Member States on the principles 
and content of the Union's foreign policy, as a kind of foreign policy agenda 
approved by Council and Parliament, could be a prior condition for a genuine 
Union foreign policy. Consequently, Italy will propose that the Member States 
should agree on the essential interests they intend to uphold and defend 
jointly, whether in terms of major geographical areas or more universal topics. 
In addition, the statement announces the Italian Government's intention of 
keenly pursuing the goal of following a common strategy at all times within all 
international organizations, particularly the United Nations and the Security 
Council, even if the aim of securing a permanent seat for the European Union on 
the Security Council continues to be a more long-term goal. In addition, the 
Italian Government believes that the Foreign Ministers of the Union could take 
decisions by majority vote more frequently, confining the need for unanimity to 
questions where national interests are closely involved, such as defence, and 
devising more flexible formulas which will enable a number of Union members to 
act alone in a climate of joint cooperation and solidarity. With regard to the 
institutional structure of the second pillar, the Italian Government believes 
it is absolutely vital for there to be a permanent body empowered to represent 
the Union in foreign policy matters, with proper structures and performing the 
tasks of analysing, formulating, proposing and implementing Council decisions. 
If this principle were to be accepted, the Italian Government would propose that 
a secretary-general be nominated by the Council, and possibly confirmed by 
Parliament, in order to give the Union a recognizable identity and confer 
greater continuity, credibility, responsibility, legitimacy and transparency on 
the measures it takes, thereby overcoming the constraints imposed by the 
rotating presidency. As an alternative, the Italian Government also puts forward 
the idea of an elective presidency, for a period of two or three years, also 
nominated by the Council and approved by Parliament, although it acknowledges 
that it would not be easy for an elected presidency to coexist with the system 
of rotating presidencies and the countless meetings of the Council of Ministers, 
committees and working parties that would ensue. Consequently, it also suggests 
that foreign policy could be separated from the other responsibilities of the 
presidency, in which case the elected president would chair the General Affairs 
Council and would be assisted by a vice-president, who would be replaced every 
six months in accordance with the usual rotation and would belong to the country 
chairing the other Council meetings. The Italian Government's statement proposes 
that the Western European Union should be the instrument of security and defence 
for the foreign policy of the Union, although it should be gradually absorbed 
into the European Union. In this connection, the Italian Government believes 
that certain institutional changes, such as ensuring that membership of the WEU 
and the European Union gradually coincide, harmonizing the presidencies, and 
gradually integrating the functions of the secretariats of the CFSP and WEU, 
leading to an eventual merger of the two organizations, could give a higher 
profile to the WEU's capacity to formulate and implement measures with security 
and defence implications, acting at the same time as a catalyst for European 
cohesion within the Atlantic Alliance, which would continue to be the basic 
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pillar of collective defence and of the ties between the United States and 
Europe. 
With regard to the challenge of democratization, the Italian Government's 
statement takes the view that democratizing the Union means above all that 
broader legislative powers should be given to the Eurooean Parliament, 
representing the sovereignty of the people, to be exercised through simplified 
procedures confined for the most part to consultation, codecision and assent. 
Specifically, the codecision procedure involving the European Parliament should 
be more widely used by introducing, as proposed by Italy during the debates on 
the Maastricht Treaty, a hierarchy of acts, which would be divided into three 
levels: first, constitutional laws, for which unanimity or a reinforced majority 
would be needed in the Council, together with ratification by national 
parliaments; second, legislative provisions, which should establish a general 
framework for particular sectors or subjects and should be adopted by a major1ty 
vote in Council in codecision w1th the European Parliament; finally, regulatory 
and implementing provisions, which should be the responsibility of the Council, 
which could delegate to the Commission for those areas which are not left in the 
hands of the Member States in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. 
Democratization also means that the national parliaments should be more closely 
involved in the tasks of the Union. Leaving aside the idea of establishing an 
assembly of national legislators to act as a third chamber, the Italian 
Government considers that, as well as exerting greater control over the actions 
of the respective governments in the Union, national parliaments should step up 
their contact, exchange of information and coordination with the European 
Parliament. As for the possibility of including among the common policies the 
other sectors already mentioned in the Treaty, the Italian Government feels that 
the Union should not be given too many areas of responsibility, but rather that 
flexible use should be made of the subsidiarity principle, which could be more 
clearly defined so as to avoid an excessive amount of regulation not only in the 
Union but also in the Member States. However, the Italian Government does not 
believe it is advisable to draw up a list of exclusive competences. With regard 
to the 'people's Europe', the Italian Government proposes that a full l1st of 
fundamental rights and freedoms should be drawn up so that the notion of 
European citizenship would include all forms of expression, association, 
activity and free movement of citizens, with particular reference to civil 
rights, relations w1th the inst1tutions, education, employment and the family. 
It also recommends that the instruments for upholding and protecting these 
rights vis-a-vis the institutions should be strengthened and extended, 
particularly as regards the Court of Justice. With regard to cooperation in the 
fields of justice and home affairs, the Italian Government intends to propose 
measures designed to simplify joint decision-making, strengthen the binding 
nature of legal instruments, introduce decision-making mechanisms specific to 
the Community institutions, and overcome the existing constraints on the power 
to instigate and initiate policy. Finally, with a view to increasing 
transparency in the Union and making its main laws more comprehensible, the 
Italian Government proposes that the provisions adopted during the last 40 years 
should be brought together and consolidated in a single text, and that a 
constitution should be drawn up defining the institutions, their powers, basic 
principles and rights and also including, in the form of protocols, the internal 
market, economic and monetary union and the new common policies. 
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Joint declaration of 15 July 1995 by the German and Italian Foreign Ministers 
regarding the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
This declaration was made following the meeting in Monte Argentario, Italy, on 
15 July 1995 between the German and Italian Foreign Ministers and includes an 
undertaking by the two countries to cooperate closely in the preparations for 
the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Under the terms of the declaration, both 
countries would be guided by the following principles at the Intergovernmental 
Conference: 
1 • Granting full powers of codecision to the European Parliament for all 
legislative matters. In addition the legislative procedure should be 
simplified and streamlined to make it more transparent and bring it closer 
to citizens. In addition, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, 
decisions should be taken as close as possible to citizens, while 
deregulation measures should apply both at European and national level. 
2. The Commission's 
strengthened, as 
Community law. 
right 
should 
of 
its 
initiative 
powers over 
should be 
monitoring 
3. The budgetary control procedure should be improved. 
maintained 
compliance 
and 
with 
4. In order to enhance and improve the efficiency of the common foreign and 
security policy, the European Union's capacity to take decisions and to 
act should be strengthened, mainly by making greater use of majority 
voting in certain sectors. At the same time, the capacity for the analysis 
and planning of Union decisions should also be improved. For its part, the 
European Parliament should be much more closely involved in matters 
relating to the CFSP. The European Union should develop into a Union of 
security and, in the longer term, defence, while still maintaining its 
transatlantic ties. With this in view, the role of the WEU should be 
strengthened as an instrument for crisis intervention by the European 
Union. The joint declaration also proposes closer institutional ties 
between the EU and the WEU, as well as bringing the WEU within the area 
of competence of the European Council. In any case, the long-term 
objective is the integration of the WEU with1n the European Union. 
5. With regard to European citizenship, the joint declaration proposes that 
the fundamental duties and freedoms should be codified and responsibility 
for safeguarding them entrusted to the Court of Just1ce. With regard to 
justice and home affairs, the declaration proposes that increased use 
should be made of Community procedures, particularly as regards asylum 
policy, the granting of visas and immigration; the decision-making process 
should be simplified; the Commission should be given greater rights and 
wider powers of initiative and the European Parliament should be given 
wider democratic control, with the Court of Justice responsible for 
ensuring uniform application of the relevant laws. 
6. In order to increase transparency and the understanding of the European 
Un1on by public opinion in the Member States, the joint declaration also 
proposes a new format for the Treaty to make it more leg1timate 1n the 
eyes of the people. 
- 100 - PE 165.963 
Wh1te Paper on the 1996 IGC (Volume II) 
An essential point in the joint declaration relates to the common foreign and 
security policy. The declaration gives priority to bringing the countries of 
central and eastern Europe closer to the European Union and the transatlantic 
structure, a process to which they give their express support. With regard to 
the Mediterranean region, both countries also undertake to contribute to the 
success of the Euro-Mediterranean conference to be held in Barcelona on 27 and 
28 November 1995. Both parties also express support for the peace process in the 
Middle East as an important precondition for stability in the Mediterranean 
region, while also calling on Europe and its transatlantic partners to develop 
a shared vision for the twenty-first century. With this in view, both countries 
believe that transatlantic links must continue to be a driving force behind 
global trade liberalization within the framework of the World Trade 
Organization. Both ministers stress the importance of incorporating Russia 
within the western cooperation structure and call for closer relations between 
NATO and Russia. Finally, both countries support the reform of the current UN 
system and its institutions, including the Security Council, while calling on 
UN member states to meet their financial obligations. 
Position of the Italian Government on the IGC for the revision of the Treaties, 
18 March 1996 
This four-part document was submitted in the days leading up to the Tun.n 
European Council. The first part sets out Europe's options for the future; the 
second describes the Italian Presidency's preparations for the IGC; the third 
summarizes the Italian position on specific aspects of the negotiations; and the 
fourth considers the future course of those negotiations. 
On the IGC and options for the future, the Italian Government intends to 
continue with Italy's traditional pro-European commitment, seeking to further 
develop European integration by means of the following strategic priorities: 
firstly, consolidation of the Union's federal dimension via greater internal 
solidarity and cohesion and the bolstering of its capacity to project a common 
external image enabling it to defend the shared values of all the Member States 
concerning peace, stability and freedom; secondly, action to prevent any return 
to a 'Europe of nation-states' which would eventually lead to 'nation-states 
without Europe'; thirdly, to strengthen the Union's existing structures and 
institutions; and fourthly, action to stop the Union being surreptitiously 
transformed into a glorified free-trade area with no soul and no real 
perspectives for the future. 
On the Italian Presidency's preparations for the IGC, the text states that a 
draft agenda for the IGC will be put to the Turin European Council, setting out 
three major subjects for the intergovernmental negotiations: relations between 
the citizens and the Union; adjustments to the institutional set-up; and the 
Union's external identity. 
Concerning Italy's position on the concrete aspects of the negotiations, the 
Government's priorities are centred on those three main subjects. On relations 
between the citizens and the Unions, Italy's priorities are: firstly, inclusion 
in the first part of the Treaty of certain fundamental rights, applicable to 
everyone irrespective of nationality (specific proposals are made as regards 
non-discrimination, action against racism and xenophobia and respect for 
majority rights); secondly, development in the Treaty of the concept of 
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citizenship, through the inclusion of more far-reaching civil and social rights, 
making it clear that European citizenship complements national citizenship 
rather than replacing it; and thirdly, detailed revision of the rules governing 
cooperation in justice and home affairs (CJHA). On the last point, Italy 
proposes: a more precise definition of the areas covered by joint positions, 
joint actions and agreements, and a review of those instruments; the gradual 
transfer of certain areas to the Community pillar, including immigration, asylum 
policy and the juridical status of third-country nationals legally resident in 
the Union; reaffirmation of the legally binding character of joint positions and 
actions and the possible introduction of legal instruments comparable to 
Community directives; empowerment of the Court of Justice to rule on acts 
adopted under the Treaty's provisions on justice and home affairs, together with 
a reinforcement of parliamentary control; incorporation in the Treaty of the 
Schengen agreement in the context of a 'differentiated solidarity' mechanism; 
and rationalization of decision-making. 
In the fourth place, the Italian text examines the subject of employment, which 
it considers must be one of the key themes of the IGC. Italy believes that the 
revised Treaty must include a chapter on employment committing the Member States 
to undertake closer coordination of their employment policies on the basis of 
the strategic guidelines adopted at the Essen and Cannes European Councils. 
However, Italy does not think the IGC should review the existing Treaty 
provisions on EMU. Concerning the environment, the Italian view is that more 
effective protection would be ensured by majority voting in this field and other 
related areas, such as taxation. Italy believes that the inclusion of certain 
new policies in the Treaty {in the areas of enerqv. tourism and civil 
protection) and the strengthening of certain existing policies {social policy. 
consumer protection) would improve the public perception of the Union. It also 
considers that inclusion of the social protocol in the Treaty should be a major 
objective of the Conference. 
On transparency, Italy favours its strengthening, by means of specific 
provisions regulating the publicization of Union acts and access to all 
documents and through simplified legislative procedures and a more transparent 
Treaty. Italy also believes that the occasion of reforming the Treaty should be 
used to confer legal personality on the Union, thus removing one of the main 
problems of the existing three-pillar structure. The principles of subsidiarity. 
proxim1ty and proportionality should also be given their due importance: in this 
connection, Italy would accept a protocol to the Treaty setting out some of the 
elements of the 'code of conduct' approved by the Edinburgh European Council. 
It feels, however, that over-emphasizing subsidiarity could undermine the 
Commission's ability to submit proposals, re-fragment the single market and 
destroy the uniform nature of Community law. Finally, Italy believes that the 
principle of the equality of all the Union's working languages at all levels of 
the EU must be scrupulously adhered to. 
Concerning changes to the institutional set-up of the Union with a view to 
enlargement, Italy believes that the existing institutional balance should be 
retained, as should the single institutional framework for all spheres of Union 
action. A number of alterations to the workings and composition of the 
institutions are nonetheless proposed. On the Commission, Italy considers that 
it should keep its existing and irreplaceable role as the guardian of the 
Treaties standing in a relation of trust with the Member States and the European 
Parliament; its powers of initiative should be extended to the field of justice 
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and home affairs. On the number of Commissioners, which Italy considers to be 
too high already, it is suggested that, while compromise solutions could be 
considered, there should be less Commissioners than Member States. On the 
European Council and the General Affairs Council, without wishing to prejudice 
the increasing political importance of either, Italy considers that the main 
innovation required is to introduce the generalized use of majority voting in 
the Community sphere, with the sole exception of certain 'constitutional' 
provisions; it also argues that majority voting should be gradually applied to 
Titles V and VI of the Treaty. Italy favours reforming the weighting of votes 
in Council to take greater account of population, and, as a transitional 
measure, proposes recourse to a reinforced qualified majority for certain areas 
at present subject tu the unanimity rule. Italy also believes that the IGC 
should examine the Council's working methods, which have visibly deteriorated 
in recent years; it wishes to see a genuine qualitative and quantitative 
reinforcement of the Council Secretariat and the clear attribution to the 
General Affairs Council and COREPER of the task of global coordination of Union 
activities, in respect of which 1t is proposed that Article 151 of the Treaty 
should be redrafted. Italy does not, however, believe it vital to change the 
existing six-month rotation arrangement for the Council Presidency, although it 
believes that consideration should be given to proposals which might genuinely 
improve the situation. 
On the European Parliament, Italy considers that the IGC should rationalize and 
consolidate its role: Parliament should participate more fully in the CFSP and 
in CJHA. Equality between Parliament and the Council should be ensured through 
a hierarchy of acts tying the procedure for adopting acts to the~r status, and 
the number of legislative procedures should be reduced to three: assent (which 
should be extended, at least, to the revision of the Treaties), codecision and 
consultation. Codecision could be streamlined via ehminating superfluous stages 
and abolishing the possibility of a third reading in Council in the case of 
disagreement in the Conciliation Committee. On the membership of Parliament, 
Italy favours a ceiling of 650 to 700 MEPs, which should not be raised after 
future enlargements. It also advocates setting a deadline for adoption of a 
single electoral procedure. 
On the subject of the national parliaments, Italy considers that their closer 
association with Union activities entails the effective application of the 
declarations annexed to the Treaty and he more effective organization of 
consultation and information links between the national parliaments and their 
European select committees. The Union's own procedures should also be structured 
so as to permit more substantial dialogue between the Member State governments 
and their national parliaments. On the Court of Justice, Italy believes that its 
existing powers should be preserved in full and extended to the field of 
cooperation in home affairs and justice on matters directly affecting the rights 
and freedoms of citizens. It also favours preserving and developing the powers 
of the Court of Auditors - above all in the context of intensified anti-fraud 
action and the Committee of the Reoions. Finally, on the subject of 
flexibility and differentiated integration, Italy bel1eves that the revised 
Treaty should explicitly set out this principle, alongside a series of 
indispensable conditions for its operation. These should include preservation 
of the single institutional framework and the entire acguis communautaire and 
confirmation that Member States joining a Union policy or sphere of action at 
a later date will do so on a basis of formal and substantive equality. 
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On the Union's external identity, Italy believes that the IGC should give 
priority to the following: rationalization of competences in the area of 
external economic relations, with a view to improved coordination at Union level 
in the fields of world trade and development cooperation; creation of an 
analysis, planning and implementation unit for the CFSP, so as to ensure 
improved preparation and follow-up of Council decisions; greater visibility and 
coherence for the CFSP, with the appointment to this end of a 'personality' or 
secretary-general who would be responsible for continuity at Union level and 
would assist the rotating presidency and discharge the tasks confided to him by 
the Council, while fully respecting the competences attributed by the Treaty to 
the Commission concerning external relations and fostering the coherence of all 
aspects of the image projected by the Union to the world; reform of the 
unanimity rule once a consensus has been reached at the highest decision-making 
level (the European Council) on the principles and substance of the Union's 
external policy (Italy believes that such a prior consensus would facilitate 
greater use of simpler decision-making formulas, such as constructive abstention 
and reinforced qualified majority voting, on the basis of respect for political 
and financial solidarity on the basis of appropriate rules); and construction 
of the European security and defence dimension via implementation of the Treaty 
provisions on the CFSP, leading eventually to a common defence, on the basis of 
full respect for the transatlantic agreements. Italy also supports working 
towards the absorption of the WEU by the EU: this process could begin by 
incorporating the 'Petersberg missions' 1nto the Treaty and bringing the WEU 
structures under the Union's aegis. Italy wishes to see this objective expressly 
set out in the Treaty itself. Finally, Italy would support moves towards closer 
cooperation between the Member States in the field of armaments, in particular 
through the creation of a multilateral European structure. 
Concerning the establishment of a planning and analysis unit and the definition 
of a 'new function including executive tasks', Italy would prefer to see an 
institutional structure operating as follows: the European Council would be the 
highest authority as regards the political dynamic of the Union's external 
policy and the definition of its objectives; the Council of Ministers would be 
the decision-making body; and the future Secretary-General for external policy 
would be responsible for planning and the implementation of decisions, under the 
political control of the Council and in structured coordination with the 
Presidency-in-Office and the Commission. Italy believes that this would entail 
creating a coordinated analysis, planning and implementation structure (a type 
of European external policy committee) in which the Presidency, the Commission 
and the future CFSP Secretary-General would cooperate in the various phases of 
external policy, providing it with the requ1site coherence, effectiveness and 
visibility. 
Finally, the Italian text considers the question of the evolution of the 
negotiations, stating that Italy wishes to avoid lowest-common-denominator 
solutions and aims to help constitute, along with Member States with similar 
sympathies, a 'critical mass' which will enable the Union to achieve further 
progress while preserving its unique character. 
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Luxembourg Government memorandum of 30 June 1995 on the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference 
This paper by the Minister for Foreign Affairs sets out the Luxembourg 
Government's initial position on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. After 
a brief historical survey of the reasons why the Treaty on European Union needs 
to be amended at the Intergovernmental Conference, and after describing the 
goals of the conference, the Luxembourg Government undertakes to take part in 
the wide-ranging public debate leading up to the reform of the treaties, and 
stresses that the remarks contained in the document are preliminary in nature, 
bearing in mind that genuine negotiations will not begin until the formal 
opening of the Intergovernmental Conference. The general approach that the 
Luxembourg Government intends to adopt during the Intergovernmental Conference 
is based on the twin concern of securing realistic progress towards European 
integration while at the same time safeguarding the country's vital interests. 
The stated aim of the Luxembourg Government is to achieve a more integrated and 
more democratic Europe based on greater solidarity. Specifically, it believes 
that deepening the Union by means of Community integration must be one of the 
main concerns for the Intergovernmental Conference. Other objectives should be 
the attainment of the internal market and economic and monetary unlon, 
reaffirmation of solidarity between large and small countries, between north and 
south, and between richer and poorer countries, strengthening cultural ties, 
measures to combat nationalism, which is a source of so many conflicts, the 
fight against unemployment and social exclusion and, in general, preserving the 
social model enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, protecting the 
environment, achieving greater transparency and involving citizens more closely 
in the integration process. After defining the European Union as a unique 
construction bringing together sovereign states which have freely transferred 
certain sovereign powers to be exercised within a single institutional framework 
in accordance with common rules and procedures, the document polnts out that the 
various powers are currently being exercised at three separate levels: on the 
one hand, powers held exclusively by the Union and exercised by its 
institutions; on the other hand, powers exercised jointly by the Union and the 
Member States in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and, finally, 
powers exercised solely by the Member States. 
The Luxembourg Government memorandum devotes a chapter to the question of how 
to achieve a more effective foreign and security policy. It first examines 
matters relating to the CFSP, and then looks at questions relating to defence. 
With regard to the CFSP, it stresses that the political will to act is the 
crucial element in making proper use of the instruments provided for in the 
Treaty on European Union. However, it also calls for consideration to be given 
to a number of improvements that could be made in order to make the CFSP more 
effective and make the external action of the Union as a whole more cohesive. 
With this in view, the first step should be to look at the design of the CFSP. 
The document advocates the establishment within the Council secretariat of a 
joint analysis and planning facility, with which the Commission would be fully 
associated and to which the WEU would also contribute. With regard to decision 
making, the Luxembourg Government advocates greater use of majority voting. In 
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addition, in formulating common positions and actions, the Luxembourg Government 
believes that the principle of 'unanimity minus one' would represent 
considerable progress, in that it would enable a Member State to dissociate 
itself from a joint action without preventing it. With regard to the 
implementation of the CFSP, the Luxembourg Government believes that closer 
involvement by the Commission in certain areas, particularly joint actions under 
the control of the Council, would have advantages from the point of view of 
efficiency. In addition, the Luxembourg Government proposes that ways should be 
found of giving the Union legal personality so as to strengthen its capacity to 
enter into legal commitments vis-a-vis third parties. Finally, the CFSP should 
in principle be financed from the Community budget, and the principle of full 
financial solidarity by the Member States should be guaranteed. Finally, the 
Luxembourg Government believes that measures having military implications should 
be conducted in such a way that a Member State is not obliged to participate 
against its will, while at the same time no Member State can prevent the 
majority from agreeing to undertake such actions. Implementation of these 
actions would be the responsibility of the WEU, while all the Member States 
should be required to meet the financial costs of actions with military 
implications. 
With regard to defence, the Luxembourg Government believes that the Atlantic 
Alliance should continue to be the cornerstone of security in Europe, and that 
sooner or later all members of the European Union should also become members of 
NATO. For the time being, the WEU should continue to be a separate organization, 
although this should not prevent it from playing an increasingly active role in 
the future. Furthermore, until the WEU can be integrated by stages into the 
European Union, the Luxembourg Government believes that measures are needed to 
strengthen relations between the two organizations. In particular, the WEU 
should be confirmed as the military arm of the European Union and should pursue 
two objectives: on the one hand, greater participation in collective defence as 
the European pillar of NATO and, on the other, greater involvement in conflict 
prevention and management in Europe and the world. At operative level, the WEU 
should be able to undertake on behalf of the European Union humanitarian 
missions, peacekeeping and peacemaking missions, and crisis management missions 
involving armed forces. In addition, all Member States of the European Union 
should contribute to the funding of actions carried out on behalf of the Union. 
The Luxembourg memorandum also supports closer cooperation in the fields of 
justice and home affairs. The Luxembourg Government believes there are four 
reasons why no progress has been made in this area: the complexity of the 
matters concerned and the sensitive nature of the areas covered, which closely 
affect the sovereignty of the Member States; the need for unanimous decisions 
to be taken before the legal instruments provided for in Title VI of the Treaty 
can be adopted; the option of granting jurisdiction to the Court of Justice, 
which has proved a major obstacle to the adoption of conventions; and, finally, 
the operating structures at five different levels which have proved a 
considerable impediment to decision making. Consequently, the Luxembourg 
Government considers that there should be a single institutional framework for 
the different pillars. To that end, it suggests that provision should be made 
in the Treaty for the Court of Justice to be empowered to settle disputes both 
between the states and between states and the Commission, and to give 
preliminary rulings. In addition, the Luxembourg Government supports the 
application of the rules laid down in Article 100c, which provide for 
initiatives to be taken by the Commission and for decisions to be taken by a 
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qualified major1ty in the field of asylum policy, rules governing the crossing 
of external frontiers, immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of 
third countries, combating drug addiction, combating international fraud 
(subject to the proviso in Article K.1) and customs cooperation. At the same 
time, it proposes reducing the number of levels through which proposals have to 
pass during the drafting stage so as to accelerate the decision-making process. 
The memorandum also touches on the question of differentiated integration in the 
European Union. After regretting the inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty of the 
opt-out clauses for the United Kingdom and Denmark, and calling for the 
provisions deriving from the Schengen Agreement to be included 1n the Treaty, 
the Luxembourg Gover:~ment expresses its desire to see the principles and 
objectives for all future progress towards integration approved at the same time 
by all Member States. Nevertheless, the Luxembourg Government accepts that, for 
reasons recognized as objectively valid by the Commission and the Council, some 
states may wish to move at a different speed from others. It believes that 
different speeds of integration will be inevitable in the event of future 
enlargement. This phenomenon should be viewed in the light of the 1976 Tindemans 
report, in other words not as a Europe a la carte, since all are agreed on the 
final objective to be achieved in common and are therefore committed to iti it 
is simply a question of the implementation being staggered over a period of 
time. 
The Luxembourg Government memorandum then turns to the subject of the soc1al 
dimension. It begins by affirming that the social dimension 1s equally as 
important as the Union's other major ambitions, and should be a common focus for 
all Member States. It is deeply attached to the principles of the social charter 
and the social dialogue, and to the drawing up of a list of minimum social 
rights, and it calls for special attention to be paid to the encouragement of 
sustainable growth that will generate employment. 
The memorandum also refers to other matters connected with the deepening of the 
Union. First of all, it expresses support for granting the European Union the 
legal personality already enjoyed at present by the Community, the ECSC and 
Euratom. It also expresses 1ts willingness to reconsider extending the 
Community's external competence in the field of services. At the same time, the 
Luxembourg Government believes that there is no need to grant the Union any new 
powers when the Treaty is reviewed. However, it would like the preamble to the 
new Treaty to include explicit reference to the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms under European law, equality between men and women and 
measures to combat racism and xenophobia. It wants to see a more transparent 
decision-making mechanism, with the decisions themselves becoming easier to 
understand. 
Finally, the memorandum turns to institutional questions and enlargement. The 
Luxembourg Government supports accession on a 'case-by-case' basis, in other 
words when all the required conditions have been met, and expresses its 
willingness to consider the possibility of differentiated accession to the three 
pillars. In addition, from a strictly institutional point of view, the 
principles that will guide the action taken by the Luxembourg government are as 
follows: 
(a) First of all, equal status must be maintained for all Member States and all 
citizens of the European Union in line with the European Parliament 
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resolution of 17 May 1995, which means that all Member States should be on 
an equal footing as regards participation and involvement in the Union's 
decision-making process. Accordingly, each Member State must be represented 
in all the Union's institutions. 
(b) Similarly, all the main political forces in a Member State must be duly 
represented in the directly elected European institutions. 
(c) Apart from a number of adjustments necessary for the purposes of efficiency 
and democracy, the overall institutional balance within the Union must be 
respected. 
(d) The extension of qualified majority voting in the Council is necessary. 
However, unanimity should continue to apply to all subjects which closely 
affect the sovereignty of the Member States and thus of the national 
parliaments, such as revision of the Treaties, European citizenship, new 
accessions, taxation and own resources. The Luxembourg Government wants to 
maintain the existing system of rotating presidencies and will accept no 
deviation from this principle. 
(e) With regard to the Commission, the Luxembourg Government 1s 1n favour of 
retaining its independence and collegiate nature, its exclusive right of 
initiative and the possibility of giving it new responsibilities. 
(f) The memorandum provides for a twin-track reform of the European Parliament. 
On the one hand, the government wants to simplify procedures, particularly 
the codecision procedure, with the number of procedures reduced to three: 
codecision, assent and consultation. It is willing to extend the field of 
application of the codecision procedure to all areas in which the Council 
currently decides by qualified majority. On the other hand, it is ready to 
review the Treaty provisions governing the budget procedures with a view to 
making them more effective and, in this connection, believes that 
interinstitutional disputes over the classification of expenditure need to 
be ended. 
(g) The Luxembourg Government is in favour of maintaining the existing powers 
of the Court of Justice, as well as the procedure for appointing its 
members. 
(h) With regard to the Court of Auditors, the memorandum proposes improving the 
instruments for combating fraud available to the institution, as well as 
stepping up its capacity to investigate and gain access to all the data 
needed to carry out its checks. 
Memorandum on the IGC from the Governments of Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. 7 March 1996 (cf. Belgium, p. 25) 
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II nm NETHERLAQDS II 
Note of 14 November 1994 on the enlargement of the European Union: the 
opportunities and obstacles 
This note was sent to both Chambers on 14 November 1994 and was debated in 
plenary on 14 February 1995. It contains references and observations concerning 
the followlng points: the political dimension of security; the tightening of 
links with the EU; various practical problems; institutional questions; and, 
lastly, issues concerning a multi-speed Europe. 
With regard to the enlargement of the European Union, the Dutch government is 
in favour of including the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the 
political and economic structures of the West; this should happen as soon as 
possible, whilst safeguarding the Union's cohesion and stability, and after the 
appropriate institutional adjustments have been made. As regards lts attltude 
towards future accession negotiations, the Dutch government announces in its 
reference note that it will be guided, not only by the objective of safeguarding 
cultural values, but also by the democratic principles and fundamental rights 
set out in the Union Treaty, subject to the following four aims: 
- the achievement in Central and Eastern Europe of a stable security policy, 
socio-economic development and democratic stability; 
- the maintaining of Germany's active participation in the process of European 
integration, as well as in the joint European and Atlantlc securlty structure; 
- the maintaining of the internal market and a common legal system, and hence 
a European Union capable of acting decisively; 
- the achievement of the above objectives at a reasonable cost. 
As regards security policy, the Dutch government feels that integration in the 
European Union automatically implies extending security guarantees to the new 
Member States, since the criteria for joining the European Union are in a way 
the same as those required to join the WEU or NATO, and a parallel approach 
should therefore be maintained for the enlargement of the European Union, the 
WEU and NATO. This means that the accession of the countrles of Central and 
Eastern Europe to the European Union, the WEU and NATO must be considered 
together, although in certain cases accession to NATO might precede accession 
to the European Union, provided that this did not jeopardize relations with 
Russia. The Dutch government recommends that the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe should sign binding agreements with neighbouring countries on the 
subject of border disputes, frontier problems linked to the issue of minorities 
and any other potential source of conflict. Finally, as far as security is 
concerned, the starting-point should be to ensure that the European Union, the 
WEU and NATO expand eastwards without causing a new split in Europe, although 
this does not mean that such expansion requires the prior approval of Russia. 
With regard to tightening links with the European Union, the Dutch government's 
document suggests that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe should be 
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gradually integrated by means of the signing of Europe Agreements providing for 
the establishment of a free trade area within ten years and offering those 
countries the prospect of subsequent accession to the Union. At present, the 
Dutch government considers that this approach should apply to the four Visegrad 
countries, plus Romania and Bulgaria. It considers that when links with the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe are being strengthened, they must 
receive equal treatment, although, in view of the great political and economic 
differences between the various countries with which the European Union has 
concluded Europe Agreements, t.he relevant distinctions must be made when 
negotiations begin and when the subsequent enlargement takes place. In any 
event, such distinctions must be based on the criteria laid down by the European 
Council in Copenhagen. Furthermore, the Dutch government does not want the 
expansion of the Union to result in its losing efficiency or the ability to take 
decisions. 
The Dutch government's note also refers to a number of pract1.cal problems 
resulting from enlargement. The first issue dealt with is the adoption of the 
acguis communautaire. The Dutch government is in favour of laying down long 
transitional periods or establishing a customs union first. In both cases this 
would mean maintaining existing border controls for a certain period of time. 
In connection with migration and cooperation between judicial authorities, the 
document proposes establishing transitional periods during which certain 
restrictions on the free movement of workers would apply, 1.n order to prevent 
large-scale migration in the initial stages towards the current members of the 
European Union and until both economic development and progress in the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe lead to a reduction in migration. In the Dutch 
government's opinion the problem of migration must be discussed with the CCEE 
at some stage prior to accession and to this end it recommends cooperating 
closely with them in launching a policy on internal affairs and justice. It 
considers that this could be achieved by means of negotiations with those 
countries, in order to ensure that the resolutions, guidelines and conclusions 
drawn up by the presidency of the Union in the sphere of internal affairs and 
justice are put into practice and that possible joint actions in these fields 
can be implemented in accordance with the provisions of Article K. 3 of the 
Maastricht Treaty or even by concluding binding agreements. The document also 
deals with the tensions existing between the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and advocates that the bilateral problems among the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe and between them and other third countries should be resolved 
before they join the European Union, the WEU and NATO, so as to ensure that such 
problems do not entail additional risks, especially as far as the internal 
decision-making system is concerned. The document also mentions the implications 
of enlargement for the European Union's Mediterranean policy. It says that equal 
treatment (at least in material terms) must be granted to all the countries, 
whether in the Mediterranean area or in the former Soviet Union, whether the 
European Union has association agreements with them and irrespective of whether, 
in this case, they may accede to and become members of the European Union at a 
subsequent stage. The document also discusses the financial implications of 
enlargement for the common agricultural policy and the Structural Funds. Bearing 
this in mind and in case the considerable financial consequences of enlargement 
might lead to a substantial increase in the Netherlands' contribution to the 
European Union, the Dutch government states that it is in favour of revising the 
present rules governing the Structural Funds as well as the common agricultural 
policy. It therefore maintains that the Dutch contribution to the European Union 
must not rise to an unacceptable level after 1999, when the Structural Funds are 
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revised, since this would have extremely significant implications for the 
national budget. It therefore proposes either modifying the present system of 
contributions for farming and structural policy, or establishing long-term 
temporary exceptions for the new Member States, or else a combination of the 
two. 
The document also deals with the institutional questions resulting from 
enlargement. The Dutch government is against the idea of merely extrapolating 
the present institutional framework when the enlargement negotiations begin and 
feels that no particularly significant results will emerge from the 
Intergovernmental Conference unless the imminence of the further enlargements 
gives rise to new corpromise formulas. According to the Dutch government, the 
institutional reform must be aimed at preserving the successful operation of the 
single market, and order must therefore be established in the Union beforehand 
by means of deregulation and subsidiarity prior to enlargement. In its opinion 
there should be regulation only where strictly necessary, using an accessible 
and comprehensible form of legislation and pursuing a transparent legislative 
policy. In its opinion this objective must be at the top of the European agenda 
in the coming years. 
The document also deals with the question of a multi-speed Europe, and considers 
that a degree of differentiation in the process of European integration is 
inevitable in a Union of possibly 20-28 Member States. Such differentiation 
should, however, not undermine the Union's cohesion more than is strictly 
necessary and the Dutch Government is in favour of a multi-speed approach, which 
would make it possible for the same objective to be maintained for all the 
Member States, although they could achieve them at d1ffer1ng tempos. In any case 
it proposes a series of criteria which should be maintained: firstly, 
differentiated integration must be compatible with the objectives of the Treaty 
on European Union; secondly, each Member State must be free to paLticipate if 
it wants and can meet the requirements for more rapid progress; d1fferentiated 
integration must not undermine the Community legal system or the cohesion of the 
internal market (the Dutch government attaches particular importance to this 
third criterion); finally, States which choose to stay outside must not be 
allowed to oppose the formation of other more advanced groups wh1ch meet the 
remaining requirements and criteria. 
The Dutch government is therefore against 'Europe a la carte' and the 
possibility of Member States being able to choose freely whether or not to JOln 
certain areas and not others, particularly as regards the internal market and 
connected policies. For example, it considers that the transition to the third 
stage of economic and monetary union is a good example of the kind of approach 
which it advocates regarding multi-speed integration. As far as the second and 
third pillars are concerned, the Dutch government considers that not all the 
Member States share the same view of the Treaty's objectives and it therefore 
considers that although the multi-speed approach is preferable, the option of 
variable geometry in both pillars should not be ruled out. This would mean that 
the objectives and their implementation would vary for each country or group of 
countries, as in the case of the Schengen Agreement or the common foreign and 
security policy and the WEU. 
Finally, the conclusions of the Dutch government's document emphasize a parallel 
approach for accession to the European Union, the WEU and NATO, as an initial 
point of departure for negotiations with the CCEE and highlight the vital 
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economic and political importance of preserving the smooth operation of the 
internal market, the Community legal system and transition to the third stage 
of economic and monetary union in 1999 at the latest, with a view to accession. 
It stresses the need to establish long transitional periods once the countries 
of Eastern Europe have joined as well as maintaining existing border controls 
initially. The document insists that the financial burden should also be 
maintained at an acceptable level for the Member States, which would require 
subsequent modification of the common agricultural policy and a substantial 
reform of the Structural Funds. From the institutional point of view, the Dutch 
government states that the accession of new Member States must be preceded by 
a fundamental institutional reform, to enable the institutions of the European 
Union to take more effective and decisive action. It then proposes a deepening 
of the Union, which would not be aimed at adding new policies but at maintaining 
its capacity to take effective action both internally and externally. Finally, 
the document expresses doubts about whether the Intergovernmental Conference in 
1996 will make sufficient progress in this direction and is in favour of 
differentiated integration in certain fields, which should not threaten the 
internal market or jeopardize the cohesion of the European Union as a whole. 
Dutch Government Memorandum of 30 March 1995 on European Foreign Policv. 
Security and Defence - moving towards more decisive external action by the 
European Union 
This report was submitted to the Dutch Chamber of Deputies on 30 March 1995 by 
Foreign Minister Mr Hans van Mierlo. This second memorandum, intended by the 
Dutch Government to help stimulate the debate in the Netherlands on the future 
of Europe, begins by briefly describing the new tasks entrusted to the CFSP by 
the Maastricht Treaty. It goes on to analyze the changes in the political and 
security situation in Europe, and the need for the EU to take more decisive and 
incisive external action. In this regard, the Dutch Government believes that 
political and economic integration should be accompanied by the integration of 
common security structures. Consequently, the government takes as a starting 
point the need for a parallel approach to accession to the EU, the WEU and NATO, 
although it does not rule out the possibility of some countries becoming members 
of NATO before they join the EU. In any event, transparency should be a vital 
aspect of the enlargement of the three abovementioned organizations, which will 
also require a vigorous dialogue with Russia. After mentioning a series of 
factors which argue in favour of more decisive external action by the European 
Union, the memorandum considers the objectives and the context for a common 
European foreign and security policy. First, with regard to the EU and the WEU, 
the memorandum takes the view that there is no need for the IGC to reformulate 
the objectives of the CFSP, which have already been adequately defined in 
Article J.1(2) of the Maastricht Treaty. However, the Dutch Government proposes 
that the external action necessary to achieve these objectives could be 
strengthened. With that in view, the memorandum puts forward a series of 
proposals which will be discussed below. It also analyses plans to improve the 
efficiency of the CFSP in the light of the policies developed by other 
international organizations, such as NATO, OCSE and the United Nations. The 
government believes that NATO has adjusted significantly to the changing 
circumstances of the current situation, but that further reforms are 
nevertheless needed, with consideration being given to the composition, size and 
use of the integrated military structure. With this in view, the implementation 
of the plan launched by NATO at the January 1994 Summit on combined joint task 
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forces (CJTF), is moving ahead more slowly than initially scheduled, thereby 
restricting the operational role of NATO and of the WEU in particular. The 
memorandum expresses the view that the EU should take maximum advantage of the 
possibilities offered by the OCSE framework when implementing its own foreign 
policy. With regard to the United Nations, the memorandum points out that those 
EU Member States which are also permanent members of the Security Council 
represent an important link between the UN and the CFSP and, in this connection, 
the Dutch Government is convinced that the cohesion and effectiveness of the 
CFSP would benefit if the amended EU Treaty included a requirement for closer 
coordination, since experience has shown that this leaves much to be desired at 
present. 
The third part of the memorandum contains an assessment of the CFSP and puts 
forward a number of suggestions on that subject. The document points out that, 
although the CFSP is an instrument included in Article J of the EU Treaty, in 
practice the common foreign and security policy does not exist. Although any 
assessment of the pol1cy must inevitably be provisional given the limited nature 
of the experience, the memorandum takes the view that the ineffectiveness of the 
CFSP should be ascribed not only to the technical deficiencies it exhibits, but 
above all to reasons connected with political will. In this connection, the 
Dutch Government believes that one of the key questions to be addressed at the 
forthcoming IGC is whether or not the Member States are willing to translate 
political will into firm action through the introduction of new Treaty 
provisions that will curb use of the unanimity rule when taking and implementing 
decisions relating to the CFSP. In order to make the CFSP more effective, the 
memorandum puts forward a series of proposals relating to specific areas that 
have proved to be weaknesses in the system, namely the capacity for analysis, 
the decision-making system, financing, and the coherence of the second pillar 
structure as regards the consistency needed for any external action. With regard 
to the capacity for analysis, the memorandum suggests that the IGC could choose 
to strengthen the unit responsible for the CFSP in the Council secretariat or 
establish a separate independent structure headed by a Secretary-General who 
would deal exclusively with the CFSP and would act as a driving force behind 
that policy. In any case, the memorandum takes the view that, if the Commission 
is to be fully associated with the work carried out under the CFSP as laid down 
in Article J. 9, it must be able to participate in the activities of the 
reinforced unit responsible for the CFSP within the Council, or in the new 
structure to be established to deal exclusively with the CFSP. The Commission's 
current participation in the implementation of the CFSP should be extended so 
as to include preparations for decision-making. With reference to the decision-
making system itself, the document puts forward a number of alternatives to the 
consensus rule. For decisions on the implementation of a common decision, it 
proposes improving the current wording of Article J.3(2) so as to ensure that 
all decisions in th1s area are taken by qualified majority. In addition, it 
proposes greater use of abstention when adopting a joint action. It also 
proposes restricting the use of the current unanimity system and introducing a 
system of 'unanimity minus one', which should become the general rule except 
where the vital interests of a Member State are at stake, in which case the 
unanimity rule should continue to apply. The memorandum also considers the idea 
put forward by Germany of introducing a system of majority voting when adopting 
joint actions, specifying that this would be a majority voting system within an 
intergovernmental context, as opposed to a majority voting system within the 
Community framework, based on the Commission's exclusive right of initiative, 
the involvement in the process of Parliament and the role played by the Court 
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of Justice in reviewing the legality of legislation approved in this way. In any 
case, the possibility of bringing the CFSP within the Community framework could 
be seen as a long-term option. In addition, after specifying that the options 
proposed regarding the adoption of joint actions could also be appropriate for 
the process of adopting common positions under the terms of Article J.2, the 
Dutch Government expresses the view that under no circumstances should the 
unanimity rule lead to a situation where Member States could be compelled to 
deploy troops for the purposes of crisis management as part of any common 
defence policy that the EU might develop in future. With regard to financing, 
the Dutch Government believes that joint actions should be implemented by all 
Member States and funded from the Community budget, which would involve a role 
for the Commission and the European Parliament. However, should the Council 
decide that the CFSP should be financed from national budgets, the Dutch 
Government's view is that the scale of contributions should be based on GNP. In 
cases where only certain countries take part in a joint action and others do 
not, although not opposing it, the Dutch Government considers that the costs of 
the operation should be equitably shared between the participating and non-
participating countries. Finally, with regard to consistency and continuity of 
external action, the Dutch Government once again believes that the 'acquis 
communautaire' should be respected, which in its view means resolving the 
current uncertainties and weaknesses of the pillar system which result in the 
inclusion of Community elements within the framework of CFSP decisions and vice 
versa, in a tendency for certain Member States to use the CFSP framework to take 
decisions on matters which under the Treaty should fall within the competence 
of the Community, and in attempts to use intergovernmental channels to settle 
questions which are the responsibility of the European Community and which have 
been decided in the conventional manner under the majority voting system, on the 
basis of a Commission proposal. 
The Dutch memorandum then turns to an assessment of the common European defence 
pol~cy, putting forward a series of proposals. On the question of the relations 
between the EU and the WEU following the entry into force of the Treaty on 
European Union, the government considers that the IGC will offer a suitable 
opportunity to raise the question of the integration of the WEU within the 
European Union at political and institutional level, a goal which the IGC could 
attain by including a provision to stagger this integration over a number of 
years, with the date of expiry of the amended Brussels Treaty in 1998 offering 
a useful point of reference for this process. The memorandum goes on to look at 
the various arrangements under which the integration of the WEU within the EU 
could be achieved with a view to developing a common defence policy and examines 
the following three options: the WEU could be incorporated into the EU in two 
ways, either by maintaining the current arrangements under the second pillar or 
by establishing a separate fourth pillar. A third possibility would be to 
maintain the WEU as a separate and independent organization, though working in 
close cooperation with the EU. On the question of how the WEU should be 
incorporated into the EU, the Dutch Government stresses that, with regard to 
security guarantees, most Member States including the Netherlands believe that 
a common defence policy should involve a mutual obligation, although this does 
not alter the fact that meeting this obligation should continue to be a matter 
for NATO. In addition, the Dutch Government believes that the inclusion in the 
Treaty on European Union of new objectives and tasks in the field of a common 
defence policy should not involve an obligation to undertake these tasks at any 
time and in any circumstances, leav~ng open the possibility that these 
objectives and tasks could be undertaken exclusively by an ad hoc coalition. 
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In addition, incorporating the WEU into the European Union should create a 
direct link between the European Union and the North American members, which 
could take the form of an Atlantic agreement, although this would not be a 
substitute for the North Atlantic Treaty. After examining the questions relating 
to the differing membership of the EU and the WEU, the memorandum addresses the 
lnstitutional problems deriving from the possible incorporation of the WEU into 
the EU and concludes that, regardless of whether the common defence policy 
should come under the second or fourth pillars, the powers of the Commission in 
this field should be confined to involvement in the implementation of tasks 
distinct from those mentioned in Article V of the Brussels Treaty. The role of 
the European Parliament would depend on the position occupied by the WEU 
Assembly in relatioP to the common defence policy. The memorandum also raises 
the possibility of the WEU continuing as a separate body. However, of all the 
options outlined above, the Dutch Government is in favour of the future 
integration of the WEU within the EU and does not believe that the establishment 
of a fourth pillar within the EU Treaty system would be a more valid 
alternative. The Dutch Government believes that integration of the WEU within 
the second pillar would have the advantage of facilitating the transition from 
the CFSP to the common defence policy and would boost the incisiveness and 
credibility of both. Furthermore, given the complexity of existing problems, it 
does not believe that the WEU can be fully integrated within the EU in the 
short-term; however, it proposes that, even if the WEU continue~ to exist as a 
separate organization for some time to come, the IGC should take the first steps 
towards full integration. 
After discussing the various mainly operational effects that integration of the 
WEU would have, the Dutch memorandum places emphasis on the question of 
democratic control. Should the IGC agree on a decision-making system for the 
CFSP where the unanimity rule is not applied, it believes that decisions adopted 
in this way should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny at European level. 
Although it is to be hoped that the IGC will grant the European Parliament 
greater powers under the CFSP, if it fails to do so the options described above 
will have to be considered with a view to determining whether the advantage of 
greater efficiency can offset the drawback of reduced democratic control. In any 
case, this dilemma may not arise, since the Dutch Government believes it highly 
llkely that decisions in this sector will continue to be taken on the basis of 
unanimity. 
Finally the document analyses the effects of enlargement of the Union with 
respect to the proposals for achieving a more vigorous CFSP and the formulation 
of a common defence policy, taking the view that accession to the EU, the WEU 
and NATO by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe should as far as 
possible be a parallel process, given that their accession to the EU should not 
pose problems from the point of view of the CFSP and the future common defence 
policy. The memorandum also recommends that there should be sufficient 
flexibility in the implementation of the CFSP and the common defence policy, 
given the wide variety of geopolitical interests that will exist after the 
accessions have taken place and which might make the formation of ad hoc 
coalitions advisable. Turning finally to the forces at play within the EU, the 
memorandum notes that although most of the current problems can be resolved by 
bringing the CFSP within the Community framework, it is certain that at present 
most of the Member States are not prepared to follow this course and, as a 
result, the CFSP will continue to maintain its intergovernmental structure for 
the time being, in line with the approach advocated mainly by the United Kingdom 
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and France. The Dutch Government intends to support the German position, 
favouring the introduction of majority voting as a way of making the CFSP more 
effective as part of a general approach that is more favourable to the Community 
framework. The Dutch Government believes that the absorption of the WEU by the 
EU will be a gradual process that will not be completed by 1996, and which the 
IGC will only be able to set in motion. 
European Cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs. Third Memorandum 
for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (23 Mav 1995) 
On May 23 1995 the Dutch Government submitted a third memorandum related to 
cooperation within the European Union in the fields of justice and home affairs 
(JHA). For the Dutch Government those matters (free movement of persons; visa 
and asylum policy; immigration; position of nationals of third countries; fight 
against organised crime; drug trafficking and fraud; so as measures to combat 
racism and xenophobia) can no longer be tackled on a purely national basis. On 
the contrary, those problems require effective cooperation within the European 
Union, and judicial, customs and police cooperation is the only means of 
affording citizens security and legal protection. Anyway, given the slow 
progress that has been made after the coming into force of the Treaty on 
European Union, the Dutch Government considers it desirable for the functioning 
of the third pillar to be properly evaluated in the framework of the IGC and 
points out two central issues to such an evaluation: the effectiveness of 
cooperation and the maintenance of the rule of law. In this third memorandum the 
Dutch Government br1efly summar1zes the background to cooperation in the field 
of justice and home affairs, analyses the problems involved and makes a number 
of proposals aimed at improving the situation. In four different chapters the 
Dutch 'position paper' deals with the JHA policy framework; the state of play; 
the evaluation of JHA cooperation; and possible ways of improving JHA 
cooperation. 
After describing the current JHA policy framework, the memorandum points out the 
results to date of the JHA policy concerning migration policy; asylum policy; 
police and customs cooperation and action against international organised crime; 
combating illegal drug trafficking; and the judicial cooperation in criminal and 
civil matters. As a conclusion, the Dutch Government believes that, generally 
speaking, the concrete results of cooperation in the fields of justice and home 
affairs have been somewhat meagre, especially in view of the ambitions 
entertained in the initial work programme of November 1993. Even in those areas 
- visa, customs, drugs and fraud policy - in which measures have to be laid down 
in both a Community and a JHA framework, harmonisation problems sometimes arise, 
and decision-making proceeds at a different pace. This has consequences for the 
efficiency of cooperation and the legal protection of citizens. 
Concerning the evaluation of JHA cooperation, the Dutch Position Paper refers 
to a certain number of problems. Some of them relate to the efficiency of 
decision-making; decisions requiring unanimity; the lack of detailed objectives 
and multi-year work programmes; the limited role of the Commission; cumbersome 
committee system; the problem posed by the legal nature of JHA decisions; and 
the problem of funding JHA activities. Certain other problems, following the 
Dutch memorandum, relate to the democratic and judicial supervision of the 
decision-making process: the influence of national parliaments on JHA decision-
making; parliamentary access to administrative information; public access to 
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administrative information; and legal guarantees via the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice. As a conclusion, the Dutch memorandum states that 
cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs is characterised by a 
number of shortcomings. More particularly, these relate to the following areas: 
policy results and decisiveness: 
(a) decision-making subject to unanimity of votes; 
(b) absence of policy objectives; 
(c) lack of direction in the policy preparations conducted by the Presidency and 
the limited role of the Commission; 
(d) cumbersome decision-making structure. 
access to information, judicial supervision and democratic scrutiny 
(e) parliamentary and public access to administrative information is limited; 
(f) no certainty that the Court of Justice can exercise jurisdiction in order 
to provide legal guarantees; 
(g) parliamentary influence on decision-making in the JHA framework is limited. 
Finally, the Dutch memorandum proposed a certain number of possible ways of 
improving cooperation in the field of just~ce and home affairs. Concern~ng the 
double option full communitarization or abandonment of the third pillar, the 
memorandum clearly outlines that while the Dutch Government takes the existence 
of the JHA pillar as the starting point for its stance on the IGC, each JHA 
policy area and problem identified must be examined to determine what 
improvements are possible, including further communitarization. 
In particular, the memorandum include a certain number of intermediate options 
for improving JHA cooperation, some relating to procedural improvements which 
could be effected w~thout any need for an amendment to the Treaty. Other, more 
far reaching measures, particularly those involving institutional alterat~ons, 
would require an amendment of the Treaty on European Union. All those measures 
could be summarized as follows: 
a) Clarification of the Treaty's policy objectives: 
The Dutch Government is of the opinion that more specific policy objectives 
and resources should be incorporated. This would imply that Article K.1 of the 
Treaty on European Union would no longer simply list a number of policy areas, 
as it does now, but would indicate, for each of the policy areas in question, 
the principles on which the policy is based, the objectives of the policy and 
the policy resources to be used. 
b) Improvements in political guidance, and multi-year work programmes: 
The Dutch Government believes that a multi-year work programme would help to 
promote the progress and the continuity of cooperation in the fields of 
justice and home affairs. Such a programme would be even more effective if its 
main points were laid down by the European Council. The JHA Council could then 
interpret and elaborate these points. 
c) Strengthening the Commission's right of initiative: 
Following the memorandum, the Dutch Government would argue in favour of 
extending the right of initiative to cover three areas in which it has thus 
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far been reserved to the Member States: judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. customs cooperation and police cooperation. On the other hand, the 
Dutch Government believes it would be less appropriate to furnish the 
Commission with an exclusive right of initiative in an intergovernmental JHA 
structure. Rather than introduce an exclusive right of initiative in the JHA 
pillar, a more obvious course of action would be - in view of the connections 
between the pillars - to review the merits of transferring certain areas from 
the third to the first pillar. 
d) Streamlining decision-making: 
The Dutch Government takes the view that the decision-making structure would 
be streamlined. This would make it easier for the K.4 Committee to play the 
coordinating role assigned to it under the Treaty on European Union. In 
conjunction with a multi-year work programme consideration could then be given 
to projects for which the K.4 Committee would be responsible. No amendment to 
the Treaty would be required for this purpose. 
e) Clarification of the legal nature of JHA decisions: 
The Dutch Government believes that the legal force of the 'common position' 
and 'joint action' should be defined more clearly. The IGC should clarify 
Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on this point. It could, for 
example, be laid down that a decision is binding the respect to the result to 
be achieved, but leaves the Member States with competence when it comes to 
selecting the ways and means of achieving the result. 
f) Clarification of financing mechanisms: 
The Dutch Government's basic principle is that Community financing has clear 
advantages over intergovernmental financing. Both policy-related and 
institutional factors come into play here. From the point of view of policy, 
financing from the Community budget facilitates cooperation between the third 
and the first pillar, which is an advantage when assessing policies. From an 
institutional point of view, the Netherlands attaches importance to the fact 
that funding from the Community budget involves the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the European Court of Audit more closely in financial aspects 
of the third pillar. 
The Dutch Government believes that the Treaty on European Union should clearly 
indicate what expenditure could be considered for Community budget funding and 
what procedures will apply if intergovernmental financing is adopted. 
g) Greater involvement of the EP and national parliaments 
The Dutch Government feels that, in addition to existing national 
parliamentary supervision, the European Parliament should be more closely 
involved than it now is in decision-making on justice and home affairs 
matters. This could be done in two ways. Firstly, the EP, no less than 
national parliaments, must be afforded better access to administrative 
information in the context of the third pillar. To this end, the Government 
is in favour of a Treaty provision stating that all draft decisions which 
would be binding on the Member States should be put before the EP prior to the 
decision-making procedure in the Council. Secondly, such a provision should 
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also make it possible for the EP to offer an opinion on the draft decision 
before it within a reasonable time (for example, three months) and thus help 
in directing the polltical debate. 
h) Strengthening the role of the Court of Justice 
In order to ensure the most extensive role possible for the Court in the JHA 
pillar, the Dutch Government believes that the Court should have full, 
compulsory jurisdiction. Full jurisdiction should be understood to mean 
jurisdiction in regard to both the settlement of disputes and the giving of 
preliminary rulings. 
Moreover, the Dutch position paper refers to the communitarization of speclfic 
sectors. In this respect, and after recalling that full communitarlzation of 
cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs would not be a reasonable 
course of action, the memorandum recognises that consideration should be given 
to examining the extent to which certain specific areas would lend themselves 
to communi tarization as provided for in the Article K. 9 of the Treaty on 
European Union. In particular, the Dutch memorandum declares that the Dutch 
Government wishes, in consul tat ion with the Dutch parliament,__ t_c:;_qexamine the 
merits of communitarization of visa and asylum policy. Any policy adopted by the 
EU should expressly take the Schengen acquis as the starting po~:Jt for further 
policy development. 
Furthermore, concerning Schengen and JHA cooperation, the memorar1dum establishes 
that the limited results of cooperation in the fields of JU: ':: ",ce and home 
affairs are offset to a certain extent by the results of cooperat1on by the 
Schengen countries. Schengen does not, however, compensate for the absence of 
access to information, judicial control and parliamentary ~nvolvement at 
European level. It would not be desirable, in the Dutch GoveLu.1Pnt' s opin1on, 
to endeavour to introduce separate provision for this in the Schenc.Hm framework. 
It therefore believes that the goal should be for the EU to,_?gQpt the Schengen 
acguis. Such a transfer should not, of course, result in a dilution of the 
acquis. The Dutch Government believes that combining the substantive 
achievements of Schengen with the institutional structure and sctfeguards of the 
EU will make it possible to achieve significant advantages in numerous respects. 
The IGC should elaborate on this proposal. 
Fourth memorandum by the Dutch Government (12 July 1995) on the institutional 
reform of the European Union 
The fourth and final memorandum of 12 July 1995 was submitted by the Netherlands 
Government to the Dutch Parliament 1n late July. It is the final part of the 
Dutch Government's contribution to the public debate on the planned revision of 
the Maastricht Treaty, not only in the Netherlands, but in the whole of Europe. 
In fact, the government is still in the process of drawing up its contribution 
to the IGC. The memorandum begins by expressing the belief that the IGC, the 
move to the third stage of EMU, the reform of the Structural Funds, the CAP and 
the financing system, and the accession of new Member States to the Union, must 
be dealt with separately, and in accordance with the relevant rules in order to 
ensure the success of the negotiations. The Dutch Government places special 
importance on the institutional reforms necessary for the future development of 
the Union and draws a distinction between the reforms needed within the 
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framework of the current Union of fifteen, in order to improve what it calls the 
'constitutional quality' of the Union, and on the other hand those necessary 
with a view to enlargement. It therefore believes that, in addition to the CFSP 
and cooperation under the third pillar, the conference agenda should be confined 
to a certain number of fundamental issues connected with these two questions. 
The first part of the memorandum dealing with 'constitutional auali ty' considers 
the measures needed to introduce greater transparency, a more effective division 
of tasks between the EU and its Member States and an increase in the democratic 
legitimacy of the decision-making process. In general terms, the Dutch 
Government believes that the levels of effective administration existing at 
national level should also be achieved at European level, something which could 
be done through more effective application of the three principles of 
subsidiarity, democracy and transparency. On the question of·subsidiarity, the 
Dutch Government believes that in cases where a problem can be dealt with only 
at European level, the Union should have the necessary instruments at its 
disposal. At the same time, when submitting a proposal, the Commission should 
explain why provisions are needed at European level (subsidiarity), whether 
there is a possibility of adopting less stringent provisions (proportionality), 
and should include a cost/benefit analysis and an assessment of the scope for 
fraud and for monitoring implementation. Following a public debate on the 
Commission proposals and their ju$tification, the Council could hold a debate 
on admissibility, which would focus on the three criteria mentioned above. To 
avoid any possible deadlock and abuses, it is proposed that the revised Treaty 
should make provision for these debates to be held solely in cases where 
requested by a Member State and these subsidiarity tests should be accompanied 
by the necessary guarantees, including the possibility of referring cases to the 
Court of Justice. 
With regard to the principle of democracy, the Dutch Government believes that 
for all decisions adopted by the Council under the majority voting rule, 
national parliaments should have a say over legislative and budgetary matters 
and should be able to exercise control over political decisions of the Union and 
their implementation. In addition, in cases where the Council takes dec~sions 
unanimously, whether political or legislative in nature, parliamentary scrutiny 
should be guaranteed in principle by the involvement of the national 
parliaments. However, given that a single governmen~ or national parliament 
could block the process for taking decisions unanimously, the memorandum 
proposes that the European Parliament should also be consulted on decisions 
requiring unanimity. The memorandum proposes that Parliament's right to put 
forward recommendations should be spelled out more clearly so that the Council 
cannot adopt decisions until Parliament has made its recommendations or until 
a certain period of time has elapsed. This right of consultation would also 
entail the right to receive adequate information, and this would relate to EU 
policy as a whole, including cooperation under the second and third pillars. 
Furthermore, even in cases where decisions are taken unanimously, Parliament's 
powers could go beyond the right of consultation. For example, with reference 
to current Article 228 of the Treaty, the Dutch Government considers that the 
revised Treaty should recognize Parliament's right to approve any Treaty signed 
by the European Community. For those legislative provisions adopted under the 
Community pillar, the Dutch Government believes that the codecision procedure 
should be extended and should replace the cooperation procedure, which is less 
democratic. It is also in favour of increasing Parliament's powers of control, 
particularly as regards proper and efficient use of funds from the Community 
- 120 - PE 165.963 
Wh1te Paper on the 1996 IGC (Volume II) 
budget. At administrative level, the Dutch Government repeats the view it 
expressed at the previous IGC that the European ~arliament should have the right 
to veto individual Commissioners. 
On the question of transparency, the document expresses support for the 
principle of open government at European level. In this connection, it supports 
public access to information and calls for the European Union to establish 
legislative provisions giving citizens full rights of access to information as 
well as proper facilities for appeal. The basic view of the Dutch Government is 
that government documents should be accessible unless there are good grounds to 
justify confidentiality. In any case, proper justification should be provided 
for the refusal of any individual request for information. In addition, the 
Dutch Government proposes that a provision be included in the Treaty to 
guarantee Parliament's right to full and timely information. The document also 
raises the question of the public nature of proceedings during the decision-
making process and expresses support for holding Council meetings 1n public as 
far as is possible when the latter is acting as leg1slator. This would also 
involve holding the admissibill.ty debate (subsidiarity) mentioned above in 
public, as well as the final vote in Council, including explana~ions of vote, 
while the intermediary negotiating stage would remain closed to the publ1c. 
The memorandum then moves on to discuss the need for clarity in the decision-
making procedure, and argues 1n favour of s1mplifying this procedure. The Dutch 
Government puts forward four proposals: extending the codec1s1on procedure to 
other areas; simpl1fying and clarify1ng th1s procedure; abandoning the 
cooperation procedure; and better regulat1on of the r1ght of consultat1on. The 
Dutch Government also proposes that for legislative matters the assent procedure 
should be replaced by the codecis1on procedure and retained solely for the 
approval of treaties. The document also advocates the radical simplificat1on of 
the text of the Treatv on European Un1on, a task which the Reflect1on Group 
could entrust to a group of independent legal experts. With regard to the 
quality of legislation, the memorandum recommends that this is necessary not 
only to make it more accessible, but also to facilitate 1ts appl1cation and curb 
abuses. On the subject of commitology and the hierarchy of Commun1ty acts, the 
memorandum merely states the Dutch Government's 1ntention of taking a 
constructive approach to this question, bearing 1n mind that the needs of 
efficiency and democracy require a simpler system of commitology and a hierarchy 
of Community acts. 
The second part of the memorandum deals with institutional changes in the light 
of future enlargements, and discusses what institutional measures will be 
needed, together with reform of the CAP, Structural Funds and budget system, in 
order to maintain the Union's cohesion and its capacity to act decisively, while 
putting forward a series of proposals. The document first notes that to continue 
applying the extrapolation method used for the various enlargements, which made 
it possible to extend the appropriate initial balance achieved between strict 
proportionality and equality between all the original Member States to the 
benefit of the smaller States, would inevitably lead to a loss of efficiency, 
decision-making capacity and democratic legitimacy. The Dutch Government 
therefore believes that the composition and decision-making mechanisms of the 
institutions need to be amended. In any case, any institutional reform will have 
to leave the Community legal order and the existing institutional structure 
unchanged, although these need to be protected and strengthened. 
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With regard to the Council four questions need to be considered: the decision-
making system; the weighting of votes; the presidency; and the Council's working 
methods. With regard to decision-making by the Council, the document refers to 
the views expressed in the second and third memoranda on the second and third 
pillars, and proposes that Council decisions on first pillar matters should in 
principle be made by a qualified majority, although unanimity should continue 
to be needed for matters relating to taxation, the decision on own resources, 
and decisions of a constitutional nature concerning reform of the Treaties, use 
of languages and accession. With regard to the weighting of votes, the Dutch 
Government considers that a reasonable balance should be struck in the weighting 
of votes between large, medium and small States. After discussing the option of 
granting more votes to the larger countries, the Dutch Government expresses its 
support for a double majority system (current weighting of votes plus 
representation of a given percentage - in principle 50% - of the Union's total 
population), since it would strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the current 
decision-making system. In addition, the Netherlands would continue to oppose 
the Ioannina agreement. Of the four proposals considered on the question of the 
Council Presidency (making it annual, separating internal and external affairs, 
introducing an elected presidency or appointing a presidential team), the Dutch 
Government expresses provisional support for the last of these options. The 
presidential team would consist of a 'troika' of Member States (one president 
and two vice-presidents) who would share responsibilities for one year. Finally, 
on the question of the Council's working methods, the Dutch Government urges the 
IGC to seek new formulas and calls on the Reflection Group also to consider the 
question and to put forward proposals to improve the situation which would not 
involve amendment of the Treaties. 
With regard to the Commission, the Dutch Government supports the principle that 
each Member State should have one Commissioner. Of the other possible options, 
the government would be willing to accept a situation where there were fewer 
Commissioners than Member States, but only if all Member States were will~ng to 
renounce permanent representation. The Dutch Government was opposed to the idea 
that some Member States had a permanent right of representation and others did 
not. 
On the question of how many seats the European Parliament should have, the 
memorandum calls on Parliament itself to put forward proposals as to how the 
maximum scheduled number of 700 seats should be divided. Nevertheless, the Dutch 
Government believes that a certain minimum number of seats should be set aside 
for the smaller countries. 
With regard to the Court of Justice, the memorandum proposes that the principle 
of 'one State, one Judge' should be maintained. At the same time, in order to 
ensure the effectiveness of its work, which could be disrupted by an excessive 
increase in the number of judges following successive enlargements, the document 
proposes the introduction of a system of two 'plenary' Chambers. To ensure the 
uniform application of Community law by both Chambers, the memorandum suggests 
that judges should be rotated or that the Advocate-General should act as an 
intermediary. 
Finally, on the question of different speeds of integration, the document refers 
to views expressed in the first memorandum. However, the Dutch Government 
believes that, whatever developments occur in this field, the single 
institutional framework of the European Union should be preserved. It also 
- 122 - PE 165.963 
Wh1te Paper on the 1996 IGC (Volume II) 
repeats that the Union should move forward in a single direction as far as 
possible, and that it would prefer not to see integration at different speeds. 
In fact, it believes that the concession previously granted to the United 
Kingdom was a last resort which needs to be remedied. 
Memorandum on the IGC from the Governments of Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. 7 March 1996 (cf. Belgium, p. 25) 
Communication of March 1996: 'From Madrid to Turin: the Netherlands' priorities 
for the 1996 IGC' 
In this memorandum the Dutch Government submitted the results of the Reflection 
Group's work to the national parliament, while also outlining (in the third 
section) the main positions to be defended in the discussions by the Netherlands 
on the themes of the IGC. A summary of these positions follows. 
Concerning the IGC agenda, the Netherlands wish it to concentrate on a minimum 
number of areas, in the interests of its own success. On the Netherlands' 
objectives for the Conference, the government stresses that its positions have 
already been set out in detail in the four previous memorandums: the present 
text represents a further stage of clarification. On the question of principles, 
the Netherlands supports the strengthening of fundamental right2 in the TEU, 
considering that before the IGC decides on the matter there should be careful 
examination of the legal implications of the various possiblP options. The 
Treaty should enshrine the right of the public to access to government 
information in the Union; the Treaty should be simplified; there should be 
improved application of the principle of subsidiarity on the basis of better-
argued proposals from the Commission; and efforts should be made to improve the 
quality of Community legislation. The Netherlands feel that the IGC should not 
rule out the notion of a multi-speed Europe: the revised Treaty should specify 
criteria and provisions for a selective process of multi-speed integration. On 
the environment, the legislation in this field should be clarified with a view 
to integrating environmental policy into the other Community policies. The 
Netherlands believe that all the Community languages should have equal status. 
Concerning the institutions and with reference to the European Parliament, the 
Netherlands favour reducing the number of decision-making procedures to three 
(consultation, codecision and assent), and would simplify the codecision 
procedure and extend it to further areas. On the Council, the Dutch view is that 
QMV should be retained and, if possible, extended as far as the internal market 
is concerned; the text calls for caution on the matter of changing the weighting 
arrangements, and does not rule out a dual weighting system based on a majority 
of both votes and population. On the Commission, the Netherlands favour: 
extending its existing prerogatives and powers; increasing its efficiency; 
making it more fully accountable to Parliament, especially as regards the 
personal responsibility of the commissioners, considered individually; 
simplifying the commitology procedures; and retaining at least one Dutch 
commissioner. On the Court of Justice, the Netherlands would keep its existing 
prerogatives intact and extend them to third-pillar (CJHA) cooperation. 
On the internal market, the Dutch Government supports reinforcing the 
instruments for combating fraud; would, under certain conditions, favour 
- 123 - PE 165.963 
White Paper on the 1996 IGC (Volume II) 
inclusion in the Treaty of prov1s1ons concerning employment; opposes new Treaty 
provisions on energy, tourism and civil protection; does not think any new 
exemptions should be granted with respect to the freedom of provision of public 
services; and would incorporate the social protocol in the Treaty. 
On the CFSP, the Netherlands favour setting up a planning and analysis unit, to 
which the Member States, the Council Secretariat and the Commission would 
contribute; such a body should not, however, in the Dutch view, have any right 
of initiative. The Netherlands endorse the extension of majority voting to CFSP 
decisions, considering that the precise arrangements could be decided later, and 
oppose the idea of a high-profile, political 'Mr or Mrs CFSP', considering that 
the role in question should be filled by an official under the authority of the 
General Affairs Council. The Dutch Government would support the gradual 
integration of the WEU with the EU, and would step up cooperation between the 
two to this end. 
Finally, in the CJHA field, the Netherlands favour: strengthening the roles of 
the Court of Justice, the Commission and the European Parliament; 
communitarizing visa and asylum policy; incorporating the Schengen 'acquis' into 
the TEU; and, in general terms, making greater use of the 'passerelle' between 
the first and third pillars, so as to facilitate the transfer of certain areas 
from the third pillar to the Community legal framework. 
II AUSTRIA II 
Guidelines of the Austrian Government on the subjects likely to be dealt with 
at the 1996 IGC (submitted in June 1995) 
I. Introduction 
The guidelines have been drawn up by the Federal Chancellery and the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry in cooperation with other ministries, the Lander and the social 
partners. The positions adopted by the Conference of 'Landeshauptmanner' (heads 
of government of the Lander) of 4 May 1995 have been taken into consideration. 
The main challenges to be met in the field of institutional reform are as 
follows: 
- strengthening democratic legitimacy, transparency and bringing the Community 
closer to its citizens; the consequent need to apply the principle of 
subsidiarity; 
- strengthening capacity to act under the CFSP and in the field of justice and 
home affairs; 
- in the context of Union enlargement, consolidating and strengthening the 
Community's capacity to act and the efficiency of the act1on in the field of 
economic, social and environmental policy. 
With regard to models for differentiated integration, the guidelines single out 
four principles to be observed: 
differentiated integration should remain the exception to the rule. Phased 
integration should be the model to follow; 
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- in the case of phased integration, the goals for Community integration should 
be determined in common. With regard to the institutional aspects of phased 
integration, the guidelines favour the use of a single institutional 
framework; 
differentiated integration should not be allowed in political areas where 
certain Member States wish to secure competitive advantages; 
- the different levels of integration established as a result of differentiated 
integration should remain open to those Member States not taking part. 
Agreements establishing integration at various levels should include 
transitional arrangements. 
II. Functioning of the Community pillar 
The guidelines devote considerable attention to the question of existing 
policies and how they can be strengthened in material and institutional terms 
and with regard to decision making. 
In general, the Government considers that the Community should give priority to 
environment policy and the fight against unemployment. 
With regard to granting new powers to the Union, the Government believes that: 
- Community powers in the field of energy policy would be useful for measures 
currently under way in the energy sector; 
Community powers in the field of civil protection policy should be included 
in the Treaty on European Union; 
- Community powers in the field of tourism policy are not necessary. 
The Government is opposed to any discussion of the material aspects of EMU at 
the 1996 IGC. 
The Government has serious reservations about discussing CAP reform at the 1996 
IGC. 
On the question of Community social policy, the Government stresses the fact 
that the United Kingdom has secured unwarranted competitive advantages. The 
Community's social policy should be brought within the Community framework and 
harmonized by including the protocol and agreement on social policy in the first 
pillar. In addition, the Government urges that the procedure provided for in 
Article 189b (simplified) should be extended to cover all aspects of Community 
social and employment policy. 
With regard to environment policy, the Government calls for: 
- inclusion of the term 'sustainable development' in Article 2 of the TEU; 
- inclusion of 'protection of the environment' in the list of prohibitions or 
restrictions contained in Article 36 of the TEU; 
- inclusion of 'environment-friendly agricultural production' in the objectives 
listed in Article 39 of the TEU; 
- improvement of Article 100a (4) of the TEU; 
- extension of the procedure under Article 189b of the TEU to all measures 
implementing Article 130s of the TEU. 
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III. Institutional questions 
European Parliament 
The Austrian Government supports the extension of the European Parliament's 
legislative and supervisory powers. With this in view, discussions are needed 
on the simplification of legislative procedures and commitology. 
The Austrian Government seems to have reservations about the European 
Parliament's request for a right of initiative vis-a-vis the Commission. 
However, it is in favour of revising the investiture procedure for the 
Commission and stresses the value of the proposal made by Mr Santer during the 
last investiture procedure in January 1995. 
The question of the number of Members of Parliament is not a matter of priority 
for the Austrian Government. According to the guidelines, the functioning of the 
European Parliament is dependent upon its working methods. 
On the question of cooperation between national parliaments and the European 
Parliament, the Government calls for interparliamentary procedures of the COSAC 
kind to be consolidated. It is opposed to any attempt to establish a second 
chamber of national parliaments. 
Council 
The Austrian Government wants the role of smaller Member States to be 
maintained. This is one of the constituent elements of the European Union. 
With regard to institutional provisions concerning the role of the Council, the 
Austrian Government is opposed to any reduction in the members needed for a 
blocking minority. 
It calls for a partial reV1s~on (article by article) with regard. to the 
extension of qualified majority voting in the Council. 
The Government is in favour of retaining the current system of rotating 
presidencies. 
Commission 
The Government is willing to consider a reduction in the number of 
Commissioners. However, each Member State must have the right to nominate one 
member of the Commission. 
With regard to the extension of the Commission's powers, the Government calls 
for it to be given powers to combat fraud and in the areas covered by the third 
pillar. 
Subsidiarity 
According to the guidelines, the subsidiarity principle should be strictly 
applied. It is seen as an instrument for improving the distribution of tasks 
between European, national and regional level. 
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Hierarchy of acts 
The Austrian Government is 'interested' in establishing a hierarchy of acts, but 
account would have to be taken of the need for balance between the bodies of the 
Union. 
Basic rights 
The Austrian Government believes that the basic rights of Union citizens need 
to be guaranteed. The 1996 IGC should discuss how this should be done. 
IV. CFSP 
Austria subscribes to the objectives of the CFSP as set out in Article J.1 of 
the Treaty on European Union. It has a strong interest in seeing the Union 
become a factor for stability in Europe. 
In accordance with the dictates of the integration progress, Austria supports 
the principle that the Union's foreign policy should be gradually brought within 
the Community framework. 
Institutional questions 
The major shortcomings can be seen as the lack of preparation for decision 
making and implementing measures. 
- In order to improve the capacity for planning and analysis, the Austrian 
Government proposes that a planning unit be set up consisting of members of 
the Council secretariat, the Commission and the Member States. The unit would 
operate alongside the Council secretariat. The government proposes that its 
functions should be: 
* information and observation 
* analysis and evaluation 
* drawing up options and proposals in order to put into practice the 
conclusions reached by analysis. 
- Austria accepts that the role of the Council presidency should be to gu1de 
pol1cy and sees no need for reform. 
- On the question of the role of the Commission, the government proposes that 
its right to propose measures should be reinforced. 
Decision-making 
- The Austrian Government affirms its readiness to discuss a cautious move 
towards majority voting: 
* in stages (for joint actions) 
* on a sectoral basis (with regard to decisions taking 'unan1mously minus 
one', 'positive abstention', except in cases of vital national interests) 
* the Government is in favour of retaining unanimity for the military security 
aspects of the CFSP. 
- The cohesion of common positions and joint actions needs to be enhanced. 
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Financial questions 
- To ensure that CFSP decisions can be implemented as quickly as possible, 
funding must be guaranteed by the Community budget, taking account of the 
specific role of the Council of Ministers. 
European Parliament 
- Under the present circumstances, parliamentary control over the CFSP must be 
exercised by the national parliaments. However, the information component in 
Article J.7 of the TEU could be extended and made more systematic. 
Common defence policy 
- The priority goal of the CFSP is to prevent military conflicts. At the same 
time, the means and structures must be found to respond to and punish military 
aggression. 
- Austria's position is based on the need for a European security policy 
involving the EU, WEU, NATO and OSCE. 
- With regard to the European Union's role in the European security system, the 
Austrian Government proposes that its capacity to act be enhanced in the 
following areas: 
* conflict prevention, 
* cr1s1s management, 
* peacekeeping operations, 
* civil protection, 
* humanitarian actions. 
V. Cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs 
The government largely agrees with the assessment on the (mal)functioning of the 
policy on justice and home affairs made by the Commission, Council and European 
Parliament. 
It proposes that a work programme should be established and a genuine 
institutional impetus given to the third pillar. 
In order to overcome the structural problems of intergovernmental cooperation, 
the Austrian Government is in favour of including Community instruments under 
the third pillar. 
* Article K. 9 must be used and made operational. With this in view, the 
government proposes that the decision-making mechanism (unanimity and 
ratification in the Member States) should be revised and its field of 
application extended to all areas covered by Title VI of the TEU. 
* Respect for fundamental rights under the third pillar must be guaranteed, 
particularly as regards data protection. 
* To achieve the proposed institutional impetus, the Austrian Government 
proposes that either the Commission or another 'monocratic and collegiate' 
body should have a more extensive r1ght of initiative than at present. 
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European Parliament 
The Austrian Government's position on the role of the European Parliament and 
the national parliament is the same as for the CFSP. 
Duplication of powers 
The Austrian Government would like to see a clarification of the powers 
governing visas, health, measures to combat drugs and international crime, and 
nuclear security. 
Clarification and simplification of work structures 
The Austrian Government proposes that at least one level of activity should be 
abolished under the third pillar. For that purpose, it proposes: 
* Option A: abolition of the steering groups 
* Option B: merger of the K.4 committee with COREPER, leading to creation of 
COREPER III 
Measures to combat racism and xenophobia 
The Austrian Government proposes: 
- requiring governments to consult and inform each other on all measures to 
combat racism and xenophobiaj 
- establishing minimum standards for protection against racist and xenophob1c 
activities. 
Austria's positions of principle on the Intergovernmental Conference: Austrian 
Government document of 26 March 1996 
This text was submitted by the Austrian Government on the eve of the Turin 
European Council, and consists of nineteen pages divided into four parts, 
concerning: 1) the challenges facing the Unionj 2) the need to bring the Union 
closer to the publici 3) efficiency and democracyj 4) the CFSP. 
Concerning the challenges facing the EU, the Austrian Government considers it 
necessary to reinforce the Union's capacities for action in a number of areas. 
European integration in general is seen as crucial to social and economic 
development in Europe, and EMU is felt to offer further potential benefits. 
Austria believes that the peace and stability which are the fruit of the 
integration process must be extended to other European countries. In this 
connection, Austria enumerates a number of issues that the IGC must face. 
Firstly, as regards democracy and bringing Europe closer to the public, Austria 
considers that Member States must be suitably represented in the legislative 
process, and that the 'extra' representation of small and medium-sized Member 
States should be retained. The existing interinstitutional balance should 
therefore be preservedi the legitimacy and transparency of Union policies should 
be improved through simplification of the legislative process, closer 
cooperation between the Council and Parliament and the consolidation of links 
with the national parliaments. The regional dimension of the integration process 
should be strengthened as a contribution to transparency i the principle of 
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subsidiarity should be consistently applied; and the protection of fundamental 
rights should be improved. All these measures would serve to bridge the existing 
gap between the Union's citizens and its institutions. 
On the subject of employment, Austria considers that action against unemployment 
should be a major priority for the Union, alongside environmental protection, 
which, as a matter of major concern to the public in the Union, should be one 
of the key themes of the IGC. The Conference should promote the ecological 
dimension of the Community policies. 
On internal security, on the grounds that full freedom of movement for Union 
citizens will only be possible once their security has been guaranteed at 
European level, Austria considers that all matters relating to immigration, 
asylum and action against crime, terrorism and drug trafficking should be dealt 
with in the basis of supranational coordination of legal and police authorities. 
On the CFSP, Austria believes that the IGC should: encourage greater coherence 
between the various aspects of external policy; set up a joint planning and 
analysis capacity; improve the effectiveness of decision-making and 
implementation in the CFSP field; and develop the policy's operability in the 
areas of conflict prevention, crisis management, peace-keeping measures, 
disaster aid and humanitarian action. On the subject of enlargement and the 
workings of the Union, the Austrian Government proposes: clarifying and 
simplifying the legislative procedures; extending majority voting; improving 
working methods and organizational procedures; and retaining the Commission's 
role as the motor of the system. Enlargement and institutional reform are seen 
as part of one and the same process, to be undertaken in tandem on a phased 
basis. On the subject of flexibility and coherence, Austria considers that the 
dual challenge of widening and deepening the Union will necessitate 
differentiated integration; this should, however, remain the exception rather 
than the rule, should be transitional in nature, and should under no 
circumstances mean that Member States which, for reasons of economic 
development, are not in a position to accede to a higher level of integration 
(as in the case of EMU) end up shut out of the integration process as such. 
After this first section setting out the challenges facing the Union, the 
Austrian text goes on in its second part to consider means of bringing the Union 
closer to the public. On the question of human rights, Austria favours: 
accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights; incorporation 
of the content of the European Social Charter in the Treaty; strengthening and 
further development of the principle of gender equality in the Treaty; and 
reference in the revised Treaty to action against racism and xenophobia. On the 
subject of the existing inequalities between men and women, Austria suggests 
that there should be an explicit Treaty provision conferring on Member States 
the right to undertake actions in favour of women. On European citizenship, 
Austria believes that a fresh impetus should be given to this concept, which 
should be more fully defined: it should be made clear that European cit1zenship 
complements national citizenship but does not replace it. 
On CJHA, Austria considers that a number of polic1es at present falling under 
the third pillar should be communi tarized. These include: visa and asylum 
policy, external frontier controls, immigration policy, policy concerning third 
country nationals resident in the Union acticn against drug trafficking and 
international fraud, customs cooperation and action to combat fraud against the 
Community budget. However, it believes that crim1nal law matters should remain 
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under the third pillar. The role of the Community institutions, instruments and 
procedures will require strengthening to deal with the subjects still under the 
third pillar, with a view to inproving the latter's continuity and dynamism. 
There should be greater use of majority voting on third-pillar matters, 
especially as regards action against organized crime. On the operational level, 
there should be a significant reduction in the number of working levels, and a 
clarification of the powers corresponding to the different pillars. The 
Commiss1on should play a greater role in third-pillar matters, in the interests 
of improved continuity, dynamism and coherence, and its right of initiative 
should be extended to the third pillar. The Treaty should include a provision 
guaranteeing the uniform interpretation of third-pillar legislation by the Court 
of Justice. Concerning Parliament's role in the third pillar, Austria favours 
strengthening its right to be informed and consulted, and also believes the 
national parliaments have an important role to play in third-pillar matters. 
Transparency should be increased in the area of the third pillar: all non-
confidential documents should be published, and the European Parliament should 
be kept regularly informed on Council meetings. The funding of the th1rd pillar 
should be more clearly defined, and should be subject to financial control by 
the Court of Auditors. Finally, Austria feels that the continued existence of 
different national laws on internal security, with respect to the third pillar, 
the Schengen agreement and the Dublin Convention, is inefficient and confusing, 
and believes that the IGC should unify all these systems; in particular, Austria 
supports incorporation of the Schengen agreement into the Treaty. 
On employment and social affairs, Austria believes the Treaty should 1nclude a 
high level of employment as one of the Union's fundamental objectives. With a 
view to coordinating and monitoring employment policy in the Member States, 
Austria supports introducing a control mechanism. Provisions should be 
instituted to improve the coordination of consultation on employment policy 
between the Employment and Social Security Council and ECOFIN. ~he substance of 
the Social Charter could be incorporated in Title VII of the Treaty. In 
addition, all future proposals should be examined by the Commission for their 
impact on social policy and employment. 
On the environment, Austria believes that the concept of environmental 
protection should be incorporated in the Treaty in relation to the CAP, the 
trans-European networks and the common transport policy. In certain cases, 
environmental protection should be incorporated in such a way as to permit 
economic sanctions in certain cases. Member States should still have the 
possibility of establishing or maintaining stricter environmental rules at 
national level. On the institutional aspect, codecision of Parliament should be 
extended to environmental matters, and there should be greater use of majority 
voting in this field; it should, however,be possible for certain sensitive 
questions, such as water resources or land use, to be decided on by unanimity. 
The Commission should examine all future proposals from the viewpoint of their 
likely impact on the environment, and could, in this connection, submit a report 
annually to the Council. Finally, Austria reiterates its hope that nuclear 
energy will eventually be abandoned, and states its intention to press for 
animal welfare to be taken into account in Union policies. 
On transparency, Austria would like to see a greater involvement of publ1c 
opinion in the preparation of EU legislation, through green papers, white papers 
and Commission proposals. It favours publication of the texts of 
interinstitutional agreements, and supports the idea of clearer and more 
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comprehensible legislation. The public should have easier access to Union 
documents, and the structure of the Treaties should be simplified. 
On subsidiarity, Austria wishes to see this principle clarified, and supports 
the participation of the national parliaments in the monitoring of its 
application; it could be added to the Treaty in the form of a protocol. The 
Committee of the Regions and individual regions should have the right to bring 
legal action in cases of breach of the principle of subsidiarity or the powers 
of the regions. 
The third part of the text concerns efficiency and democracy. The first aspect 
discussed is the institutions, followed by the subjects of legal acts, financial 
matters and Union policies. On the subject of the European Parliament, Austria 
would maintain the existing proportional arrangements concerning its membership, 
and would not change the voting system; it would simplify and speed up the 
complex legislative procedures now in force. There should be only three 
procedures: codecision, assent and consultation. Codecision should be extended 
to fresh areas, and Parliament should play a greater role in the process of 
selecting the President of the Commission. 
On the subject of the national parliaments, Austria believes the Treaty should 
include an explicit reference to the need to involve them in the integration 
process, while leaving the precise form in which this is done to the Member 
States. At all events, the national parliaments should receive clear, full and 
timely documentation on important Commission legislative proposals. The 
relationship between the European Parliament and the national parliaments should 
be complementary, not competitive, and existing cooperation structures such as 
COSAC should be further developed. 
With respect to the European Council and the Council of Ministers, Austria 
supports greater use of QMV, which should apply to such areas as taxation, some 
spheres of social policy and the harmonization of provisions directly affecting 
the internal market. Unanimity should, however, still apply to sensitive areas 
of derived legislation and decisions on own resources. On the weighting 
arrangements, Austria believes that the current relative 'over-representation' 
of the small and medium-sized Member States in tl:e decision-making process 
should remain. It would, however, reform the Council's working methods, while 
keeping the system of rotating presidencies. The Presidency should be supported 
by a reinforced Council Secretariat, and there should be a more efficient 
division of labour between the members of the troika. 
On the Commission, Austria wishes to see it retain its three main functions, 
namely: determination of the common interest, monopoly powers of legislative 
initiative and monitoring of the implementation of Community law. It believes 
it is crucial for the Commission's legitimacy that each Member State should 
continue to have a Commissioner. On the Court of Justice, Austria would preserve 
its central role as the body responsible for interpreting Community law, and 
would strengthen its powers in third-pillar matters. On the Court of Auditors, 
Austria stresses its vital role in the fight against fraud, and believes it 
should gave the power to bring actions before the Court of Just~ce; the Treaty 
should include a provision making it compulsory for the nat~onal author~t~es to 
cooperate with the Court of Auditors. Austria, as a federal state, supports 
greater powers for the Committee of the Regions, and will put to the IGC various 
proposals submitted in this connection by the Austrian Lander, the Federation 
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of Regions and the Federation of Cities. Finally, on the Economic and Social 
Committee, Austria would promote this body to fully-fledged institutional 
status, with its members being appointed for a five-year term, in line with 
Commissioners and MEPs. 
Austria does not think it realistic to introduce a list of the Union's and 
Member States' competences at the IGC, and would, rather, retain the existing 
Article 235 of the EC Treaty. It does, however, support the reform and 
simplification of commitoloov. On action against fraud, Austria favours 
intensified and more effective measures based on sui table moni taring mechanisms. 
It does not believe that the IGC is the moment to discuss own resources and the 
budgetary procedures, taking the view that these matters should be debated when 
the post-1999 financial perspectives are negotiated. On other Union policies, 
Austria would intensify application of Article 113 of the EC Treaty, on the 
lines suggested by the Reflection Group. It would also institute a high level 
of consumer protection: this dimension should be extended to other Union 
policies, and Article 129 of the EC Treaty should be modified accordingly.-
Austria considers that all proposals tending to extend the scope of Community 
policies should be examined from the viewpoint of the subsidiarity principle. 
The last section of the Austrian text concerns the CFSP. The discussion begins 
with the question of planning and analysis at Union level: Austria would support 
the creation of a planning and analysis unit consisting of experts from the 
Member States, the Council Secretariat and the Commission. Institutionally, this 
unit would be an adjunct to the Council Secretariat, but would work closely Wlth 
the Commission with a view to utilizing the latter's experience and resources. 
It should not have a formal right of initiative, as this would complicate the 
CFSP' s institutional structure. On the subject of second-pillar decision-making, 
Austria favours a gradual transition to majority voting, with the proviso that 
certain sensitive areas of national sovereignty, such as military security, 
would remain subject to unanimity. On the precise arrangements for majority 
voting, Austria suggests examining the following models: firstly, qualified 
majority voting for specific areas of the CFSP (to be decided on at the IGC); 
secondly, super-qualified majority voting (consensus minus one/two) for non-
military areas of the CFSP, so as to stop decisions being blocked by a Member 
State; thirdly, majority voting as the general rule for all aspects of the 
implementation of joint actions. In all of these cases, Austria believes there 
should be the possibility of 'constructive abstention' or 'opting-out'. austria 
would not support a 'flexible' model (as suggested by some Member States) 
enabling a group of Member States to undertake an action on behalf of the Union 
without that action being endorsed by the Union as such. It would, however, 
endorse measures to ensure greater coherence between the CFSP and the Union's 
external economic relations. 
Concerning the implementation of the CFSP, Austria would reinforce the role of 
the Council Secretariat, which could be given specific external policy 
responsibilities, such as dialogue with third countries. The members of the 
troika should also be systematically involved in CFSP execution; the same 
applies to the Commission in areas connected to the first (Community) pillar. 
The Union should have its own legal personality. Finally, on the matter of 
security and defence, Austria expresses its willingness to play a full part in 
the European security structures. With a view to facilitating convergence 
between the EU and the WEU, Austria would support the latter becoming subject 
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to the former's instructions and guidelines in the area of the 'Petersberg 
missions'. 
Portugal and the IGC for the revision of the Treaty on European Union - Foreign 
Ministrv document, March 1996 
With this official document of the Foreign Ministry, the Portuguese Government 
has for the first time adopted an official document expressing its position on 
the IGC. The text begins by listing the subjects to be discussed at the IGC and 
outlining the philosophy which should underlie the revision. On the matter of 
objectives, Portugal stresses that the European integration process should 
continue to be based on the principles of: equality between all Member States; 
respect for the cultural identity and specific national and institutional 
characteristics of each Member State; respect for fundamental human rights; 
political, economic and social solidarity between peoples, regions and Member 
States; and sufficiency of means. Portugal lays the highest importance on 
preserving the basic institutional balance, in the context of a single 
institutional framework, respect for the principle of participation of all 
Member States in the Union's decision-making process and its institutions, and 
guaranteed equality of status for all its national languages. It also emphasises 
the need to deepen the concept of solidarity, which, it considers, has 
political, economic and also social aspects. Portugal believes that the concept 
of economic and social cohesion must be retained as a key element of any reform, 
and proposes that job-creation policy and action against social exclusion should 
be tackled at Union level. It also suggests that, parallel to the IGC, there 
should be consideration of the effects of enlargement and its impact on the 
common policies and the Union's finances. 
The Portuguese document goes on to consider the orocess of rev~s~on, 
ratification and entry into force of the revised Treaty. Portugal favours the 
rigorous retention of the existing terms of the Treaty, opposing any alteration 
in the existing mechanisms concerning revision, whether at the negotiating stage 
or in the ratification process. On the subject of differentiated integration, 
it rejects any strategy or model which would permanently institutionalize a 
differentiation between groups of Member States, with their own objectives, 
methods and specific calendars, since this would lead to the dissolution of the 
Union. Portugal does, however, favour using exceptional and transitional 
mechanisms and formulas to deal with the conjunctural problems of European 
integration, but stresses that under no circumstances must these be turned into 
rules for its future. Portugal believes that the Union already possesses 
sufficiently flexible formulas, such as transition periods and temporary 
derogations, which represent the ideal means of finding solutions without 
running the risk of dissolution or break-up. It feels that any 'hard core' 
solution, with certain Member States going further down the road to ~ntegration, 
can only be viable if the common objective is defined by all, with its 
implementation alone being subject to differentiated time schedules on the basis 
of full respect for the Union's single institutional framework. Such a system 
would have to be governed by clear rules, jointly determined beforehand, with 
special support mechanisms for those Member States which were temporarily unable 
to commit themselves to all the agreed policies. 
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On the subject of institutional reforms, Portugal places great importance on the 
global preservation of the institutional balance in the EU. It also believes 
that institutional reform must go hand in hand with discussion of other key 
factors for the Union's future development, such as: evaluation of the impact 
of enlargement on the operation of the Community policies; the financial 
perspectives and the own-resources regime; and the continuation of the present 
rhythm of integration. 
Concerning the Council and the Council presidency, Portugal believes that the 
rotating presidency and its exercise in the same conditions by all the Member 
States are corollaries of the principle of equality in sovereignty, and that the 
revision of the Treaty should therefore here take the form of ensuring that the 
rotating presidencies have sufficient back-up to give their work the necessary 
continuity. With respect to the weighting arrangements and the qualified 
majority threshold~ Portugal considers that the existing weighting of votes in 
Council should basically be preserved. Concerning the qualified majority 
threshold (at present 71%), the Portuguese view is that in view of the 
possibility of successive enlargements leading to a situation where a qualified 
majority could increasingly be obtained by a group of Member States 
corresponding to an increasingly lower percentage of total population, formulas 
for weighing the votes should be found to ensure balance without reducing Member 
States' ability to form qualified majorities or blocking minoriti9s. 
On the subject of the European Council, Portugal advocates developing its role 
of defining basic principles and general political guidelines, while not 
altering its nature or its position in the institutional framework; given the 
eminently political character of this institution, its functions and powers 
should not be excessively formalized in the direction of full integration into 
the decision-making structures. 
On the European Parliament, Portugal feels that some of the functions conferred 
on it by the Treaty of Maastricht have not yet been sufficiently considered or 
put into practice, and that the revision and adjustment of the existing 
mechanisms should not affect the existing institutional balance. On the 
codecision procedure, the Portuguese view is that its field of application could 
be extended, especially as regards the areas currently governed by the 
cooperation procedure; it is also felt that the codecision procedure should be 
simplified. Portugal favours explicit recognition of the principle of 
consultation in those first-pillar areas where it remains optional, and believes 
that the principle should be reinforced in the field of citizens' rights and 
interests and that improvements are needed to the application of the system of 
consulting the European Parliament under the second and third pillars. 
Concerning the number of MEPs, Portugal suggests a ceiling of 700; it considers 
that the present over-representation of the smaller Member States is the best 
way of responding to the need to ensure representation of the different national 
political forces in an institution which should be a faithful reflection of the 
diversity of the peoples of the Member States. 
On the Commission, Portugal believes that there should be at least one 
Commissioner per Member State, and has no objection to maintaining the existing 
system of vice-presidents. It would consider the possibility of having the 
President of the Commission elected by the European Parliament from a list of 
names submitted by the European Council; it feels that Parliament's existing 
powers of control over the Commission are sufficient, and opposes any formula 
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involving the possibility of censuring individual commissioners. Portugal 
considers that the nature, role, composition and structure of the Commission 
should remain as they are, in accordance with the existing terms of the 
Treaties; it does, however, favour simplification of the procedures by which the 
Commission exercises its e~isting powers. The Commission should remain a 
collegiate, ~ndependent and dynamic body, and should retain its exclusive right 
of initiative; at the same time, it should be more closely involved in second-
pillar and third-pillar matters, with a view to improved coherence and 
coordination as between Community and intergovernmental spheres. 
With regard to the institutions and bodies, Portugal believes that the Court of 
Justice should play a more prominent role in the protection of the individual 
rights of the Union's citizens, and that its powers and independence and the 
mode of appointment of its members should not be called in question. Portugal 
considers it particularly necessary to strengthen its powers in the area of the 
third pillar, and favours a longer term of office for the judges. The role of 
the Court in anti-fraud action and that of the control institutions in ensuring 
the rigorous administration of Community resources should be reinforced, as well 
as their effective cooperation with the Member States. However, Portugal sees 
no reason to change the statutes of the Court of Auditors. The Portuguese 
Government considers that the Committee of the Regions should retain its present 
statutes and consultative role, although the range of subjects on which it has 
to be consulted could be extended and the possibility of Parliament consulting 
it could be introduced. On the subject of the Economic and Social Committee, 
Portugal feels that its powers and character should remain as they are. 
On the decision-making process, Portugal stresses the need for simplification 
and transparency. It favours reducing the number of procedures: the cooperation 
procedure should be abolished and the codecision procedure rationalized and 
simplified. With a view to improving the Council's efficiency, Portugal 
advocates extending the range of decisions eligible for qualified majority 
voting, alongside recourse to super-qualified majorities in particularly 
delicate circumstances. It believes, however, that certain ul tra-sensi ti ve 
subjects will still require unanimity: a non-exhaustive list would include the 
rev1s1on of the Treaties and other subjects affecting the structure of the 
Union, the own-resources system, taxation, etc. 
On the subject of transparency, Portugal feels that this principle should be 
embodied throughout the Community institutional system: it should be included 
in the Treaty as a guarantee of the citizens' right to information, but its 
practical implementatlon should involve ensuring the confidentiality of 
negotiations in Council while guaranteeing substantial openness concerning all 
aspects of the Council's legislative activity. Portugal also favours the 
simplification of the procedures and the Treaty, considering that the provisions 
which are obsolete or refer to the transition periods could be deleted or 
updated. On. the language regime, Portugal opposes any reduction in the number 
of working languages, in the interests of preserving the cultural diversity of 
Europe and the principle of equality between Member States; it takes the view 
that the use of national languages is a factor of transparency in the Union's 
working and of legal security, as well as permitting greater participation by 
the national parliaments and facilitating the understanding of the European 
integration process by public opinion in the Member States. Portugal accordingly 
calls for guarantees concerning the equal status of all Member State languages. 
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On the hierarchy of legislation, Portugal suggests that the IGC should examine 
the matter with a view to determining improved means of organizing legislative 
activity, in terms of both the interinstitutional sphere and the Union's 
relations with national legislative bodies. Concerning the national parliaments, 
it believes they should be more closely and effectively linked with the work of 
the Union, but without altering the Union's institutional set-up. As a specific 
formula, Portugal proposes extending the COSAC model to other fields, especially 
the areas of the second and third pillars. 
On the subject of deepening the Union, the Portuguese text firstly considers 
Union citizenship. Portugal favours giving a higher profile to the concept of 
citizenship in the revised Treaty, especially with respect to social and 
economic rights. It therefore believes that the new Treaty text should include 
a 'European Citizenship Charter'. It also feels that the Treaty should include 
a more detailed definition of the human rights dimension, with regard to 
compliance with the duties of protecting minorities and combating racism, 
xenophobia and intolerance. Portugal also believes the Union should accede to 
the European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols, and considers that 
the revision of the Treaty should lay maximum stress on the functioning of 
democracy in the Member States and respect for the rule of law within the Union. 
On unemployment, It believes that action to combat joblessness should be 
explicitly referred to in the revised Treaty. It takes the view that economic 
and monetary progress should be accompanied by a series of pro-employment 
instruments applying throughout the Union, rather than conjuncturally as has 
hitherto has been the case. This should be complementary to the continued effort 
to create economic and social cohesion, as a key element in solidarity within 
the Community and a vital principle that must be preserved in any future model 
of development of the integration process. Concerning the distribution of 
powers, Portugal advocates deepening the process of European integration, 
alongside a positive and dynamic interpretation of the principle of 
subsidiarity, which is seen as fundamental to respect for the acguis 
communautaire. It would also consider extending the Community's powers to cover 
such fields as enerav. tourism and civil protection. It also proposes 
strengthening the social dimension and correcting the existing imbalance between 
the single market and its flanking policies, which are in need of reinforcement. 
On the environment, Portugal feels that policy should be compatible with the 
Union's other fields of action and suitably linked to the cohesion policies. On 
economic matters, it supports continuing with the close coordination of 
policies, with a view to ensuring effective, integrated and Community-wide 
action to combat marginalization and social exclusion of whatever type. The 
Portuguese Government feels it is vital that the IGC should find means of 
promoting balanced, sustainable and employment-creating growth. Concerning the 
outlying regions, Portugal believes that particular consideration must be paid 
to them in the revised Treaty. On subsidiarity, it feels that the provisions set 
out in the TEU, further developed by the Edinburgh European Council and 
consolidated in the institutional declaration of November 1993 are sufficient 
for the full application of the concept, and that no further definition is 
required on the legal front. Portugal does not favour including an exhaustive 
or restrictive 'list of powers of the Union' in the Treaty. 
On budgetary matters, Portugal favours retaining the basic equilibria already 
established, coupled with full use of the existing mechanisms. It would, 
however, consider accepting greater powers for the European Parliament in the 
budget process. It welcomes the stepping-up of fraud prevention and anti-fraud 
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action, as well as the strengthening of the control functions aimed at ensuring 
sound management of the Community's resources. At all events, Portugal does not 
consider that these objectives require changes to the Treaty. On financial 
questions, it rejects all approaches implying renationalization of the common 
policies or applying subsidiarity criteria to important areas such as economic 
and social cohesion. 
On the CFSP, Portugal considers that its 'communitarization' is not a realistic 
option: the policy should remain in the intergovernmental area in which it was 
created, as it affects the core of the Member States' sovereignty. However, 
Portugal would support including procedural changes and minor adjustments to the 
CFSP in the Treaty revision. The key principles here should include that of full 
respect for the principle of equality between Member States and, at all times, 
that of gradual deepening of the Union and that of political solidarity between 
Member States. Portugal favours preserving the institutional balances laid down 
in the Treaty in this field, taking the view that any changes must take account 
of the existing acguis and the retention of the single institutional framework, 
as well as the continued existence of the 'pillar' structure under the TEU, 
corresponding to differentiated models of integration. As far as decision-making 
in this field is concerned, Portugal favours introducing a formal provision into 
the Treaty permitting 'constructive abstention': in other words, in a particular 
situation a Member State could abstain from a particular action without stopping 
those Member States which wished to undertake that action from adopting and 
implementing it. Portugal feels that it is essential to decide how many Member 
States coils invoke constructive abstention over individual joint actions or 
positions, and to define clearly the cases in which financial solidarity between 
Member States would not apply universally. It does not think it realistic to 
extend qualified majority voting to the second pillar in unalloyed form; it 
does, however, consider it possible to define, rigorously and by consensus, a 
number of subjects or 'platforms' to which qualified majority voting could later 
be applied. Portugal favours basing the qualified majority on the principle of 
absolute equality between Member States: each Member State would have one vote, 
and a qualified majority would require a minimum number of Member States. 
With regard to the external representation of the Union, Portugal believes that 
the central role of the Presidency should remain, but would consider extending 
the troika system via the ad hoc inclusion of other Member States having 
particular expertise or experience related to specific purposes. Any such 
alterations should be adopted on a case-by-case basis and by consensus in 
Council; Portugal is totally opposed to the creation of any kind of 
'directorate'. It could accept the notion of an external representative of the 
Union ('Mr or Mrs CFSP'), provided the formula devised is compatible with the 
existing institutional balance. Such a figure should only exercise the powers 
devolved to him by the Council, and should not have powers of initiative. His 
functions could be linked to the Commission, and he should in all circumstances 
be appointed on a consensual basis by the Council. He could put forward subjects 
for discussion to the Presidency and intervene in the process of consultation 
between Member States, facilitating compromise solutions if necessary. He would 
not, however, in any circumstance be entitled to limit the presidency's room for 
manoeuvre or to affect the CFSP decision-making bodies. 
Concerning the operational reinforcement of the second pillar, Portugal favours 
the setting-up of a unit for analysis, forecasting, planning and monitoring in 
the field of the CFSP, under the aegis of the Council Secretariat including 
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representatives of all the Member States, with a greater role for the 
Presidency, and acting in coordination with the Commission. This unit would have 
~o right of initiative, but would have the role of supporting the actions of the 
Presidency, fostering interinstitutional cooperation without affecting or 
undermining the central role of the Member States in CFSP matters. Portugal 
accordingly believes that the CFSP should remain in the intergovernmental 
sphere, and proposes that it should be dynamized via such actions as the opening 
of joint embassies in third countries or the sending of joint delegations to 
certain international conferences, as is the case in certain areas of the 
Community pillar. Portugal advocates conferring legal personality on the Union, 
enabling it to be party to international treaties. 
On security and defence matters, the Portuguese position is that NATO should 
remain the basic entity for the collective defence of the countries of Europe 
and the preservation of their territorial integrity. Portugal also favours, in 
principle, prolonging the Treaty of Brussels and maintaining the WEU as a 
separate body beyond 1998. It feels that the IGC should set up closer links 
between the EU and the WEU, without prejudicing the latter's articulation with 
NATO, with a view to creating a European security and defence identity and an 
effective European pillar within the Atlantic alliance; NATO should remain 
responsible for collective defence in the sense of Article 5 of the Treaty of 
Washington and for crisis management and peace-keeping missions which require 
a major US presence by reason of their size or complexity, while the WEU should 
have strengthened operational functions in the sphere of European defence, as 
the European pillar of the alliance, in addition to other responsibilities 
entailing the deployment of military forces in smaller-scale peace-keeping and 
crisis management missions or support for humanitarian actions. Portugal 
considers it premature for the IGC to try to create a fourth 'defence' pillar, 
and stresses that the unanimity principle must be retained for all aspects of 
this subject. 
Finally, concerning cooperation in justice and home affairs, Portugal proposes 
three types of action to improve the effectiveness of the existing arrangements. 
Asylum policy and action against illegal immigration should be transferred to 
:.he Community pillar, as, possibly, should the rules on crossing external 
frontiers and the conditions governing the free movement of third-country 
nationals, as well as the aspects of visa policy which have not yet been 
communi tarized. Should full communi tarization not be possible, Portugal suggests 
that the Community procedures in these areas should be extended via new 
legislative instruments and new institutional powers, greater use of qualified 
majority voting, including, where necessary, 'super-qualified' majority voting. 
For other fields such as police and legal cooperation and, in particular, action 
against drug trafficking, Portugal proposes a substantial reinforcement of the 
existing intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms. On the institutional plane, 
it suggests more frequent use of the binding legal instruments and 
simplification and reduction of the levels of preparation of the Council's work. 
It would also strengthen the role of the European Parliament in this field, 
confer greater powers on the Court of Justice and reinforce the Commission's 
right of initiative. Portugal also believes that there should be greater 
cooperation among the national parliaments and between them and the Union 
institutions on third-pillar matters, in terms of the exchange of information 
and the consultation mechanisms. 
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Summing up, Portugal stresses that its main objective at the IGC will be to 
ensure that there is no reduction in its own relative ability to influence the 
European integration process and that its particular interests are safeguarded. 
Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry of 18 September 1995 on the views of the 
Finnish Government concerning the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
In this memorandum to the Finnish Parliament the Government of Finland states 
its position for the first time on the forthcoming Conference. Its purpose is 
to introduce a series of views to be used as the basis for subsequent 
preparation of Finland's official position at the IGC. 
Its first chapter on the future of the European Union and the IGC states.as a 
basic premise that the European Union should continue to develop as an 
association of independent states, to which its members have transferred powers 
to be exercised jointly for the achievement of agreed objectives. Finland's 
objective is a Union which will efficiently safeguard the welfare and common 
values of its citizens and work for the development of the international 
community in stability, cooperation and security. The objectives for the Union's 
development and the timetable this will require should be defined jointly, 
respecting the right of all the Union Is Member States to take part in the 
decision-making process on an equal footing. The Finnish Government takes the 
view that the European Union cannot be based on differing classes of membership 
and that the Member States may only in exceptional cases decide by common 
agreement that a given country should observe a different speed or ·t1metable in 
its progress towards fulfilment of the jointly agreed objectives. 
The memorandum's second chapter discusses citizens and the Union. On European 
citizenship, it says that a more precise definition of this concept in the 
Treaties would be a way of ensuring that the principles of transparency, 
democracy, legal primacy, equality, social justice a~d respect for human rights 
are observed at European level. The Conference shoulc1. also study how to develop 
the social rights and duties of European citizens. In the Finnish Government's 
view, a key principle should be that citizenship of one Member State is a 
precondition for citizenship of the Union. On the need to increase democracy, 
the memorandum wants a bigger role for the European Parliament and the national 
parliaments in the Union decision-making process and points to the need for 
strengthening cooperation between them. In the campaign to increase democracy 
the role of the national parliaments should continue to be the point of 
.reference, though the question must be examined at the IGC from every point of 
view. To increase transparency, the European Union must improve the ways in 
which the Member States and their citizens gain access to day-to-day information 
on the Union, its legislation and decision-making procedure. In this respect the 
Finnish Government refers to the final report of a working party on the subject 
set up by the Finnish Ministry of Justice on 22 June 1995, which lists a series 
of ways of increasing transparency and easing the flow of information. Of these, 
the memorandum raises the possibility of adding a specific article on public 
information to the Treaty; the possibility of adopting legislation to increase 
public access to the Union institutions' documents; and systematic encouragement 
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of transparency in various other ways. The need for efficiency, in the 
memorandum's view, requires applying such criteria as the proper use of 
resources in relation to the objectives pursued, setting an adequate timetable 
for adopted decisions and the way in which such decisions are put into practice. 
The paper also discusses the issue of the subsidiarity principle, which it 
regards as essentially political rather than legal in character and hence a 
point of reference when assessing the possibility of extending the Union's 
powers. Be that as it may, the Finnish Government considers that the principle 
should not be applied in such a way that it impedes the achievement of 
objectives laid down in the Treaties, in certain important areas such as 
environmental protection and social rights, or dilutes existing Community law 
by delegating too many implementing decisions to the national sphere. On 
fundamental rights, the memorandum suggests that a possible way of strengthening 
the human rights and fundamental freedoms of Union citizens and other persons 
legally residing in the Union would be for the Union to accede to the Council 
of Europe Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and to include certain basic rights in the Treaty on European Union, such as the 
principle of equality. This list of fundamental or key rights should be worded 
in a clear and legally binding way. Finland is in favour of including a 
provision in the Treaty banning racism and xenophobia, for instance by inserting 
such a ban in the principle of equality or non-discrimination. The memorandum 
points out that egual opportunities for men and women is an important issue and 
that a specific provision should be included in the Treaties on this principle. 
Sexual equality should extend to every sphere of human activity, and to ensure 
compliance with the principle Finland thinks there should be a right of appeal 
to.the European Court of Justice and that the powers of the European Ombudsman 
should be extended to include the monitoring compliance with the principle of 
sexual equality. 
The memorandum's third chapter deals with the Union's institut1onal system, 
which should be democratic, transparent and efficient. On the Council, Finland 
believes it should continue on the basis of equal status for all the 
participating Member States. On the decision-making process in the Community 
sphere, the memorandum points out that using population as a criterion for the 
adoption of decisions by a qualified majority could weaken the position of the 
smaller countries. It appears to support the idea of increasing the number of 
decisions adopted by qualified majority in the Community pillar, specifically 
on environmental issues, in order to improve the effectiveness of the decision-
making process, but at the same time calls for a definition of the areas in 
which the unanimity requirement should continue to be the norm. On the 
Presidency, after listing the various options put forward the memorandum says 
that continuity is important but the acceptance of such proposals could lead to 
unequal treatment of the Member States. It therefore concludes that the 
proposals under discussion are not justified and suggests that other ways be 
considered for improving current practice in this area. 
On the Commission, the Finnish Government thinks its current independence from 
the Member States should continue, as should its present position under the 
Community pillar, and that there is no need to make fundamental changes to the 
Treaties on the Commission's role with regard to the second pillar (CFSP). On 
the other hand the Finnish Government proposes looking into ways of 
strengthening the Commission's roles in areas covered by the third pillar 
(CJHA). On the question of the composition and number of Commission Members, it 
thinks each Member State should have one Commissioner. At the same time it 
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cannot accept a change in the present system for appointing Members, arguing 
that it is important for Member States to retain the power to choose their own 
individual Commissioners. On the responsibility of the Commission and 
Commissioners, Finland considers it sufficient for the Commission to continue 
to be legally responsible to the Court of Justice and continue to enjoy the 
political confidence of the European Parliament. There is no need for individual 
Commissioners to be subject to a vote of confidence before Parliament, nor for 
changes to be made to the current system for dismissing Members. 
On the European Parliament, Finland admits the possibility of slightly changing 
its status in the Community sphere provided this does not lead to an 
institutional imbalance. It thinks that when preparing for the Conference there 
should be an analysis of the present scope of the cooperation procedure and the 
extent to which this procedure could be replaced by the codecision procedure 
under Article 189b of the Treaty. Similarly, it thinks that the IGC should 
ascertain whether the budget procedure could be simplified without affecting the 
role of the various institutions in the decision-making process. Finland thinks 
there is no case for putting amendments to the basic treaties to the European 
Parliament for approval. Again, since it would also affect the present 
institutional balance, Finland is sceptical about the possibility of giving 
Parliament the right of initiative. While recognizing Parliament's extremely 
limited role in the spheres of the second and third pillars, i.e. in the fields 
of intergovernmental cooperation, Finland considers that Parliament's role is 
adequate at present in the case of the second pillar (CFSP) while its role could 
be reviewed in regard to the third pillar ( CJHA) by making changes to the 
subjects that are currently governed by the third pillar. On Parliament's 
composition, Finland considers that in the event of further enlargement an 
increase in the number of MEPs could be limited by reducing the current quotas. 
In any case it considers that the number of MEPs from smaller Member States 
should be higher than that resulting from the application of any method of 
calculation based exclusively on the population of the various Member States. 
Turning to the Court of Justice, the memorandum considers there is no case for 
extending the Court's powers to the second pillar. However, it does think-close 
attention should be given to extending the Court's powers to the field of 
cooperation on justice and home affairs. It argues that there is no need to 
change the procedure for appointing judges and that their present mandate should 
be maintained. It points out that the Court of Justice and the Court of First 
Instance are not formally superior in rank to the national courts and believes 
that the role of the Court of Justice and its relationship with the national 
courts should not be changed, since the present system ensures that Community 
law is complied with and interpreted and applied consistently. 
The memorandum draws attention to the important political and policy-making role 
played by the European Council, although it is not at present a Union 
institution and does not take legally binding decisions. It suggests that 
consideration should be given to making the necessary changes to enable this 
Council to develop its guiding role more efficiently and define the way in which 
it can operate in other spheres. On the issue of the hierarchy of Community acts 
the Finnish document reviews the present system and points to the techn1cal 
problems to which clarification of the hierarchy could give rise, suggesting the 
need for a pragmatic approach to progress in this area. It goes on to look at 
the issue of commitology, favouring clarification of the present process. 
Finland would like the Council's role to be redefined in this area and thinks 
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1 t conceivable to reduce the use of this procedure by transferring major 
implementing powers to the Commission. It thinks the procedure should be revised 
in those cases where decisions are adopted under the codecision procedure with 
a view to defining Parliament's role in such cases and taking account of the 
need to act with the greatest possible efficiency. On the question of 
implementing Community law, Finland favours giving the Commission sufficient 
resources to moni taring the implementation of Community law in the Member 
States, if necessary by introducing new forms of penalties. 
Chapter 4 of the Finnish memorandum deals with the common foreign and security 
policy. It points out that enlargement of the European Union to include the 
Central European and daltic countries is vital for the Union's security and 
considers that when defining the needs of the Union's security policy sufficient 
attention must be given to the Scandinavian dimension. When discussing the 
decision-making procedure under the CFSP, Finland wants all important decisions 
to be adopted by consensus, while the qualified majority procedure could be used 
to deal with other issues such as the implementation of agreed measures. On the 
role of Parliament and the Commission in the second pillar, the Finnish 
Government considers that there is no need to change the present law (Articles 
J.7 and J.9) which respectively give Parliament the right to be consulted and 
~nformed and the Commission the right to be associated with the CFSP. On other 
ways to strengthen the CFSP, the memorandum would like to develop a joint 
assessment system and analysis capacity in this field, proposing that such 
assessment and analysis is integrated into the range of funct 1ons to be 
developed by the Council secretariat. Finland supports the idea of stepping up 
efforts to implement and monitor decisions, arguing that since the measures 
concerned are intergovernmental, it is up to the Member States to play a key 
part through their normal procedures for parliamentary supervision. On funding, 
Finland th1nks that the CFSP should be financed pr1marily outs1de LhP Commun1ty 
budget in order to safeguard the Council's independence wh~n adopting 
operat1onal decisions under the CFSP. It does not favour chanq1ng ~he present 
rotational system for the Council presidency in the CFSP sphere and considers 
that the establishment of a new figure to take charge of external relations, 
such as a CFSP Secretary General, would not help to clarify the Union's 
act1v1t1es in its relat1ons with the outside world. On cr1sis management, the 
memorandum considers it essential to define relations between the European Union 
and the WEU, which it regards as one of the main tasks for the IGC. Finland 
thinks political leadership should continue to be situated in the European 
Union, which should entrust the implementation of crisis management operations 
to the WEU. On the specific issue of defence, Finland thinks that 
intergovernmental action and unanimity in decision-making should continue to be 
the fundamental principles. It also thinks there is a need to extend military 
cooperation beyond the Petersberg agreements. Finally, Finland declares its 
willingness to make a constructive contribution with regard to amending Article 
223 of the Treaty with regard to cooperation on arms. 
The Finnish memorandum discusses cooperation on justice and home affairs in its 
fifth chapter. It argues that there is a need to define the Union's objectives 
clearly and precisely under the third pillar. The transfer of matters currently 
covered by the third pillar to the first or Community pillar should be studied 
case by case on a pragmatic and open basis, but Finland considers that issues 
of great importance to national sovereignty in the national states should not 
be placed under Community responsibility. Specifically, it considers that issues 
connected with the control of external frontiers should continue to be subject 
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to intergovernmental cooperation and that cooperation against international 
crime should be stepped up. This could take the form of increasing cooperation 
between the various Member States' police authorities and or reciprocal, legal 
and administrative assistance. It also thinks there is a need for the rapid 
entry into force of the Europol Convention and is interested in the proposals 
to set up a European legal area. Here it is especially interested in cooperation 
on issues connected with the operation of the single market, such as the 
campaign against fraud in the Community, and the application of sentencing in 
the field of family law. The Finnish Government would also like to see 
harmonization and joint action on immigration and other forms of entry to the 
Union's territory, demanding that due attention is given to the budgetary cost. 
On political asylum, Finland would like work to continue on coordinating the 
various present points of view, stating that it is ready to sign the Dublin 
Convention as soon as this enters into force. It would like to strengthen the 
Commission's role in the area of the third pillar, while considering that the 
role currently played by Parliament in this field is sufficient. It also thinks 
the powers of the Court of Justice should not be extended to areas affecting 
national sovereignty. On the other, it would like the Community institutions 
automatically to assume their responsibilities on any issues transferred from 
the third pillar to the Community pillar. Finally, Finland considers that the 
present working methods under the third pillar are unnecessarily complex and 
involve too many stages. It would therefore like to simplify the present five-
level structure. 
Chapter 6 of the Finnish Government's memorandum deals with Union activity.in 
the fields of employment, the environment and other issues. Generally speaking, 
Finland thinks there is no need to substantially increase the European Union's 
powers, though it does think there could be a case in some areas for introducing 
further amendments to the Treaties, to facilitate joint action that would help 
more effectively to solve problems affecting all the Member States and coming 
under the common objectives. On employment, the Finnish Government points out 
that any amendment of the Union Treaties should be designed to ensure that 
employment policy and its relationship with economic policy are properly 
organized at European level, and that the conclusions of various European 
Councils on the subject of employment could be a sound starting basis. At the 
same time, careful thought should be given to th~ various suggestions put 
forward for establishing separate employment funds and for possibly setting up 
an employment administration at Community level with its own budget, or for 
developing financial investment mechanisms of a pan-European nature, while 
greater use should be made of existing funds to support employment policies. 
On the environment, Finland considers that the issue of sustainable development, 
including the integration of environmental considerations into all sectoral 
policies, should be a priority when the Treaties are revised. At the same time, 
environmental cooperation with third countries should be promoted. With regard 
to the Community objectives on the environment, Finland considers that 
sustainable development should be adopted as one of the Community's basic 
objectives. The aim should be to consolidate the principle already set out in 
Article 130r(2) of the Maastricht Treaty in order to introduce these objectives 
into other sectors of Community policy, mention~ng in particular the single 
market, agriculture, transport, industrial policy, the Structural Funds and 
policies on trans-European networks. Finland considers that the Community 
already has sufficient powers on the environment, though it does think that the 
decision-making system in this area needs simplifying, and Parliament's position 
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within this system should be revised. Specifically, more use should be made of 
the qualified majority procedure in all issues relating to the environment, 
possibly including energy and environmental taxes. Community decisions in this 
field should be designed to obtain the highest possible level of environmental 
protection, leaving the various Member States free to lay down stricter 
environmental protection laws, while taking into account the principle of the 
free movement of goods. 
The memorandum further refers to the social dimension of the Union, which it 
believes should be tightened up. Finland thinks the European Union should pursue 
a policy based on social and economic development that will make it possible to 
prevent any form of social exclusion or division. It believes the principle 
should be adopted at European Union level that social policy aspects should 
always be taken into account in any decisions that are adopted. It supports the 
view that all social policy provisions should be fully integrated in the Treaty, 
to ensure that a range of minimum social protection standards is established at 
Community level, while allowing the individual Member States to apply higher 
levels of protection than required by the European Union. Finland is not in 
favour of Community-level economic control of social security but does support 
Community-level research projects on social and health policy. It would like the 
social dialogue at Community level to be stepped up to include social security 
issues, and would also like general questions of public health to be taken up 
at Community level. Finally, it believes the Union should be responsible for 
increasing cooperation in all these areas so as to even out current differences 
in the standard of living of citizens in different Member States. 
On energy, Finland cons1ders that the Union energy policy should complement the 
national policies of its Member States and enhance their value. It favours the 
establishment of a single market in the energy sector and any initiative to 
encourage energy savings in the Union and lay down European energy consumption 
standards. Finland believes the Un1on should endeavour to promote at European 
level further progress and commercialization of the energy policy and develop 
trans-European networKs. Taking the view that energy issues could be dealt with 
outside the present framework of Community competence, Finland believes that any 
extension of these powers should be carefully examined. On tourism, it believes 
coordination should be stepped up in the Community framework, initially by 
making use of existing instruments and resources. It calls for special attention 
to be given to cooperation on commercialization throughout the European Union 
and for cooperation with neighbouring areas, giving special attention to 
protection of the environment and the cultural heritage when implementing 
tourist policies. On civil protection, Finland considers that this should 
continue to be the responsibility of the Member States and should be based on 
cooperation between them. It proposes that cooperation on civil protection, 
which is currently based on Council of Europe resolutions, should continue to 
be developed in a rational way on that basis. The Commission could encourage 
cooperation but without changing its present role. At the same time, questions 
of civil protection could be better taken into account when dealing with issues 
of security or involving certain hazards, and at the same levels of protection 
in this field could be increased. 
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Finland's starting-points and objectives for the 1996 IGC - report of the 
Finnish Government, 27 February 1996 
Unlike the note of 18 September 1995, which was submitted by the Foreign 
Ministry in anticipation of the Government's official positions on the IGC, the 
report of the Finnish Government submitted to the national Parliament on 27 
February 1996 outlines the Government's starting-points and objectives for the 
1996 IGC. The document begins by summarizing the various stages of the internal 
procedure in Finland leading to the definition of the national position on the 
IGC, and goes on to set out Finland's starting-points for the Conference. 
Finland wishes to see the Union develop as an a·ssociation of independent states, 
and undertakes to support all efforts to improve its ability to promote 
sustainable economic development, employment and environmental protection, while 
also committing itself to endorsing the advances in the CFSP required for 
effective furthering of its objective and responding to crises threatening the 
Union's stability and security. Finland will also promote transparency in the 
Union's decision-making process. It supports preservation of the acauis 
communautaire; on differentiated integration, Finland believes it necessary to 
respect the conditions set out in the report of the Reflection Group of :-
December 1995. The Finnish Government does not think the IGC should cover the 
other subjects included in the agenda of future challenges for the Union agreed 
on at the Madrid European Council. Otherwise, the statement of the Finnish 
position broadly reproduces the order of the Reflection Group's report. 
Concerning Finland's positions for the IGC, and following the methodology of the 
Reflection Group's report, the Finnish Government's text starts by exam~ning 
citizenship and the Union. It first considers the aspect of the promotion of 
European values, beginning with fundamental rights. Finland feels that the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of Union citizens and persons resident in its 
territory must be protected, for instance by the Community's accession to the 
European Human Rights Convention. On equality and non-discrimination, the 
Finnish Government supports inclusion in the Treaties of a general provision 
outlawing discrimination, including a ban on racism and xenophobia. Concerning 
equality between the sexes, it feels that the Treaties should also include a ban 
on discrimination and a specific clause on the equality of men and women. Such 
a clause would commit the Union to promoting compliance with the principle of 
sexual equality within its fields of competence, without stopping Member States 
from adopting more advanced legislation. On Union citizenship, the Finn~sh 
Government considers that the existing provisions should be complemented by the 
introduction of new rights linked to this concept. 
In the same chapter, the text examines freedom of movement and internal 
security. Finland believes that clearer objectives should be attached to the 
provisions on cooperation in justice and home affairs, including a specific 
obligation on the Union to ensure that the single market does not endanger the 
security of those resident within its territory. Finland also wishes the Treaty 
should include an objective stating that the legal status of a natural person 
changing residence from one Member State to another should be maintained as far 
as possible. Concerning the possible communitarization of the third pillar, 
Finland thinks it especially important that the Conference should remedy the 
existing shortcomings in the decision-making system which represent obstacles 
to third-pillar cooperation, concerning, in particular, the unanimity rule for 
most decisions, the Commission's limited powers of initiative and the uncertai~ 
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or inadequate legal status of the decisions adopted. Finland believes that more 
CJHA decisions should be adopted by qualified majority voting, and that the 
:ommission should have greater ?OWers of initiative in this area. There should 
also be guarantees that the legality of the Union institutions' decisions can 
be examined by the Court of Justice. 
On employment, the Finn1sh Government believes that the Union's objectives 
should stress the importance of competitiveness and of achieving as high an 
employment level as possible in the Union. The Union should also be obliged to 
undertake horizontal examination of employment-related matters. Given the 
reality of mutual interdependence, Finland believes that the EU should actively 
pursue a pan-European ~trategy for employment, in parallel to the implementation 
of EMU; this strategy should be included in the Treaties. Equally, the Treaties 
should incorporate specific provisions concerning common moc1ton.na of the 
employment situation in the Union. On the social dimension, Finland Jnsists that 
close attention should be paid to the balanced development ot economic and 
social integration, with strengthening of the Union's social aspect: the social 
crotocol and a complementary agreement should be incorporated in th~ rreaty in 
such a way as to cover all the Member States. Nonetheless, F1nlcnd considers 
J:hat the adoption of basic social policy decisions should com·~ ;1'le to be a 
national matter. On the environment, Finland wishes to see ths or1:1ciple of 
sustainable development added to the Treaty objectives in thls .~eid. At the 
same time, the basic princ1ples already included in it should be ;(-;:·1forced and 
the objectives of the sectoral policies should be revised in tnt:' ~ 1aht of the 
pr1nciple of sustainable development, though without abandon}nq t.e crinciple 
of the free movement of goods. The Union should be obliged to 1ncl· . nor1zontal 
consideration of the environmental aspects in, at least, th~? C.i\i' transport 
policy, training and research policy, industrial policy and ,-,.~' ~ cv on the 
Structural Funds and the various networks. The Community's au~~,r;ty in the 
environmental field should be increased, and the decision-mak1~r· ~- ~~ss 1n this 
3.rea should be simplified. Finland proposes that qualified .-. '; · i.ty votinq 
should be used wherever possible for such matters, without ··:t.;udice to a 
reinforcement of the possibility of Member States adopting more ~d··anced rules 
~han the Community legislation in the environmental field. 
''.'he text goes on to consider transparency. After recall ina t- '.A declaration 
~pproved by Finland on the subject, the document reiterates Fi;. and's support 
tor greater public access and transparency in the Union's act1v~~~es. It points 
:.Jut that in Finland 'open government' means that public acce!:-;s to official 
documents is a political and legal obligation, and states that F1nland will 
continue to apply that principle in accordance with its rights and obligations 
as an EU member. Concerning the publication of documents, the Finnish Government 
believes that the Treaty should include an article which would allow the 
Council, at a later date, to adopt legislation on the subject. Finland would 
also accept inclusion in the Treaty of a provision obliging the Council to take 
1ts legislative decisions in public whenever the adoption of new decisions is 
involved. On simplification of the Treaty texts, Finland considers that the 
Conference should take the necessary action to ensure that the texts are 
understood by the public. With respect to subsidiarity, the Finnish v1ew is that 
there is no need to alter Article 3b of the Treaty, where the concept is 
deflned: clarification and correct application of the principle could be 
achieved by including a protocol in the Treaty based on the Edinburgh 
declaration on subsidiarity. 
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On institutional matters, the text first discusses the European Parliament. 
Finland agrees that Parliament's role should be strengthened as far as the 
legislative procedures are concerned. However, given that Finland's starting-
point is the preservation of the Union's basic nature as an association of 
states, it proposes rejecting all proposals entailing greater powers for 
Parliament in the decision-making process concerning modification of the Treaty. 
On the Commission, Finland favours preserving its independent status vis-a-vis 
the Member States and its central role in the Community pillar. It also feels 
that the Commission must have sufficient resources to enable it undertake 
effective monitoring of the implementation of Community legislation and 
compliance with the other duties of Union membership; monitoring should, Finland 
believes, be based largely on effective use of the existing arsenal of 
sanctions. Finland does not, however, see any need to make substantial changes 
to the Commission's position regarding intergovernmental cooperation in the 
sphere of the CFSP; it nonetheless welcomes the possibility of extending the 
Commission's right of initiative in third-pillar matters. On the Commission's 
membership, the appointment of commissioners and the institution's 
responsibilities, Finland considers that there should be one commissioner per 
Member State and opposes the notion of different 'classes' of commissioner. It 
endorses the ex1sting arrangements for choos1ng the Commission and its 
President, sees no need to amend the Treaty provisions concerning votes of 
censure on Commiss1oners or the1r resignation. On the European Council, Finland 
again sees no reason to alter the relevant Treaty provisions. Concerning the 
Council, the Finnish view is that it should continue to be the central decision-
making body, on the basis of the equality of the Member States. On the subject 
of the decision-making process and the weighting arrangements, Finland would not 
change the existing arrangements for qualified majority voting, at least not 
until after enlargement. It believes, however, that qualified majority voting 
should be extended to other fields, including social and environmental policy 
matters. Finland does not rule out adopting more decisions by qualified majority 
voting under the second and third pillars. With regard to the Council Presidency 
and the Council's working methods, Finland does not think that any practical 
improvements designed to make the Presidency more efficient would require 
changes to the Treaty. Concerning the Court of Justice, the Finnish Government 
sees no reason to alter its status or its relations with Member State courts; 
it believes that the court's jurisdiction should be extended to the third pillar 
but not to the CFSP. Finland is satisfied with the existing system of appointing 
ECJ judges. On the Court of Auditors, Finland believes this body's powers should 
be developed and strengthened, to improve the efficacy of its monitoring of the 
use of Community funds. It should be compulsory to consult the Court of Auditors 
on certain legislative subjects, and the institution should have the right to 
lodge formal complaints where its action is obstructed; its jurisdiction should 
be extended to cover all three pillars. On the Economic and Social Committee, 
Finland is satisfied with this body's status and sees no reason for any change 
to the Treaties in this respect. Similarly, it believes that the consultative 
role of the Committee of the Regions should continue on the existing lines. 
The Finnish Government's text goes on to consider the question of the national 
parliaments, taking the view that they should have the genuine opportunity to 
influence the Union's actions, thus fortifying its democratic character. 
Decisions concerning relations between national governments and parliaments 
should continue to be adopted at national level; the Union institutions should 
work on the basis of openness and maximum effic1ency, using procedures wh1ch 
facilitate, rather than limiting, the national parliaments' ability to 1nfluence 
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the adoption of positions by the Member States. Finland would accept cooperation 
between the national parliaments and the Member States on the lines set out in 
Declaration No 13. It sees no need to make any changes 1n the ratification 
process for Treaty revision or to create a legislative hierarchy of Union acts. 
On commitology, Finland favours clarification of the use of this procedure and 
a reinforced role for the Commission 1n its application. It does not, however, 
favour part1cipation of the European Parliament or of any other institution in 
the work of the execut1ve committees. On the subject of the Un1on's resources, 
Finland does not cons1der th1s a matter for the IGC, and therefore sees no 
reason to include specific prov1s1ons on the Un1on"s f1nanc1al system 1n the 
Treaty. Finland considers that the budgetary procedure shoula be s1mplified, 
with the. introduction of a single stage both in Council and 1n Parliament - a 
change which could alter the balance of competences between the two 
institutions. The c1ass1fication of expend1ture into compulsory and non-
compulsory categories should be simpl1fied. F1nland bel1eves that the Court of 
Auditors should have greater powers to act against fraud and carry out effective 
supervision of resource use. Concerning the Commun1tv pol1cies, Finland 
considers, in general terms, tha~ tne Commun1ty snould f1rst concentrate on 
improving its performance 1n 1ts ex1sting areas of competence. Accordingly, 
Finland does not support tne inclus1on of energy, tour1sm and c1vil protection 
among the common policies, altnough concea1ng that the last-namea could in 
practice be subsumed under the th1rd pillar. It does, however, oelieve that the 
Treaties should be amended ~o 1mprove consumer protect1on. 
The text also examines the Union's external ac~1on. It Is argued tnat there must 
be a global approacn ~o ~he ques~1on of tne ~u·s external relat1ons, to ensure 
that they are consistency and that ~he CF~¥·s resources are usea in a uniform 
manner. Finland be11eves tnat I~ IS poss101e ~o aeve1op cooperat1on between the 
var1ous areas ot ~ne union·s external relations w1thin the present Institutional 
structure, by strengtnen1ng a g1ooa1 approacn transcena1ng tne division into 
p1l1ars. It tnerefore cons1ders ttlat tne existing procedures should be subJect 
to continuous development and the relationsnip between CORE:PER and the Pol1 tical 
Committee spe1t ou~. Finlana tioes not reel tnat any or tn1s shou1a call tor 
changes in tne Treaties. Concern1ng tne development of the CFSP, Finland 
stresses the neea to taKe equal account ot tne Interests of all the Member 
6tates, ana cons1ders that the Cl":,P must cont1nue to be based on 
1ntergovernmental cooperation, mutual trust between Member States and a sense 
of sense o:c JOlnt responsioili ty. On the aec1s1on-maJung process, Finland 
supports greater use ot qual1r1ed maJor1tY vot1ng on matters related to CFSP 
1mp1ementat1on, and cons1aerat1on or tne posslb11Ity or Its extension to other 
areas. On the external represem:at1on or the un1on, tne f'innisn pos1 t1on 1s that 
~he 'visib1l1ty of the CF~P 1s primar1ly a matter for the Member State holding 
~he pres1dency, and opposes tne notion ot a permanent figure represent1ng the 
~FSP, argu1ng tnat th1s could create more, rather than less, confusion over the 
Jnion's external role. r'Inland supports the setting-up of a JOint planning and 
analysis capacity In the area of the CrSP, in principle under the aegis of the 
Souncil Secretar1at, and argues that the role of Parliament in CFSP matters 
should be clarified on the oasis of the existing Union Treaty. It also calls for 
a more flexible and rapid procedure for the financing of the CFSP, to be 
3ssociated with its Implementation. 
Finally, the Finnish Government's report examines security and defence policy, 
taking the view that military crisis management is part of the CFSP, in whose 
decision-mak1ng process and implementation all the Member States should be 
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enabled to participate on an equal basis; individual Member States should, 
however, have the right to make independent decisions concerning their own 
security, which should be respected. The aim should be to ensure the 
effectiveness of the Union's collective action while safeguarding the right of 
individual Member States to decide independently whether or not to take part in 
an operation. Finland believes that the Union's capacity for action will become 
more effective as the CFSP's scope of coverage increases: this will strengthen 
the security of both the Union and the Member States. On the subject of EU-WEU 
relations, Finland favours preserving the Union's political leadership, and 
feels that the WEU could, in its turn, be an instrument of the CFSP in the 
execution of decisions concerning military crisis management. This objective is 
seen as one of the central tasks of the IGC as far as the CFSP is concerned. 
The report concludes by listing a series of practical arrangements adopted 
internally with a view to preparing Finland's position for the IGC and ensuring 
that public opinion and the country's other bodies and institutions are kept 
informed on the subject and enabled to discuss it. 
Note of July 1995 on the fundamental interests of Sweden with a view to the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference 
In this first official statement of the Swedish Government's position on the 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference, the Government seeks to highlight Sweden's 
fundamental interests in the IGC. In its introduction, the Swedish Government 
states that it proposes to work for a Europe characterized by democracy, 
solidarity and openness. The three most important objectives for Sweden at the 
IGC are: first, to provide cooperation within the European Union with greater 
popular support and greater democratic legitimacy; second, to pave the way for 
further enlargement of the European Union; and third, to promote fuller 
cooperation in areas Sweden regards as important, particularly to encourage a 
higher rate of growth and employment in Europe and improve the environment. 
On popular support and democratic legitimacy, the Swedish Government regards ~t 
as a challenge for the European Union and Sweden as a Member State to make 
European integration a concern for the individual citizen and step up democratic 
influence. On enlargement, it says that Sweden has a great interest in enlarging 
the European Union towards the East and that once the Conference is completed 
negotiations for enlargement should begin with a large number of countries at 
the same time and should be completed as the respective country is fully 
prepared for accession. It is particularly important to Sweden that the Baltic 
states should be treated in the same way as the other Central and Eastern 
European countries. On the institutional aspect, the Swedish Government 
considers that the European Union's working methods will need adjusting to 
ensure that its future capacity for action and decision-making is preserved. 
Sweden considers that enlargement should be backed up by strengthening 
cooperation and that such cooperation should be coordinated in a way that will 
give the European Union the necessary capacity to take decisions and formulate 
policy both internally and in the international sphere, on matters relating to 
the foreign, security or commercial policies. To make the European Un~on more 
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open, simple and efficient, Sweden wants to see a greater openness not only 
towards the citizen but also in relations with the media. In this regard, it 
announces that at the IGC the Swedish Government will put forward proposals 
designed to apply at European level the principles of transparency and public 
access to official documents in the same way as it has been doing at national 
level. At the same time, Sweden considers that the European Union should 
simplify its working methods and should be easier to understand, more efficient 
in its decision-making procedures and more effective when implementing 
decisions. 
The Swedish Government also comments on the principle of subsidiarity, pointing 
out that Sweden does not want the European Union to develop in a federalist 
direction. It calls for balanced application of the principle while recognizing 
that some other questions, such as transfrontier crime or environmental 
pollution, are good examples of subjects which must be solved by cooperation at 
European level. In the Swedish Government's opinion, there is no need to change 
the current terms in which the principle of subsidiarity is incorporated in the 
Treaties. On the common foreign and security policy, the Swedish Government 
wants to see greater efficiency and thinks it will need strengthening with a 
view to further enlargement. In Sweden's view, the CFSP should continue to 
maintain its intergovernmental character, although decision-makinq on certain 
issues which are not of vital interest to national security could be reviewed. 
As regards the possible tasks which could be entrusted to the European Union in 
the field of defence, Sweden supports the view that this area conld include 
peace-keeping operations, humanitarian aid and conflict management, but not 
territorial defence. The Swedish Government also comments on ~_<;onomic and 
monetary union, and here it states that Sweden does not seek a review of this 
subject at the Intergovernmental Conference. At the same time, it points out 
that it would be for the Swedish Parliament ultimately to pronounce on Swedish 
participation in the third stage of economic and monetary union starting in 
1999. 
On employment, the Swedish Government points out that the campaign to reduce the 
present severe unemployment and promote a high and sustainable level of 
employment is a major objective for Sweden in the context of European 
cooperation. According to the Swedish Government, this objective should be 
promoted by the Conference itself and it calls for action to ensure that 
employment and social policy are given their own chapters in the Treaties and 
that consideration is given to an 'employment union'. On cooperation in the 
field of justice and home affairs, the Swedish Government points out that its 
purpose is freedom of movement for persons, an objective closely related to the 
first pillar and its institutions, the legislative acts of the European 
Community and practice in the private individual sphere. In the Swedish 
Government's opinion, a review of the Treaties should therefore take account of 
these circumstances. It also calls for stronger and more efficient cooperation 
on justice and police affairs. However, the essentially intergovernmental nature 
of such cooperation should be preserved, while endeavouring to involve the 
Community institutions in the European Union in such intergovernmental 
cooperation to a greater extent. 
The Swedish Government also deals with I Europe a la carte I ' taking the line that 
the various formulas of differentiated integration should not be discarded 
automatically, since they allow a degree of flexibility which could be necessary 
to strengthen cooperation. In any event, the Swedish Government is particularly 
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interested in European integration continuing and being based as far as possible 
on general cooperation maintaining a single institutional system. 'Europe a la 
carte' does not interest Sweden as it could damage the opportunities for 
bringing about the advantages of the single market. Finally, on the position of 
the smaller countries, the Swedish Government's note states that the position 
of such countries should be safeguarded in the case of European cooperation, 
particularly with regard to the Council as a place for the expression of 
cooperation between sovereign and equal countries. Sweden accordingly takes the 
view that any proposals which, on the pretext of efficiency, seek to change the 
balance between larger and small countries should be rejected. 
Finally, the Swedish Government says that the Intergovernmental Conference is 
only another more step in the continuing process towards enlargement and 
consolidation of the European Union, and however important it may be, it should 
not get in the way of equally important projects such as economic and monetary 
union, reform of the common agricultural policy and the structural policy, the 
forthcoming financial perspectives for 1999-2004 and full negotiations on 
enlargement. 
Communication of the Swedish Government of 30 November 1995 on the 1996 IGC 
This is a written communication from the Swedish Government to the Riksdag (the 
national parliament) summarizing the work of preparation for the 1996 IGC and 
presenting a number of statements of principle on some of the Conference's 
probable subjects. 
The document begins by explaining the state of affairs concerning the IGC and 
the preparatory work for it carried out by the relevant parliamentary committee 
of the Swedish Government and by the Reflection Group, and goes on to summarize 
Sweden's general objectives. These include: employment creation; environmental 
progress; improvements in the field of competition and the free mark~t; 
development of the CFSP; promotion of sexual equality; action against 
international crime; and strengthening of the position of consumers and employed 
persons within the common market. Sweden wants to see more specific objectives 
for employment policy and a firmer institutional foundat~on for that policy, 
with the Union becoming a 'Union for employment'. On the environment, ·it 
supports extending majority voting and the integration of the environmental 
dimension in all other Community policies. Sweden also favours more effective 
legal and police cooperation at Union level. The Swedish Government considers 
it vital that the IGC should lay the bases and conditions for the forthcoming 
enlargement of the Union. Concerning the nature of the Union, Sweden starts out 
from the position that it should continue to develop as an association of 
independent states to which its members delegate certain powers of decision with 
a view to more easily attaining certain common objectives. Sweden recognizes 
that the position of the smaller Member States is relatively more favourable 
under the first pillar, and, on subsidiarity, considers that there is no need 
to introduce new extra provisions into the Treaty. It lays great stress on 
access to information and transparency as a means of strengthening the influence 
of the citizens, as well as the uniform interpretation and application of the 
acquis communautaire as regards all aspects of econom~c integration. Sweden does 
not rule out possible new formulas of differentiated integration, but it 
considers that integration must in all circumstances continue to be based, as 
far as possible, on cooperation with solidarity and a strong common 
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institutional framework. It does not favour an 'a la carte Europe', on the 
grounds that this would make the single market meaningless. 
The Swedish document continues with a detailed consideration of the subjects of 
democracy, access to information and transparency, seen as of major importance 
for Sweden in the context of the IGC. Sweden believes that the EU should 
practise greater transparency, and that its institutions should operate on the 
principle of openness of administrative action as it exists in Sweden. The 
Council's legislative meetings should be more effectively publicized, and their 
minutes should be available to the public. The Treaty should include a statement 
of basic principle concerning openness of administrative action of the EU 
institutions. The Commission would be responsible for ensuring respect for those 
principles, and the Court of Justice would have the role of interpreting the 
provisions on openness of administrative action and confidentiality within the 
Community system; the Member States would determine what rules concerning 
openness of administrative action would apply at internal national level. 
Sweden would support action to make the revised Treaty on European Union simpler 
and more comprehensible, and would also favour revising the decision-making 
procedures in Council and Parliament, reducing their number and simplifying and 
rationalizing them. On human rights, it believes the Community should ratify the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and that the 
revised Treaty should provide greater support for the right of association of 
Union citizens, while not imp1nging on the Member States' competences in the 
matter. 
The Swedish Government devotes a special sect1on to eguality between the sexes, 
making it clear that at the IGC Sweden will advocate reinforcing the provisions 
of the Treaty of Rome on equality between men and women, so as to make this one 
of the Union's maJor objectives, with the equality dimension being taken into 
account in all the Community's activities. 
On the enlargement of the Union, Sweden cons1ders that the accession 
negotiations due to begin once the IGC is over should open on the same date for 
all the applicant countries and not later than six months after the close of the 
IGC. Sweden feels it is particularly important that the Baltic states should be 
treated in the . same way as the other would-be members. The prospect of 
enlargement should be taken into account throughout the Conference and in the 
discussion of all the subjects debated at it. 
On employment, the Swedish Government stresses that the current high level of 
joblessness is the biggest internal problem in the Union and the Member States. 
It believes the Treaty should include a new section on employment policy giving 
greater we1ght to the subject in a long-term perspective. This section should 
establish objectives and common procedures and bind all the participants to 
respect a number of principles on employment policy. The Treaty should also 
contain more effective mechanisms for ensuring coordination between finance and 
employment ministries, and should set up a 'special employment committee' 
consisting of Member State representatives of both ministries at ministerial 
level. There should be closer coordination of economic policies with a view to 
achieving more decisive and steady progress on growth and employment. Sweden 
also supports introducing specific provisions into the Treaty to strengthen the 
procedures for monitoring job creation measures introduced by the Member States 
and the Community. On EMU, Sweden does not think the IGC is the place for 
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re-examining this subject. On the internal market, it would support any 
proposals at the IGC aimed at improving the application of its rules. 
On consumer affairs, the Swedish Government considers that there is a need to 
strengthen the legal basis of a common consumer policy. Consumer protection 
should be one of the Union's most important objectives, and consumers' interests 
should be given greater weight in the other Community policies. The Treaty 
should clearly set out the right of consumers to legal protection of their 
interests and to have genuine influence on matters affecting them. One of the 
express objectives of EU consumer policy should be to develop environment-
friendly forms of production and consumption which are favourable to long-term 
sustainable development. Sweden also suggests that the IGC should examine the 
question of animal protection in its ethical dimension. 
On the environment, Sweden proposes new measures to reinforce the common 
environmental policy and make it compulsory to integrate the environmental 
dimension in all decisions relating to other policies. One of Sweden'S major 
objectives in this field is to ensure that it is not forced to lower its own 
environmental protection standards, while making every effort to bring the 
Union's environmental norms up to the highest level possible. Sweden favour[ 
establishing a series of minimum Union-wide standards while allowing Member 
States the option of establishing higher internal standards. The Swed~sh 
Government also suggests exam~n~ng the possibility of strengthening the 
environmental dimension of the Euratom Treaty. It believes, furthermore, that 
the principles of sustainable development set out in the Rio de Janeiro 
declaration of June 1992 should be more clearly reflected in the Union Treaty. 
In addition, with a view to ensuring greater attention to the environmental 
dimension in the other policies, Sweden will propose to the Conference that 
Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome should incorporate an environmental objective 
for the CAP. The Swedish Government considers that a number of other important 
aspects could be discussed at the IGC, i.e.: the need to state more clearly that 
the Community's environmental rules should be based on a high level of 
protection; the need to have the principle of substitution, as applied in 
Sweden, accepted as a Community norm; the need to strengthen the environmental 
obligations of Article 100a of the Treaty of Rome; the need to insist on the 
right of the citizens to a decent environment and to improve access to 
information on the subject; the need for greater respect for the Union's 
environmental rules; and the need to introduce majority voting in the areas 
where unanimity is currently required. 
On workers' rights, the Swedish Government supports incorporating the social 
protocol into the Union Treaty, and believes that the Treaty should be amended 
to place collective bargaining and legislation on a uniform basis in those 
Member States where this is possible. Sweden does not favour Community 
regulation on industrial action, but endorses the adoption by Member States at 
national level of provisions authorizing international solidarity actions. On 
matters concerning young people, Sweden proposes reinforcing the existing forms 
of cooperation, and considers that actions under the various Union policies, 
such as anti-employment policy, should take account of young people's needs. On 
the rights of persons with disabilities, Swede;l wishes to see them taken into 
account in all Community decisions likely to affect them, but without the Union 
being given legislative powers in this area. 
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On the CFSP, the Swedish Government's document begins by considering the 
decision-making procedure. Sweden supports retaining the unanimity rule for 
vital matters affecting its own foreign and security policy. On fundamental 
subjects of this nature, such as non-participation in military alliances and the 
basic Swedish position on neutrality and other matters of general importance in 
the area of foreign and security policy, Sweden wishes to be fully in control 
of its own decisions; it is, however, willing to examine the possibility of 
modifying the unanimity principle for other, less important subjects. On the 
preparation, implementation and moni taring of decisions, Sweden favours boosting 
planning and analysis capacities by developing a 'reinforced joint element' for 
the preparation and monitoring of decisions. This would include a conflict 
prevention element, and could be under the umbrella of the Council Secretariat, 
leaving a certain scope for the Commission to play a role. On the external 
representation of the Union, Sweden does not oppose the idea of the Union being 
represented to the outside world by a 'personality', but it feels that this 
function should be limited in character and should not create confusion as 
regards the division of labour vis-a-vis the other representatives of the 
Union's external policy. The 'personality' concerned should, at all events, act 
only in support of the Council or the Presidency and under their mandate. 
Finally, Sweden calls for enhanced moni taring of the CFSP with a view to 
strengthening it. 
On defence and peace-keeping actions, Sweden stresses the importance of conflict 
prevention and crisis management, seeing this as the main aspect of defence 
policy to be raised at the IGC. The Swedish Government believes that an active 
commitment to peace-keeping actions, disaster aid, evacuat1on operations and 
crisis management in general should constitute a natural, high-priority task for 
the EU Member States in the context of preserving peace in Europe. On the WEU, 
Sweden recalls that it has no intention of joining this organization, owing to 
the mutual security guarantee included in its Treaty. Sweden also stresses that 
it will not join a common defence, will maintain its traditional neutrality and 
will stay out of all military alliances. Rather than join the WEU, Sweden has 
opted for observer status. At all events, Sweden states that it is willing to 
take part in peace-keeping operations implemented by the WEU, but on behalf of 
the EU. Any such participation would be conditional on a national decision, on 
a case-by-case basis. Finally, Sweden wishes to see a clear separation between 
the mutual security guarantees of the WEU member states and its peace-keeping 
cooperation aspect, since the latter includes operations in which non-member 
countries such as Sweden could take part. 
On cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs, Sweden says that it 
wishes to join the Schengen agreement, provided there is more effective action 
against drugs. Sweden's long-term aspiration is that there should be free 
movement of persons between all the EU Member States, not just within the 
Schengen group. It also proposes rationalizing and developing police and legal 
cooperation. The Swedish view is that the third pillar should continue to be 
based mainly on intergovernmental cooperation, although the role of the 
institutions could be reinforced if necessary. On asylum and immigration, Sweden 
would accept the transfer of such matters to the Community pillar where 
suitable. On third-pillar decision-making, Sweden favours rationalizing the 
existing forms of cooperation by reducing the number of levels of appreciation 
and decision: either the steering groups or the coordination committee should 
be abolished. 
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In its last section, the Swedish Government's report considers the institutional 
aspects and makes a number of proposals. On the Council, Sweden proposes 
introducing greater clarity and order into its meetings and decision-making 
procedures, as well as making the necessary changes to allow the national 
parliaments to take part the decision-making procedures. These procedures should 
be simplified and reduced in number, with greater use of qualified majority 
voting in certain fields in the interests of more efficient decision-making. On 
the vote-weighting arrangements, Sweden does not wish to see its own influence 
reduced or the balance between larger and smaller Member States reduced. In this 
connection, and in relation to the possible introduction of population-based 
criteria, Sweden insists that cooperation between Member States in the 
Commission, the Council and the Court of Justice must, as far as possible, be 
based on the principle of equal representation. It favours keeping the existing 
rotating presidency, while not ruling out consideration of other models, such 
as a collective or multi-state presidency, in the context of the objectives of 
a rational overall division of labour and improved continuity. Sweden feels it 
is necessary to strengthen budgetary discipline within the Union's existing 
legislative and budgetary procedures. 
On the Commission, Sweden believes that it should continue to play a key role 
in the Union's institutional framework, and that it should be made more 
efficient. All the Member States should continue to have a commissioner, and if 
the number is to be reduced it should be on the basis of 'one and only one' 
commissioner per Member State. The Commission could be given more influence in 
third-pillar matters, acquiring the right of initiative in areas where it does 
not exist at present, including legal cooperation in the field of criminal law 
and police and customs cooperation. The Commission should be responsible for 
ensuring respect for third-pillar agreements, with a view to achieving a more 
effective and uniform national application of the relevant conventions and other 
agreements. On the Court of Justice, Sweden favours retaining the system of one 
judge per Member State. It wishes to see changes enabling the Court to issue its 
decisions and opinions much more rapidly than at present, in cases where it is 
necessary to settle disputes or interpret agreements concluded by Member States 
under the third pillar. On the European Parliament, Sweden wishes to see 
Parliament continue to play a major role 1n the Un1on's decision-making process, 
and advocates the large-scale simplification of the multiple and complex 
decision-making procedures of the Council and Parliament. After noting that 
Parliament itself agrees that the Commission should retain its sole right of 
initiative, the Swedish Government argues that Parliament's role should be 
strengthened as regards the control of the Union's finances, especially in 
matters of monitoring and evaluation, but not as regards decisions on the level 
or orientation of expenditure. Sweden considers that the national parliaments 
should play a greater role in the decision-making process, and concludes that 
the IGC should offer them improved opportunities of influencing the Union's 
actions: to this end, the national parliaments should have more time to examine 
the subjects and positions brought before them. Without going into detail, 
Sweden also proposes that the IGC should examine means of strengthening the role 
of the European Parliament in the decision-making procedures. 
On the Court of Auditors, Sweden supports revising and clarifying the existing 
provisions in the Treaty of Rome governing its work, with a view to giving it 
the necessary powers for fulfilment of its control responsibilities under the 
Treaty. The existing rules should be supplemented so as to enable the Court to 
receive information from all the bodies which administer Community funds. Sweden 
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appears to support the request of the Court of Auditors that it should have the 
power to bring actions before the Court of Justice in cases where information 
which should have been communicated to it under the Treaty has not been 
received. Sweden also considers that each Member State should have the right to 
appoint one person to the Court of Auditors, and raises the possibility of fixed 
terms of office for its members. 
The United Kingdom Government's Memorandum of 2 Marcq 1995 on the treatment of 
European defence issues at the 19~6 Intergovernmental Conference 
In this, its first official document on the IGC, the United Kingdom states its 
position on the British perspective on Europe, the present European defence 
policy situation and the institutional and defence policy adjustments needed in 
the context of the CFSP or second pillar. In the document the United Kingdom 
declares that its membership of the European Union is irrevocable and that it 
intends to play a leading role in its future development. It establishes that 
the United Kingdom's position with regard to European defence at the IGC will 
be based on five key factors: 
* a view of the European Union as a peaceful and beneficial power in the world, 
which encourages and allows flexibility, recognizing the diversity of the 
Member States rather than tryinq to impose conformity aqainst their will, and 
whose development is realistic, sustained and supported by the peoples of the 
Member States; 
* the maintaining of NATO and of the United Nations' commitment in Europe as the 
foundations of European security and defence policy, as well as support for 
NATO's ability to carry out all the tasks needed to tackle future crlses which 
may arise in this area; 
* recognition of the need for Europeans to contribute more effectively to 
shouldering their share of the burden of promoting security and stability in 
Europe, on its periphery and beyond; this burden must be shared equitably 
amongst all European nations; 
* the desire to see all the agreements concluded in this area respect the 
different rights and responsibilities of the European nations and, in 
particular, preserve each one's capacity to act in defence of its own national 
interests without restriction; 
* finally, the firm conviction that the basis for 
security and defence must be intergovernmental 
cooperation between states. 
action in 
and must 
the field of 
be based on 
On the basis of these key elements, the United Kingdom's proposals basically 
refer to the following areas: 
Firstly, the adoption of a realistic assessment of the tasks which Europeans can 
and must tackle. However, these tasks must not include territorial defence, 
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which is a NATO prerogative. In view of this, no proposal should prejudice 
NATO's capacity to carry out small-scale operations for which it must continue 
to be equipped. 
Secondly, the development of practical agreements needed to organize, mount and 
control European military operations. The British proposals regarding this are 
as follows: 
- The drawing-up of detailed practical agreements to develop the capacity of the 
WEU to carry out operations of this kind which, in any event, should be 
compatible with and not contradictory to NATO. 
The implementation of the agreements reached at last year 1 s NATO summit, which 
undertook to make available its expertise and resources for Europe-led 
operations. In practical terms, this means the launching of the Combined Joint 
Task Force (CJTF). 
- Reinforcement of the WEU 1 s political and military capacity and expertise, for 
which purpose the United Kingdom declares its willingness to make a 
significant contribution to the development of the WEU 1 S capacity, basically 
by using officers who would help to set up a Situation Centre for the WEU and 
collaborate in improving intelligence handling capabilities. 
Thirdly, the document comes out in favour of establishing a more clear and 
efficient decision-making mech~nism. In this context, the basic ideas expressed 
in the memorandum are as follows: 
- No new institutions should be set up, nor should the WEU be absorbed by the 
European Union, since membership of the two organizations is separate. 
- The WEU should be developed, on the basis of its own Treaty, as a vehicle for 
European cooperation in defence matters, in close connection with NATO. 
- Decisions should be taken exclusively at intergovernmental level by means of 
consensus between sovereign governments, with neither the European Parliament 
nor the European Commission taking part. 
- The creation of a new WEU body at Head of State and Government level (the 1 WEU 
summit 1 ) consisting of full Members of the WEU, Associate Members and 
Observers. It would be responsible for agreeing on any military action and on 
European defence policy and would, if necessary, meet with the European 
Council in order to ensure adequate coordination between the European Union 
and the WEU. The rights and responsibilities of the nations represented on 
that body would be those of the present WEU Council. Only Full Members of the 
WEU would be able to force the WEU to act, although the other members of the 
organization could be allowed to choose to take part in certain operat1ons 
without thereby changing their status in the organization. 
Finally, the Memorandum presents the British view that new institutions are not 
needed and that the debate should focus on military realities and not 
institutional abstractions; Britain does not want the WEU to merge with the 
European Union, since it considers that membership of each, like the status of 
the individual countries which are members of them, is separate. Both the WEU 
and NATO should therefore continue to act on an intergovernmental basis and the 
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WEU, not the European Union, should be the basis for cooperation on European 
defence. In fact, the tasks which should depend on European cooperation in 
defence matters, according to the British document 1 are 1 basically, crisis 
management, the application of sanctions and embargoes and humanitarian 
missions, generally in support of the United Nations or the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
UK White Paper of 12 March 1996 on the IGC: 'An association of nations' 
T-his (very didactic) memorandum contains the first statements on the IGC by the 
UK Government, and was submitted to the national Parliament on 12 March 1996. 
In its introduction, the document stresses the importance of the UK's role as 
a leading fierce in the EU for its own national interests. The UK sees the Union 
as more than a free trade area: it is the basis for democratic consolidation and 
prosperity throughout Europe and it is a means to the overcoming of the historic 
divisions which disfigured the continent during the cold war, contributing to 
the consolidation of peace. Enlargement is seen as a historic responsibility for 
Europe and as in the UK's long-term interest. After referring to the present 
climate of uncertainty and doubt afflicting the Union, the UK Government rejects 
any moves towards a political union leading to the inexorable transfer of powers 
to supranational institutions, the erosion of the national parliaments and the 
gradual creation of a 'United States of Europe'. The UK expressly rejects this 
model of the f~ture of Europe, and expresses its determination to safeguard the 
powers and responsibilities of the nation-states that are the Treaty's 
signatories. From the British viewpoint, the national parliaments should remain 
the core element of democratic legitimacy. The text goes on to set out the 
British approach to the IGC, expressing the UK's willingness to contribute to 
the success of a Conference, on the assumption that it will consolidate an EU 
conceived as a union of nations cooperating on the basis of agreements freely 
entered into and adopted by the national parliaments of the Member States. The 
position of the UK Government will at all times be based on the detailed 
analysis of Britain's interests. On the matter of flexibility, the Government 
considers the question of differentiated integration, taking the v1ew that the 
EU needs to accept a certain degree of flexibility or 'variable geometry', while 
not falling into the trap of a two-speed Europe with a hard core centred on 
certain Member States or certain policies. The UK realizes that 1n certain areas 
certain Member States will integrate deeper or faster than others, but it also 
feels that such policies will only become Union policies when they are agreed 
by all the Member States; no Member State should be excluded from an area in 
which it wishes to participate and for which it is qualified - in other words, 
Union policies must be open to all the Member States. 
The text outlines the challenges with which the EU will be faced in the next few 
years, and considers the scope of the Conference, conceived as an important 
first step towards responding some of these challenges and preparing the Union 
for the forthcoming enlargement. The British Government considers that, rather 
than substantially amending the Treaty, the best course is to develop improved 
policies for achieving its existing objectives: an example here is the CAP, 
which the UK insists should be liberalized. The UK Government insists that any 
revisions to the Treaty must be adopted by all, and therefore proposes a 
pragmatic and realistic approach during the negotiations. After recalling the 
procedural mechanism for the IGC, as established in the Treaty and the 
successive European Council decisions, the British document sets out a detailed 
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list of the main subjects which the UK Government hopes will form the IGC 
agenda: the legislative process; qualified majority voting; the presidency; the 
new Community policies; the number of commissioners; the role of the national 
parliaments; the powers and procedures of the European Parliament; the Court of 
Justice; a general examination of the CFSP; defence; the third pillar; European 
citizenship, human rights and non-discrimination; employment and social 
protection; openness and transparency; fraud and financial management; budgetary 
matters; the common fisheries policy; and animal welfare. 
On the legislative process, the UK white paper begins by considering the 
principle of subsidiarity. The UK Government says it will put forward proposals 
for the entrenchment of this principle in the Treaty. It will also press for the 
Commission to undertake more systematic consultation of business circles, the 
national parliaments and other interested parties before introducing legislative 
proposals. Concerning the 'sunset clauses', the UK proposes that Commission 
proposals should be automatically withdrawn if they are not adopted within a 
given time-limit. It also supports the proposal concerning greater use of this 
type of clause in Community legislation with a view to providing for its 
automatic expiration or review after a certain time. On deregulation, the UK 
says it will insist on this in the context of Community legislation, some of 
which should be revised while certain specific directives should be amended or 
repealed. Concerning the opinions of the Court of Just1ce on the legal basis of 
legislation, the UK Government considers that the Council should consult the 
Court beforehand in cases where one or more Member States are in disagreement 
with the legal basis recommended by the Commission for the adoption of a 
particular measure. There is no specific proposal on commitology. Concerning the 
limitation of Community action, the UK Government raises the possibility of 
limiting the scope of Community action in certain areas, with a view, in 
particular, to prevent the application of health and safety legislation to 
social policy or of fiscal measures to the internal market or the environment. 
On the implementation of legislation, the UK will put forward proposals aimed 
at improving the monitoring and implementation of Community legislat1on, 
including: annual reports by the Commission on its control activities; clearer 
procedural rules for complaints; a more systematic approach to implementation 
on the Commission's part; and improved use of Article 171 of the Treaty. On the 
hierarchy of acts, the UK Government does not favour introducing a distinction 
between different categories of Community legislation which would allow certain 
types of act to be adopted by the Commission with minimal Council supervision. 
On qualified majority voting, the UK Government in principle supports retaining 
the principle of protecting national interests deriving from the 'Luxembourg 
compromise'. However, on the subject of the criteria for obtaining a majority, 
it favours increasing the influence of the Member States with larger 
populations, for various reasons of democratic legitimacy. It proposes a system 
of weighting of votes under which the four largest Member States would continue 
to have the same number of votes while the smaller Member States would have a 
reasonable degree of influence in the system as a whole. The UK therefore 
supports changing the existing total number of votes, rather than introducing 
a second voting criterion. On the scope of majority voting, the UK opposes any 
extension of qualified majority voting, on the grounds that unanimity is not 
incompatible with effective decision-making and is the best means of preserving 
vital national interests. 
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The text also considers the subject of the Council Presidency, expressing a 
preference for the 'presidential teams' option under which three or four Member 
States would jointly occupy the presidency for a year or even longer. This 
system is felt to be particularly suited to the second (CFSP) pillar, where the 
presence of one of the larger Member States with global foreign policy interests 
would confer greater credibility on the EU's external representation. On the 
mater of new Community powers, the UK does not favour including chapters on 
energy, civil protection and tourism in the new Treaty. 
On the number of commissioners, the UK Government considers that further 
enlargement will make it impossible to retain the present system, and that a 
balanced solution should be agreed on at the IGC. The white paper here merely 
lists the various suggestions, such as: that the larger Member States would have 
the automatic right to a commissioner while the smaller Member States would not 
have this privilege; that there should be two classes of commissioner, voting 
and non-voting; or that not all the commissioners would have a specific 
portfolio. On the role of the national parliaments, the UK, seeing them as still 
constituting the main element of democratic legitimacy in the Union, proposes 
a higher profile for them. It suggests, variously, that: the main points of 
Declaration No 13 (attached to the Treaty of Maastricht) on the role of the 
national parliaments should be made legally binding by being incorporated into 
the Treaty; or there should be a minimum period for the national parliaments to 
examine Community texts, especially legislative proposals, except for the most 
urgent cases; or the national parliaments should be given a more important role 
in third-pillar matters. 
On the European Parliament, the UK Government considers that this institution 
should obtain greater public support and develop its role through the 
responsible exercise of its existing powers, in particular its powers of control 
over Community spending. Parliament can contribute to the campaign against fraud 
and maladministration, and improve its monitoring of the details of expenditure 
submitted by the Commission. The UK does not favour new powers for the European 
Parliament: this is because it considers that in a Union of nation states the 
European Parliament cannot claim to replace the fundamental role of the national 
parliaments, and because, in the view of the UK Government, it has not shone in 
responsibly exercising its new post-Maastricht powers (examples here being the 
appointment of the European Ombudsman, the temporary committees of inquiry, and 
full participation in the legislative process via the codecision procedure, in 
all of which Parliament has been sluggish in using its powers effectively while 
showing a certain tendency to exercise them irresponsibly, endeavouring to force 
the Council to accept institutional changes not directly related to the 
legislation in question). 
. 
On the Court of Justice, the UK Government considers that its workings need 
improvement. The UK puts forward the following options, in the context of 
limiting the retrospective effect of the Court's decisions: a Member State 
should only be considered responsible for damage caused by a serious and 
manifest failure to fulfil its obligations; there should be national time limits 
for all cases based on Community legislation, except in cases where a Member 
State's failure to comply with a directive represents a serious and manifest 
breach of its obligations; there should be an internal appeal procedure; there 
should be improved procedures for the rapid modification of Community 
legislation which had been interpreted in a manner diverging from the Council's 
intentions; a procedure should be instituted for urgent and highly sensitive 
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cases; a prov1s1on should be incorporated in the Treaty clarifying the 
application of subsidiarity in the interpretation of Community legislation. The 
UK Government says it will shortly submit a memorandum setting out its proposals 
on the matter in detail. 
The document goes on to examine the CFSP. The British view is that it is in the 
UK's national interest that the EU Member States should be able to speak and act 
together as far as possible on the international stage in situations where they 
have common interests. The UK therefore favours a CFSP leading to joint action 
on the basis of joint analysis and joint policy. However, it is expressly stated 
that the CFSP must in no circumstances become an exclusive policy replacing 
national policy; accordingly, whenever British interests are involved, the UK 
Government will insist on maintaining its capacity of action. The UK will 
therefore not accept any type of compromise obliging it to adopt collective 
decisions it does not agree with. At the IGC, the UK Government will press for 
a more active and effective, but still intergovernmental CFSP. With a view to 
developing coordination between Member States at the planning, analysis and 
implementation stages of joint policies in this field, the UK White Paper sets 
out some specific proposals (in Annexes Band C). These include holding more 
regular meetings of the Political Committee (responsible for preparing 
interministerial decisions) and strengthening the CFSP secretariat. The UK would 
be willing to consider the idea of appointing a single person to represent the 
Union's external policy to the outside world in the context of the CFSP, 
considering that such a figure should be fully responsible to the Council and 
should represent the collective viewpoints of the Member States, rather than 
taking autonomous decisions. On the CFSP decision-making process, the UK 
Government stresses that the CFSP's main weakness has been at the stage of 
formulation and implementation of political initiatives, while there has been 
no major problem in the decision-making process. The UK does not accept the view 
that the unanimity rules concerning CFSP decisions are an obstacle to its 
development, and will oppose any reform of the CFSP 1nvolving the introduction 
of voting methods which do not take account of the basic concerns of the 
individual Member States. The British view is that if there is no collective 
will to act in the Union there is no point in trying to force action with 
artificial voting procedures. The UK also feels that the CFSP will only carry 
genuine international weight if it represents an actual joint position, rather 
than a mere majority view. 
The White Paper also considers defence matters. Here the text refers the reader 
to the UK memorandum of 2 March 1995 on European security questions and the IGC, 
whose Annex D is formed by the White Paper itself. The UK Government reaffirms 
that the IGC should reinforce the role of NATO as the cornerstone of the 
European security system, while also enhancing the potential contribution of all 
the European countries to global and regional security. The UK believes that 
defence stands at the very core of national sovereignty, and that the most 
suitable system is the existing one based on NATO under which final decisions 
are always adopted by consensus and national governments are responsible to 
their home parliaments. The UK considers that there are no suitable subjects for 
decision at EU level, and that the Member States must be free to act in the 
defence of their own national interests in this area. It does, however, believe 
that the countries of Europe should be able to act in smaller-scale peace-
keeping, humanitarian or crisis management operations wh1ch are not big enough 
to warrant UN intervention. The UK Government sees the WEU as the most suitable 
forum for this, since the intergovernmental treaty on which it is based states 
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that defence policy declsions must be adopted unanimously, thus ensuring that 
they remain what they should be, namely decisions of the sovereign member 
states. The EU as it stands is not able and does not have the resources to play 
such a role; the UK Government does not believe that the Commission, the 
European Parliament or the Court of Justice should play any role in the adoption 
of defence decisions. The British position is that the WEU should remain as a 
separate organization with its own Treaty, and that its operational capacities 
should be developed to enable it to act effectively in peace-keeping, 
humanitarian and other crisis management operations of limited scope. This is 
the main priority of the UK presidency of the WEU over the first half of 1996, 
ln line with the measures and procedures proposed in the above-mentioned 
memorandum of 2 March 1995. 
Concerning the third pillar, the UK Government believes that all matters 
relating to action against terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and 
illegal immigration should continue to be dealt with under this 
intergovernmental pillar, and that unanimous decision-making should continue to 
apply, with the Member States cooperating on an intergovernmental basis within 
a single institutional framework. The UK considers that the role of the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice in these matters 
should remain as it is, i.e. strictly limited. The White Paper also includes a 
number of suggestions aimed at improving the efficiency of third-pillar 
cooperation (see Annex E). The UK Government favours, for instance, simplifying 
the structure of the preparatory work for the Council, but opposes other reforms 
which might affect the nature of the third pillar, such as a greater role for 
the Communlty institutions. It also opposes transferring any third-pillar areas 
to the Community pillar. 
On European citizenship, human rights and non-discrimination, the UK Government 
does not believe the EU is an appropriate forum for the protection of 
fundamental human rights, and opposes introducing a general non-discrimination 
clause covering gender, sexual orientation, race, religion, age and disability. 
In general, the UK is concerned that the creation of new rights might lead to 
the need to establish new duties, something which it does not favour on the 
grounds that the EU is not a state as such. 
On employment and the social protocol, the UK Government says it will oppose any 
extension of the Community's powers in the field of employment. It will not 
accept incorporation of the Maastricht social chapter, on the grounds that this 
would undermine competitiveness and destroy jobs. The UK Government fears that 
if the social chapter became part of the Treaty the UK could find its views 
ignored in a large number of directives on working conditions, with enormous 
potential financial and employment costs. The UK will, accordingly, not give up 
its opt-out clause, and does not believe it can be forced to do so. 
On openness and transparency, the UK is willing to cooperate in the interests 
of progress in these fields; it points out, however, that total openness could 
lead to the real negotiations being conducted in the corridors - precisely the 
opposite effect to that intended. The UK Government favours simplifying the 
Treaty, and proposes the deletion of all its obsolete articles. It argues, 
nonetheless, that many of the proposals for simplification of the Treaty raise 
problems because they could, in some cases, change its substance or alter the 
institutional balance. On fraud and financial management, the White Paper 
recalls the work under way in this field and Britain's contribution to it, and 
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argues that the reform of certain key policies, especially the CAP, will be 
vital if the campaign against fraud and maladministration of funds is to 
succeed. On the budgetary provisions, the UK feels it would be premature to 
amend them at the IGC, as the Community is to review its financing as a whole 
before the end of the century. On the common fisheries policy, the UK Government 
accepts the need for its existence, but believes that the IGC should re-examine 
its implementation, and, in particular, overfishing in European waters and the 
equitable allocation of quotas. Finally, the White Paper contains references to 
animal welfare, concerning which it advocates inclusion of a principle in the 
Treaty, possibly on the basis of the declaration approved at Maastricht calling 
for Community legislation in all relevant sectors to pay particular attention 
to animal welfare. 
In conclusion, the UK Government announces its intention of making numerous 
proposals to the IGC and maintaining a constructive and realistic approach 
throughout on the basis of the UK's national interests. The White Paper includes 
a number of annexes: Annex A (containing the agenda for the 1996 IGC), Annex B 
(a series of measures for improving the efficiency of the CFSP), Annex C (on the 
workings of the CFSP and the role of the Council Secretariat), Annex D 
(containing, as referred to at the beginning of this chapter, the memorandum of 
2 March 1995 on European security and the IGC) and Annex E (a summary of the 
UK's proposals for improving the working methods of the third pillar). 
For all further information on this note, contact: 
J. Javier FERNANDEZ FERNANDEZ 
Secretary and Coordinator, Task Force 'IGC/96' 
Tel.: 4300-2758 (Lux)- 88174916 (Str) 
Fax : 4300-9027 (Lux) - 88174840 (Str) 
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